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Since the end of World War II economic development, or 
economic underdevelopment, has created a great amount of inter­
est among scholars, governments, world leaders and people in 
general.
Norman S. Buchanan and Howard S. Ellis have defined an 
underdeveloped area as one which "on the average affords its 
inhabitants an end product of consumption and material well­
being appreciably inferior to that provided by the economies 
of the developed countries. Poor is a relative term."^
Eugene Staley's definition is similar:
An underdeveloped country is a country characterized 
by mass poverty vdiich is chronic and not the result of 
some temporary misfortune, and by obsolete methods of pro­
duction and social organization, which means that the 
poverty is not entirely due to poor natural resources and 
hence could presumably be lessened by methods already 
proved in other countries.
^Approaches to Economic Development (New York; The 
Twentieth Century Fund, 1955), pp. 3-4.
%The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 196l), p. là.
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In still another definition, an underdeveloped country 
is defined as
A country which has good potential prospects for using 
more capital or more labor or more available natural re­
sources, or all of these to support its present population 
on a higher level of living, or, if its per capita income 
level is already fairly high, to support a larger popula­
tion on a not lower level of living.^
As these definitions indicate, there is no formal con­
sensus on what specifically constitutes an underdeveloped 
country. By way of contrast, neither is there a single accep­
table definition of a "developed" country. Gerald M. Meier and 
Robert E. Baldwin point out that "no single definition of 'eco­
nomic development* is satisfactory."^ It is a common practice, 
they say, "to use the terms economic development, economic 
growth, and secular change interchangeably." They continue by 
offering the following definition: "Economic development is a
process whereby an economy's real national income increases 
over a long period of time. And, if the rate of development 
is greater than the rate of population growth, then per capita 
real income will increase."^
Charles P. Kindleberger states it this way: "In eco­
nomic growth the unidimensional measure is national income per 
capita. Economic growth implies an increase in this vari-
^Jacob Viner, Internationa1 Trade and Economic Develop­
ment (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952), p. 125.
^Economic Development. Theory. History. Policy (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inci, 1957), p. 2.
Slbid.
gable." Another economist says that "it can best be defined 
by its major objective: the exploitation of all productive
resources by a country in order to expand real income.
There are various measures to determine whether a
Qcountry falls into the underdeveloped or developed category. 
These include figures on gross national product, net national 
product, agricultural productivity per person or per acre, 
infant mortality rates, energy consumption, percentage of the 
population which is illiterate, and still others. Many stu­
dents of economic development view it as a constantly rising 
standard of living; therefore, the main guide would be the 
increase of real per capita income for a particular country 
over a long period of time. The specific figure used to 
divide the developed countries from the developing ones will 
vary from study to study, but it appears that the current 
practice is to include all countries with an annual per capita 
income of less than $400 to $600 in the less developed
9grouping.
The latter figures may appear to be rather high. In
^Economic Development (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
Inc., 1958), p; 1.
^Paul Alpeirt, Economic Development. Objectives and 
Methods (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964), pi 1.
QOther synonyms for underdeveloped include "developing" 
and "less developed!" The terms will be used interchangeably 
in this study.
QFor examples see Staley, og. cit.. p. 17; and Alpert, 
OP. cit., pp. 4-9;
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1957, for example. United Nations estimates indicated that one 
and one-half billion persons, or about 53 percent of the world 
population, had per capita incomes of less than $100. About 
300 million persons, or about 14 percent of the world popula­
tion, had incomes above $700. Most of the countries in the 
less than $100 classification are found in Asia, from Korea 
and China around to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in Africa 
south of the Sahara. Most of the countries in Latin America 
and the Mediterranean, on the other hand, had per capita annual 
incomes from $100 to about $400.^^
The Desire for Economic Development
It is generally assumed, and it will be a basic assump­
tion of this study, that economic development is desired by the 
less developed areas. For centuries, the populations of Africa, 
Asia and much of Latin America accepted poverty, illiteracy, 
semistarvation and chronic disease as an inescapable part of 
life. But since the end of World War II, there has been a 
"revolution of rising expectations."
Modem communications, as well as international travel 
and study, have gradually made it obvious to the populations 
in the less developed areas, particularly to the elite of those 
countries, that a wide gap exists between the living standards 
in their areas and those of the Western countries, especially
^%xceptions to this figure include Venezuela, $540, 
Argentina, $460 and Israel, $470. See United Nations, Per 
Capita National Product of Fiftv-Five Countries. 1952-54 (New 
York; United Nations, 1557;, p. 7,
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those in Western Europe and North America* Not only are they 
aware of this wide difference, but they are convinced that 
there are means by which the growth rate of poor countries can 
be accelerated.^^
This question is sometimes raised by the Western social 
scientists; is economic growth with all of its resulting com­
plexities really desirable? To phrase it another way, is the 
price which some of the underdeveloped societies must pay for 
economic development worth the disadvantages--in their custom­
ary social milieu--which it brings? It must be assumed that 
man seeks happiness. But as Staley points out, happiness in 
the Orient has traditionally meant man's ability to cut doifn 
on his desires, while in the West it has meant man's ability 
to satisfy his desires by increasing possessions. The Western 
view, he believes, is becoming more dominant throughout the 
world.
W. Arthur Lewis points out that "it is very hard to
1*5correlate wealth and happiness." The advantages of economic 
growth, he notes, is that "it increases the range of human 
choice." Economic development may, with its tensions and com­
plexities, bring serious disadvantages to some people, but it
^^For a variety of such opinions see Paul E. Sigmund, 
Jr. (ed.). Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: 
Frederick Ai Praeger, 1964).
^^Staley, op. cit., p. 20,
^^The Theozzv of Economic Growth (Homewood, 111.:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1^55), pp. 42Ô-21.
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cannot be said that an increase in wealth will make a people 
less happy. There are other goals, however, besides happi­
ness. ”We do not," continues Lewis, "know what the purpose 
of life is, but if it were happiness, then evolution could 
just as well have stopped a long time ago, since there is no 
reason to believe that men are happier than pigs, or than 
fishes." The case for economic growth, then, is this: "It
gives man greater control over his environment, and thereby 
increases his freedom.
The Study of Economic Development 
Concern for, and studies about economic development 
have been largely in the hands of the economists since intense 
interest about the subject developed after World War II. The 
emphasis has traditionally been, therefore, on the "purely" 
economic factors influencing economic development, with some 
concern for the role of "non-economic" factors. "Pure" eco­
nomic factors ordinarily include such things as domestic 
savings and capital accumulation, inflation, agriculture 
productivity or the land and its use, the quantity and quality 
of the population, foreign trade, the taxing system, markets, 
and the money and banking system. Most economists tend to 
classify such things as the form of government, political in-
15stability, national administration, political interest groups, 
l̂ ibid.. pp. 421-22.
l^If these groups are discussed at all, it is usually 
not under this title.
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elites, customs, mores, attitudes, morals, and aspirations as 
non-economic factors. Yet, between the economic and the non­
economic are other factors such as education^^ and health, and 
some topics such as quantity of population and land reform 
which are sometimes handled as economic problems, sometimes as 
social problems, and sometimes as both.
Several of the texts on economic development contain 
only a very limited discussion of the non-economic factors.
In this case the authors simply refer to them as "social and 
cultural" influences, sometimes with a mild treatment of the 
"political." "Social" and "cultural" are not always precisely
defined and "political" is seldom treated with any degree of
17sophistication. There are, on the other hand, books which
place more stress on the non-economic factors, at least by
18general inference if not by specific treatment.
^^Skills which have been acquired through education 
are often treated as economic factors.
l^See, for example, Benjamin Higgins, Economic Develop­
ment. Principles. Problems. and Policies (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1959), Chapter 10; Gerald M. Meier, Leading Issues In 
Development Economics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964),
pp. 16, 24, 44-45, 59, 66, 112, 266, and 448-49; Gerald M.
Meier and Robert E. Baldwin, Economic Development. Theory. 
History. Policy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 355-
67; Theodore Morgan, et al., (eds.). Readings In Economic 
Development (Belmont, Califi: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1963),
pp. 78-113; and Hans W. Singer, Internat iona1 Development 
Growth and Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), Chapter 6.
IBThese include Buchanan and Ellis, o£. cit.; Alpert,
O P . cit.: Kindleberger, o£. cit.: Walter Krause, Economic 
Development. The Underdeve loped World and the Aj^rican Interest 
(San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Co., l&6l); Lewis, op.
cit.: Bernard Okun and Richard W. Richardson, Studies in Eco­
nomic Development (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
8
In still another category are books which treat the 
problem of "development" in a general way, rather than as 
primarily an economic problem. In the book Dynamics of 
Development. An Internationa1 Development Reader, edited by 
Gove Hambidge, Teodoro Moscoso states in the Forward that "It 
is the politician who must decide whether he wants to incur 
the wrath of the landowners and suffer the effects of capital 
flight. It is he who must decide how much consumption he will 
ask the people to forgo in order to increase investment.
In fact, he continues:
Looking over the panorama of development problems in 
the world today, we find that the most difficult issues 
are not technical (developmental, in the ordinary meaning 
of the word), but political. In some key countries the 
reform-monger, to use Albert Hirschmann's phrase, cannot 
perform his craft unless and until the political leader­
ship of his country has made the decisions and achieved 
the consensus through which his activities can become 
relevant and, hopefully, effective.^^
Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer, have said: 
"In analyzing the process of economic modernization, we are 
confronted with the dilemma that the social and psychological 
and political changes (discussed in other chapters) are in 
part preconditions for economic development and in part its 
consequences." The process of development, they continue, "is
1962); and Harold F. Williamson and John A. Buttrick, Economic 
Development. Principles and Patterns (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Ha11 Inc., 1964); and Stephen Enke, Economics for 
Development (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall Inc.,19637:
19(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. vi.
ZOlbid.
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a seamless web, and the strands that compose it can be analy-
21tically separated only with some loss of realism."
Staley does not emphasize the government as such as 
playing the predominant role in economic development; never­
theless, he does emphasize the importance of social change. 
Referring to an economist who some years ago described eco­
nomic development as "essentially the accumulation of capital," 
Staley says: "I do not believe anyone in touch with the con­
crete problems of underdeveloped countries and with the ex­
periences gained in the United States Point Four program and
in United Nations technical assistance would make that mistake
22today." He continues:
Capital accumulation is important, but the real core 
of the development process is what happens in men's minds, 
especially in their habits and organization for working 
together. Even if we want to center attention on capital, 
the key questions, as we shall note later, relate to capi­
tal formation, which is a social process.
Economic development is a whole complex of interdepen­
dent changes manifested simultaneously in the-physical 
environment (new roads, buildings, harbors, machines, im­
plements, chemicals), in the forms of association by which 
men live and work (growth of cities, changes in government, 
factory organization, business corporations, banking, re­
adjustments in land tenure, family practices, even religion), 
and in the skills, habits, and thought-pattems of individ­
uals. . . .  To pick out any one aspect of this interdepen­
dent complex and center attention on it involves a consid­
erable danger of wrong analysis. . . 1^3
Robert L. Gamer, former Vice President of the Inter­
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has called
^^The Emerging Nations. Their Growth yid United States 
Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), p. 44i
2%staley, o2« d t .. p. 202.
Z^Ibid.. pp. 202-3.
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development "a state of mind.” People must first develop 
themselves, he thinks, before they can successfully tackle 
their physical environment. Development "involves changes in 
relations between classes and races. It requires improvement 
of goveimmenta1 organization and operations; the extension of 
social institutions, schools, courts, and health services.
The latter changes, he notes, "take much longer than the 
building of factories and railroads and dams." Therefore, 
the greatest obstacles to development are certain habits of 
thought and conduct.
Robert L. Heilbroner warns that the route of the 
"Great Ascent" is not smoothly paved. The underdeveloped 
countries do not have "economies" in the sense in vÆiich we 
describe the American economy. They do not yet have the "in­
stitutions, the habits, the foundation of skills and wealth 
which are preconditions for a long, sustained economic climb." 
He concludes: "Economic development is not primarily an eco­
nomic but a political and social process," and "the political 
and social changes required for economic development are apt 
to be revolutionary in nature."^5
In planning economic development John Kenneth Galbraith 
takes a dim view of the success of any foreign aid program un­
less there is an absorptive capacity in the society to be
24Guidelines for Point 4 (Washington, D. C.: Inter­
national Development Agency, 1952), p. 3, quoted in Staley, o£. ci£., pp. 203-4.
-•̂ The Great Ascent (Evanston. 111.: Harner and Row.
1963), pp. 16-17.
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aided. This includes "a substantial degree of literacy," an 
"educated elite of substantial size," "a reliable apparatus 
of government and public administration," and "a clear and 
purposeful view of what development involves.
In Economic Development in Perspective. Galbraith 
calls economic development a process, and continues:
In the early stages it undoubtedly involves the build­
ing of organs of public administration and the provision 
of an educated minority, a nucleus of people who can build 
the system of public administration and, for that matter, 
everything else. Then comes the task of popular enlighten­
ment! This enables the masses of the people to participate 
in economic activity. And it opens men's minds, as they 
can be opened in no other way, to new methods and new 
techniques! Apart from its cultural role, popular literacy 
is a highly efficient thing. Needless to say, it is also 
the mainspring of popular aspiration. As such it adds strongly to the desire for development.27
Going back to one of the economists who give consider­
able weight to the non-economic factors in economic develop­
ment textbooks, Kindleberger says there are different views 
concerning the relative importance of resources and social 
attitudes in economic development. He then proceeds, in his 
book Economic Development, to discuss a variety of the social 
factors at length.
Okun and Richardson say that the significance of insti­
tutions and social values "has been more clearly realized in 
the field of economic development than in any other area of
^^"A Positive Approach to Economic Aid," Foreign 
Affairs. XXXIX (April, 1961), pp. 445-56.
27(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 13.
Kindleberger, o£. cit., p. 57.
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economic thought." It may well be, they say, "that the eco­
nomic factors determining growth are shaped and affected by
the formal social, political, and economic organization pre-
99vailing in. a particular country."
Paul Alpert states that development is "not only eco­
nomic growth, but growth plus change; social, cultural, and 
institutional, as well as economic." What, he asks, are the 
prerequisites for economic development? He answers that "an 
essential condition for any development is flexibility of 
civilization, as well as a structure of society and economy
open to the possibility of change, especially of technical
30and economic innovation." A rigid social structure or a 
system which discourages speculative thought would constitute 
examples of inflexibility.
Still another economist puts the question this way:
"Is technical-economic change necessarily interwoven with
31social-political change?" Everett E. Hagen answers his 
question with a "yes" and adds: "Impressive evidence of the
interrelations lies in the correlation between the nature of
the political structure in the countries of Asia, Africa, and
32Latin America and the level of economic development."
^^Okun and Richardson, 0£. cit., p. 334.
Of)Alpert, op. cit.. pp. 1-2.
Framework for Analyzing Change," Development of 
the Emerging Countries. ed. Robert Ei Asher (Washington: The
Brookings Institution, 1962), p. 2.
32Ibid.. p. 3.
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"It is rather obvious," Hagen thinks, "that economic 
change breeds social and political change." He then adds:
But it would be reckless to neglect the possible flow 
of causation in the opposite direction, a recklessness in 
which many persons indulge. Without the breakdown of 
traditional social structure and, more important, tradi­
tional attitudes, economic and technical aid may produce 
little hope for economic change. And perhaps the break- 
doxm of tradition may not occur simply because traditional 
people see Western methods. Perhaps it has independent 
causes without understanding of which aid administrators 
are beating their heads rather naively against a stonewall.33
In one of the most widely used, and perhaps the best 
known, works on economic development, W. W. Rostow describes 
the preconditions for the stage which he calls "Take-Off."
He says:
Although the period of transition— between the tradi­
tional society and the take-off--saw major changes in both 
the economy itself and in the balance of social values, a 
decisive feature was often political. Politically, the 
building of an effective centralized national state--on 
the basis of coalitions touched with a new nationalism, in 
opposition to the traditional landed regional interests, 
the colonial powers, or both, was a decisive aspect of the 
preconditions period; and it was almost universally, a necessary condition for t a k e - o f f . 34
Ifhile the degree of concern varies, most students of 
economic development give some attention to factors other than 
the "purely" economic which influence development process.
The non-economic factors are not too well defined, but on most 
of the lists are included the role of government, or adminis­
tration, or sometimes politics, or in certain cases all three.
33Ibid., pp. 10-11.
^^The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 7.
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plus the usual references to "social and cultural" factors.
Governmental stability, national consensus, and a com­
petitive political system are often cited as factors beneficial 
to economic development. These same conditions are, as it will 
be shown below, what some political scientists say are charac­
teristics of "political development." As this study is con­
cerned to a great extent with the role of government in 
development, a more detailed investigation of what constitutes 
political development will be made later.
The Problem and Hypothesis 
The list of non-economic factors influencing economic 
development is indeed endless. Some of the more important 
ones, however, have been singled out and have become subjects 
of a constantly growing number of studies and investigations. 
Four of these major influences will be used in this study.
They are "government," "population," "education," and "agricul­
ture and land reform." These four have been chosen because of 
the relative large abundance of literature on each one. At 
the same time, treatment of the other voluminous influences 
will not be attempted due to their less important influence or 
to the fact that even a rudimentary consensus as to their im­
portance is still lacking.
The basic problem of this study is to determine if 
these four factors, considered by most students of the develop­
ment process to have considerable influence on economic develop­
ment, are being used in planning and carrying out United States'
15
development assistance programs.
The initial hypothesis of the study is that these fac­
tors are being given serious consideration in United States 
development assistance program. A related hypothesis suggests 
that economic development is not purely a matter of economics, 
but a process subject to many social and political influences, 
some of which are considered in this study.
Scope and Method of the Study 
Each of the four factors studied will be treated in 
separate chapters of the dissertation. First, under each 
heading, the conceptual theory of each factor will be stated. 
This will be followed by a description of the United States 
position, as nearly as it can be determined, on implementing 
this factor in its foreign assistance program.
Preceding the treatment of the four basic factors will 
be a chapter on the development of United States aid approaches 
and a chapter describing the Latin American economies, with 
emphasis on Mexico and Peru. The latter is necessary because 
the scope of the study will be limited primarily to the study 
of aid programs to Latin America. The two countries of Mexico 
and Peru will be used for purposes of case studies.
Basic sources of information will be primarily United 
States government documents \Aiich deal with the foreign assis­
tance programs.
CHAPTER II
UNITED STATES DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE:
RATIONALE AND CONDITIONS
At the time that economic underdevelopment was for­
mally recognized as a world problem, both the United States 
and the United Nations began to investigate ways and to set 
up programs for aiding the modernization process in the less 
developed states* This chapter will trace the development of 
foreign assistance programs of the United States and will 
emphasize the stated goals or objectives as seen by the 
Congress and executive personnel* In addition, conditions 
for the receipt of American aid will be singled out.
Early Development Assistance Programs
The United States' long-run direct development assis­
tance programs may be said to have begun in earnest about 
1 9 4 9 .̂  In President Turman’s Inaugural address of January 20
iThe Export-Import Bank, in operation since 1934, was 
a source of finance for development, particularly for indus­
trial projects. However, its original purpose was to en­
courage an increase in United States exports * It has charged 
relatively high interest rates; has ordinarily required that 
loans be repaid in I5 years, and is prohibited from competing 
with private financial firms. Criteria for loans are estab­
lished conjointly by the Bank and the Department of State* 
U*S. Statutes at Large, XLIX, p. 526, as amended by Public 
Taw Ô9 , 80th Congress.
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of that year he stated:
Fourth, we must embark on a bold now program for 
making the benefits of our scientific advances and indus­
trial progress available for the improvement and growth 
of underdeveloped areas.
For the first time in history, humanity possesses the 
knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these 
people•
The United States is preeminent amovig nations in the 
development of industrial and scientific techniques. The 
material resources which we can afford to use for the 
assistance of other peoples are limited. But our impon­
derable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and inexhaustible.2
Mr* Truman's address gave some indication of the 
future direction of the foreign economic policy of the United 
States. Some authorities argued that the new program was 
neither "bold" nor "new." It was pointed out, for instance, 
that American missionaries and private businesses had for many 
years been providing "technical assistance" to people of less 
developed areas.^ There was also mention of the fact that the 
United States had already undertaken similar programs in Latin 
America through the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific 
and Cultural Cooperation, and the Institute of Inter-American 
Affairs.4 Technical Assistance projects had also been adopted 
in connection with the Greek-Turkish aid program. Moreover,
^"Inaugural Address of the President," January 20,
1949, Department of State Bulletin. XX (January 30, 1949), 
p. 125.
oBrookings Institution, Current Issues in Foreign Eco­
nomic Assistance (Washington: 1951), p. 61.
^An account of the United States assistance programs 
in the Americas is found in Philip M. Click, The Administration 
of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1957TT
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prior to President Truman's 1949 address, a number of Special­
ized Agencies of the United Nations were engaged in activities 
of this nature.
Most of the above mentioned operations had been of a 
restricted or specialized character. Previous United States 
aid programs had been for the most part designed to serve im­
mediate security interests connected with World War II and its 
aftermath. At the same time, a broad program of technical 
assistance under the United Nations had been handicapped by 
the inevitable delays in decision and implementation by a 
large, international body and also, until 1953, by the refusal 
of the Soviet Union to contribute to its work.^
As put into effect, the United States program was both 
"bold” and "new” in that unlike most other aid programs up to 
that time, its first objective was to assist in economic 
development, not to build or support military strength. It 
was "bold” because it manifested a fundamental change in the 
manner in which Americans had previously conceived of their 
countiry's foreign policy.^
There was another aspect of President Truman's 1949 
Address which deserves elaboration. The program should be, he 
said, "a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work
^Franz B. Gross (ed.). The United States and the United 
Nations (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 249,
^This idea was later expressed by President Truman when 
he recommended that Congress act favorably on the Technical 
Assistance Program. See Department of State Bulletin. XXI 
(July 4, 1949), p. 862.
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together through the United Nations and its specialized agen­
cies whenever practicable.xn another message to Congress 
on June 24, 1949, the President explained in more detail his 
proposed Point Four program. He reminded the Congress that 
under Article 56 of the United Nations Charter, the United 
States as a member had pledged itself to take "joint and 
separate action" in cooperation with other members in order 
"to achieve a higher standard of living for the nations of the 
world."8
Also in the June address, the President gave further 
information about channeling the United States aid for develop­
ment. "Much of the aid that is needed," he said, "can be pro­
vided most effectively through the United Nations." He noted 
that a United Nations Technical Assistance Program, of an 
expanded nature, was being set up at the time and added; "In 
addition to our participation in this work of the United 
Nations, much of the technical assistance required can be 
provided directly by the United States." In any case, the 
President continued, "whether the operation is conducted 
through the United Nations, the other international agencies, 
or directly by the United States, the country receiving the 
benefit of the aid will be required to bear a substantial
9portion of the expense."
^Department of State Bulletin. XX, loc. cit.
9.
8Department of State Bulletin. XXI, loc. cit.
'Ibid.
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To implement this program. President Truman recommended 
a first year appropriation not to exceed $45 million. That sum 
included $10 million requested in the 1950 budget for activi­
ties of a similar nature. The sum was to cover the United 
States participation in the programs of international agencies 
as well as the assistance provided directly by the United 
States.
The proposed program was further clarified by a State 
Department publication in January, 1950. It said;
It is not possible to state any rule which will auto­
matically determine whether a particular project should be 
undertaken through the multilateral channel of the United 
Nations, one of its specialized agencies, the OAS or some 
other international organization, or on a bilateral basis 
between the United States and the underdeveloped country 
desiring the assistance. The general guide is that inter­
national agencies will be used as far as practicable.il
By way of further explanation, the report said that 
exact application of the above principle would appear as speci­
fic projects came up for consideration. It continued:
It may be anticipated that the multilateral system will 
most readily be used where a proposed project is of direct 
interest to or involves coordination among several coun­
tries, as in the control of epidemic diseases or pests; 
where a project requires the mobilization of the technical 
resources of a number of countries, when the need is great 
and the number of trained technicians limited; where inter­
national uniformity or standardization is an end in itself, 
as in the case of air navigation standards; or where the 
international character of the source of the assistance may 
be particularly helpful in achieving its purpose.1%
lOlbid.
^^U. S., Department of State, Point Four. Publication 
3719 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office), p. 39.
12Ibid.. pp. 39-40,
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Besides these multilateral undertakings, the report 
envisioned the United States as participating in additional 
projects "which it deems desirable and which are impracticable 
for the United Nations, the Organization of American States or 
other appropriate international organizations to undertake 
even with United States support." It was assumed that such 
direct assistance would be necessary because of lack of funds, 
inability to act quickly enough, disinclination to pursue a 
specific project, and "inability to work in a non-member coun­
try or other reasons limiting effective operations," Lastly, 
the report stated that the United States would continue with 
projects on a bilateral basis which it had already agreed to
aid.
A bill providing for the Point Four program was intro­
duced in the House of Representatives on July 12, 1949. 
Hearings were held later in 1949 and in January, 1950. A 
report issued by the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1950 in­
dicated the Committee carefully evaluated the need and effects 
of both bilateral and multilateral aid programs. Noting that 
they had chosen both channels, the report said "the choice of 
both channels is deliberate."!^ The Committee agreed that in
13Ibid.
l^U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, House 
Report 5616. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.
l^U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Supplemen­
tal Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Econo­
mic Assistance. House Report 1802, Part IV, 81st Cong., 2nd 
Sess., p. 11.
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some cases the multilateral approach was probably best, partic­
ularly in those areas which required the cooperation of other 
countries•
On the other hand, the Committee also agreed that bi­
lateral programs were necessary. The Committee felt that the 
latter method had already proven itself in various aid programs 
which had been initiated earlier. Furthermore, it was believed, 
the facilities of the United Nations were limited, particularly 
in contrast to what could be done through bilateral action.
In fact, it was the Committee's belief that more of the tech­
nical cooperation activities of the programs could be carried 
on through bilateral rather than multilateral programs, at 
least for the first year.
The report of the Foreign Relations Committee in the 
Senate was also sympathetic to aid in general and to both ap­
proaches of distribution.^^ The method to use, however, was 
given considerable study. There were reasons, the Senators 
noted, why the United States should share in the United Nations 
Expanded Program, First, the United States was a member of 
that body and all of the specialized agencies. As such, it 
was bound to play a considerable role in the decisions made 
by those bodies. Secondly, the support of the United Nations 
assistance programs would lend strength to that body and, the 
report continued, "presumably what is good for the United
l^U. S. Congress, Senate, Supplementary Report of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, Foreign Economic Assistance. 1950. 
Senate Report 1371, Part 2, 81st Gong., 2nd Sess., p. 6.
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Nations is good for us,"^^ More important still, the Senators 
felt, the United States did not "have a comer" on the tech­
nical information of the world, and so other nations could 
make substantial contributions. Lastly, it was pointed out 
that work through the United Nations would supply technical 
assistance which the United States could not supply, and would 
actually save money by making the assistance dollars go much 
further.
The Act for International Development was enacted as 
Title IV of Public Law 535, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, which 
also included the Economic Cooperation Act of 1950 (Title I), 
the China Area Aid Act of 1950 (Title II), and the United 
Nations Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950 (Title III). The 
Act provided for both multilateral and bilateral channeling of 
development aid! Concerning the former, the United States was 
"authorized to participate in multilateral technical coopera­
tion programs carried on by the United Nations, the Organization
of American States, and their related organizations, and by
18other international organizations, whenever practicable."
The President was authorized, within limits of appro­
priations made available, to make contributions to the United 
Nations' technical assistance program which would contribute 
to accomplishing the purposes of the program as effectively as 
would participation in comparable programs on a bilateral basis.
l̂ Ibid.
^^United States Code. 1952 ed., II, p. 3056.
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Further, the President was authorized to make contributions 
for technical cooperation programs carried on by the Organi­
zation of American States, its related organizations, and any 
other international organization.^^
With respect to the bilateral program, the President 
was authorized to make agreements with "any person, corpora­
tion, or other body of persons," as well as with any foreign 
government agency. Such assistance would be available only 
when the President determined that the recipient nation would 
pay a "fair share" of the cost of the program; only when the 
President felt that all necessary information concerning such 
a program was given "full publicity" by the receiving nation; 
and only when the President was assured that the program was 
needed and would be fully d e v e l o p e d . ^0
The bilateral programs could be terminated by the 
President if, in his opinion, the program no longer contributed 
to the purposes of the Act establishing it, if the program was 
felt to be unnecessary or undesirable, or if such assistance 
was no longer consistent with the foreign policy of the United
States. Termination could also be accomplished by a concur-
91rent resolution of both houses of the Congress.^
Congress authorized an appropriation not to exceed $35 
million for the period ending June 30, 1951. This figure
l^Ibid.. p. 3058. 
20lbid.. pp. 3056-57. 
Zllbid.. p. 3058.
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included all amounts appropriated to carry on the activities 
of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs, and other tech­
nical cooperation programs as defined in the Act.2%
The technical assistance programs expanded during the 
first ten years of existence to the point whereby appropria­
tions for the fiscal year 1959 amounted to $150 million for 
bilateral assistance. In addition, the United States earmarked 
about $23 million during the same year for the United Nations 
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, and $1.5 million to 
a technical assistance program administered by the Organization 
of American States.
By 1959, all twenty of the Latin American countries 
plus some five territories were receiving technical assistance, 
and approximately $35 million of the total amount appropriated 
for technical assistance in 1959 was spent there. Most of the 
projects were of a long-term nature. Some, however, were sub­
ject to termination upon completion of a specific program; new 
programs were being established. Most of the aid was channeled 
to programs in agriculture, public health, and education. Yet, 
some of the funds were used in projects dealing with transpor­
tation, industrial safety, housing, labor relations, mining,
22lbid.. p. 3057.
23u. S. Department of State, Report to the Congress 
on the Mutual Security Program for the Second Half of Fiscal 
Year 19^^. Publication 6926, General Foreign Policy Series 




The technical assistance programs, now administered 
through the Agency for International Development, continue to 
be an important part of the United States aid programs. By 
1967, appropriations for this work amounted to approximately
$200 million.25
The United States and the United Nations 
Expanded Technical Assistance Program
The United Nations program of technical assistance is 
similar to the United States program in many ways. The ETAP 
of the United Nations and the Point Four program in the United 
States were established about the same time. Contributions of 
the United States to the multilateral program are part of a 
total United States contribution to worldwide technical assis­
tance and, as such, are usually considered by Congress as one 
large program, administered in different ways. For these 
reasons, the ETAP will be briefly discussed here.
Partly as a result of strong support from the United 
States, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
passed resolution number 222, August, 1949, suggesting that 
existing facilities of the already operational technical agen­
cies be used for an expanded program of technical assistance. 
The program was to be decentralized, dependent on voluntary
2^Ibid.. pp. 68-70.
^^The Budget of the United States Government for the 
Fiscal Year Ending June 30. 1967 (Washington. D. C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1966), p. 85.
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contributions, and under the ultimate control of the Secretary- 
General. Total contributions to the Expanded Program would be 
apportioned to tiae various agencies according to a scale of
Opredetermined percentages.
Administration of the United Nations ETAP, as original­
ly envisioned, was to be done by a Technical Assistance Commit­
tee, and a Technical Assistance Board. The former was composed 
of the then 18 members of ECOSOC. It was to make final recom­
mendations on United Nations action to the General Assembly. 
Reporting to TAG, would be the Technical Assistance Board (TAB). 
The latter was composed of the executive heads of the partici­
pating agencies, chaired by the Secretary-General. It was to
07coordinate the operational aspects of the program.^'
At a Technical Assistance Conference held at Lake 
Success in June, 1950, some 50 countries pledged a total of 
$20 million to the new program. The United States delegation 
promised, depending on Congressional action, a sum of $12 mil-
nolion, or not more than 60 percent of the entire costs.
Several significant changes were made in the United
^^Department of State. Bulletin. XXXV (July 9, 1956), 
pp. 76-83.
27A short but excellent study of the United Nations 
Technical Assistance Program is that of Johanna Van Goeckingk, 
United Nations Technical Assistance Board; 4  Case Study in 
International Administration (New York: United Nations, 1955);
see also ibid.
^®U. S. Department of State, Technical Assistance Under 
the International Agencies. Publication 4^65 (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 4 and 12.
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Nations program in 1952 and 1954, In the former year a new 
plan which provided for a full time chairman of TAB was adop­
ted. A more recent change discarded the percentage formulas 
for specialized agencies as established in 1949, and substi­
tuted a plan whereby funds would be distributed on a basis of 
program requests by individual underdeveloped countries.
Still another change in 1954 required TAG to review the over­
all program in light of its importance for economic develop­
ment, and under the guidance of the General Assembly, to
29authorize allocation of funds among the various agencies.
Although final approval of the Technical Assistance 
Program rests with the General Assembly, funds are allocated 
to the individual specialized agencies and then are within 
their control. Each agency plans the details of its own pro­
jects, recruits its own experts, and is fully responsible for
30the operations of each of its projects.
Most of the members of the United Nations have given 
financial support to the technical assistance program, including 
the ones that are getting aid, to about the same extent as they 
are assessed by that body for other expenses. There are, how­
ever, some exceptions. Originally contributing approximately 
60 percent of the program, the United States support now ac­
counts for about 40 percent of the total. For other United 
Nations expenses the United States has, in recent years, paid
Department of State Bulletin. XXXV, loc. cit.
SOlbid.
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about 32 percent of the t o t a l . T h e  Soviet Union's contribu­
tion to the assistance program has been about 3.7 percent of
32the total expenditures in recent years.
As the United States and the United Nations programs 
of technical assistance began what may be called new emphasis 
on economic development, a brief comparison of the two programs 
may be in order. Furtiiermore, the question of the most appro­
priate means of channeling development assistance, raised at 
the time, continues to be a subject of debate.
There are some basic differences in the two programs.
In establishing the United Nations program, the resolution 
declared that assistance "shall not be a means of foreign eco­
nomic and political interference in the internal affairs of
the countries concerned, and cshall] not be accompanied by any
33consideration of a political nature." In the United States' 
program one of the announced goals was to assist less developed 
countries in building political democracy. The aid could, it
31The U. S. share is based on a scale recommended by 
the United Nations Committee on Contributions. See U. S., 
Department of State, United States Participation in the United 
Nations. Report by the President to Congress for the Year 1964. 
Publication 7943”Twashington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1966), p. 287.
3%u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act 
of 1959. 86th Cong., 1st Sess,, Part II, pp. 312-14; United 
Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations. 1964 (New York: 1966),
pp. 248-49.
^^Walter R. Sharp, "The Institutional Framework for 
Technical Assistance: A Comparative Review of United States
and United Nations Experience," International Organization.
VII (August, 1953), p. 346,
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was pointed out, "give a concrete demonstration of the econo­
mic progress toward higher standards of living which can be 
realized through democratic means.
Other differences in the two programs include the lo­
cation and extent of control over the assistance and the man­
ner in which it is rendered. Under the terms of the United 
Nations resolution, the recipient governments had the ultimate 
power of decision on the kind of service to be rendered. The
assistance was to be provided so far as possible in the form
35desired by the recipient.
In the bilateral programs, the United States has ulti­
mate power to decide on the kind of services it will render 
and the form in which it will be r e n d e r e d . T h e  United Nations 
principles specify that assistance should be given "only to or 
through governments." In the bilateral programs, the United 
States would use private agencies and persons as well as the 
channels of government. In both programs, however, the terms
were subject to negotiation and agreement, and the governments
37had ultimate control.
Under the United Nations program, requesting govem-
34ibid.. p. 348.
35u. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Supplemen­
tal Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Econo­




Point Four, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
37poreign Economic Assistance. House Report 1802, loc.
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ment8 "should be expected to agree" to the conditions accom­
panying assistance; under the bilateral programs, assistance
is available only when the President determines "that the
38country fulfills the statuatory qualifications."
The United Nations resolution requires governments to
agree "normally to assume responsibility for a substantial
part of the costs," and at least that part payable in local
currency. Section 307 (C) of Public Law 535 requires the
requesting country to pay a "fair share" before assistance
39can be made available.
The United Nations' program draws on a broader person­
nel base than the United States program. This has several 
consequences, one of which is perhaps important. The United 
Nations can send field teams to less developed areas from 
countries whose general level of development is not markedly 
higher than their own. This has tended to minimize cultural 
differences between the advancing and receiving groups.
As pointed out above the United States insists that 
its program of technical assistance be publicized. All of the 
larger United States country missions contain information 
centers for this purpose! The United Nations, on the other 
hand, works more quietly, trying consciously not to arouse 
the hope of the indigenous people too much.
38lbid.
Sharp, op. cit.. p. 349.
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The Expanded Technical Assistance Program is supposed 
to be such that work undertaken should be integrated with the 
routine duties of other agencies. This has not always proved 
successful. The technical assistance program of the United 
States was placed under the director of the International 
Cooperation Administration (now AID) so that it might compli­
ment other IGA programs, or vice versa. Lastly, United States 
administrators are given strong encouragement to work with 
their United Nations counterparts.^^
Development Assistance and the Search 
for Proper Direction
United States aid to the less developed countries in 
the form of technical assistance was not immediately followed 
by aid programs of a more intensive character. In October 
1949, Congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act which 
provided primarily for military aid to North Atlantic Treaty
42Organization allies, China, Iran, Korea and the Philippines. 
Agreements with particular countries were set forth in execu­
tive agreements rather than treaties, but the Act required 
that certain conditions be imposed upon the recipients. Among 
the latter was the stipulation that the aid be used for the
^^U. S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before a Subcommit­
tee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Technical Assistance 
Programs. 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 2, 1956, p. 417.
^^Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domes­
tic Commerce, Foreign Aid By the United States Government 1940- 
51 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 7; 
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. U. S., Statutes at Large, 
LKIII, p. 714.
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purpose for which it was intendedi
The next major step in the development of a United 
States foreign assistance program came two years later. This 
was the passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Preceding 
Congressional action on this bill were several significant
43studies of foreign aid, all initiated by the executive branch. 
The Bell Report on the Philippines recommended that the United 
States assist that country with economic loans and grants of a 
substantial size. In turn, the Report cautioned that the govern­
ment of the Philippines should overhaul its tax collecting 
machinery, streamline its agricultural production system, set 
up a more adequate program of public health, promote education, 
concentrate on improving urban housing, and give adequate atten­
tion to improving public admi nis trationThe Gray Report con­
tained similar suggestions, while emphasis in the Rockefeller 
and Brookings Reports was on improved administration of United 
States' agencies which were participating in foreign assistance
^^These include Gordon Gray, ^  al., Report to the 
President on Foreign Economic Policy %Gray Report) (Washington, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1950); United States Inter­
national Development Advisory Board, Partners in Progress 
(Rockefeller Report) (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1951); United States Budget Bureau- The Aiiministration 
of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations. Report prepared 
for the Bureau of the Budget by The Brookings Institution 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1951); and
United States Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, Report 
to the President of the United States (Bell Report) (Washington, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1950)»
^^The major provisions of the Report are outlined in 
International Cooperation Administration, Certain Reports and 




The Rockefeller Report contained other significant 
observations which are basic to this study. The International 
Development Advisory Board, set up by the act that created the 
Point Four program, had much praise for the latter undertaking. 
Nevertheless, it placed strong emphasis on the possibility of 
working more through the United Nations. By working through 
the United Nations, the Board felt, the United States could 
avoid propaganda blasts such as "American Imperialism," which 
would surely be directed against the bilateral programs of the 
United States. Furthermore, channeling the assistance on a 
multilateral basis would enable other countries to join as 
givers rather than just takers. It would make technical assis­
tance "their program," and it would make it clear to the rest 
of the world that the United States did not aim at "American­
izing" the globe, but rather was intended to help each coun­
try build from its own resources, "with its own heads and 
hands, and on the foundation of its own heritage
Many governments, the Board believed, "are sensitive 
to having an outside government rendering assistance, and pre­
fer to obtain such help from an international agency," The 
fact that the underdeveloped countries could turn to the 
United Nations programs would, in any case, contribute to the
45lbid.. pp. 16-18.
^^International Development Advisory Board, Conclu­
sions and Recommendations (Washington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office, 1953), p. 24.
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overall objective sought by the United States, and could actu­
ally in some cases lessen the possibility of misunderstanding.^^ 
Many of the suggestions made by the various foreign 
aid studies were incorporated into the Mutual Security Act of 
1951. For the first time, all of the United States' assis­
tance programs, except that dealing with the Export-Import 
Bank, were grouped together under one heading. The purpose of 
the Act, as stated in the preamble, was to maintain the security 
and’promote the foreign policy of the United States" by giving 
assistance "to friendly countries" in order to "strengthen the 
mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the 
free world;" to "develop their resources in the interest of their 
security and independence and the national interest of the 
United States;" and to "facilitate the effective participation 
of those countries in the United Nations system for collective
A Osecurity." The Act specified that it was to be administered 
in such a way as to "eliminate the barriers to, and provide 
the incentives for, a steadily increased participation of free 
enterprise in developing the resources of foreign countries.
A Q. . ." Finally, the Act prohibited aid-of any type to any 
country "unless the President finds that the supplying of such 
assistance will strengthen the security of the United States 




U. S., Statutes at Large. LKV, p. 373.
49,
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agreed to join in promoting international understanding and 
good will. . •
Soon after the passage of the MSA of 1951, Congress 
passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act. Known popu­
larly as the Battle Act, the new legislation stipulated further 
conditions on receipt of the United States' aid. An embargo 
was placed on the shipment of arms and related materials, 
petroleum, and other products with a strategic value "to any 
nation or combination of nations threatening the security of 
the United States. . . Later on. Congress imposed still
further conditions. It required the director of the Mutual 
Security Agency to take steps which would ensure that recipi­
ent countries so direct their budgetary, fiscal, and political
52resources that the objectives of the aid might be accomplished.
In the years 1951 and 1952, economic assistance was 
greater than its military counterpart. By 1953, however, due 
primarily to Korean expenditures, economic aid accounted for 
approximately one-third of the total $6 billion authorization. 
Military aid continued to exceed economic aid through 1959,
By 1960 economic aid slightly exceeded military grants and 
loans. In the succeeding years economic aid has exceeded aid 
for military purposes until by 1965, the former was more than
SOibid.. p. 581.
5^U. S., Statutes at Large, LKV, p. 644.
5%William A. Brown, Jr., and Redvers Opie, American 
Foreign Assistance (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Insti­
tution, 1953), p. 533.
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60 percent of the total.
A number of studies and inquiries about the role and 
nature of the United States foreign assistance programs have 
taken place since the mid-1950's. Some insight about the aid 
programs may be gained from reading a dialogue which took 
place in 1956 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Chairman Fulbright was questioning Mr. John B. Hollister, 
Director of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), 
and Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State, about 
the United States' Technical Assistance Program. The ques­
tioning ran as follows:
Senator Fulbright: Do you concern yourselves with poli­
tical matters in these countries?
Mr. Hollister: We have to.
Senator Fulbright: In what respect?
Mr. Hollister: Well, the whole picture is partly eco­
nomic, partly political, and partly 
military, and that is, of course, why 
the country teams in most of these 
countries work together. . . . The 
political is the most important, (but) 
the whole thing has to be tied up in 
one ball of wax.
The questioning then shifted to the way in which pro­
jects are determined. It continued:
Senator Fulbright: Do you ever consult with people in that
country as to what they would like or 
is it developed here and you tell them 
what they need?
Mri Hollister: Well, sin.ce I have been there. Senator,
I have insisted that we should not try 
to get into programs that the countries 
themselves do not think are good ones.
53see Table 1, p. 38.
^^Technical Assistance Programs. op. cit., p. 412.
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TABLE 1
UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE, 

















1949 (15 mos.) 6,283 6,283 _ 1001950 ... 3,614 56 98
1951 ... 2,622 980 73
1952 ... 1,985 1,481 581953 .... 1,958 4,159 32
1954 ... 2,228 3,296 40
1955 .... 1,821 2,396 43
1956 .... 1,506 2,928 341957 .... 1,627 2,085 41
1958 .... 1,620 2,364 411959 .... 1,916 2,110 48
1960 .... 1,866 1,718 52
1961 .... 2,012 1,384 59
1962 .... 2,508 1,448 63
1963 .... 2,297 1,809 56
1964 .... 2,136 1,498 59
1965 .... 2,041 1,229 63
1966 .... 2,100 1,275 62
1967 .... 2,200 1,150 66
Sources: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
1965 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
l§ëS). p. 863; figures for 1965 through 1967 (esti­
mates; are taken from The Budget of the United States 
Government. Fiscal Year Ending June 30V 1967 (Washing* 
ton, D, C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p.
73 and 85.
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There is this to be said: Sometimes
a country thinks a project is a good 
one, \ttiich we may not want to go into, 
but we do not anywhere try to put into 
effect the program which the country 
itself does not want.
Senator Fulbright: IThy do you think Burma refused to accept
technical aid from this country?
Mr, Hollister: I have not the faintest idea. That wasbefore my time.55
At this point Mr, Hoover came to Mr. Hollister's aid 
and told the inquiring Senators that as far as he knew Burma 
refused the aid not because of the way the United States admin­
istered it, but because it was a policy of Burma at the time 
not to accept aid of any type from any country. Senator 
Fulbright then turned to Mr. Hoover and asked: "Do we, as a
practice, have the country concerned participate in formulating 
the program?" At this point Mr. Hoover corroborated the ear­
lier remarks of Mr. Hollister:
We try to gain their advice and their cooperation to 
the utmost extent possible, but of course the final deter­
mination of the program is in our hands. . . .  There are 
some programs which may well be thought not applicable in 
a country! Occasionally we suggest more beneficial pro­grams to them.56
While Mr. Hollister was becoming acquainted with his 
new duties, the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and 
Public Affairs was engaged in a study of the aid programs.
This study, as those before it had done, praised the work of
"̂̂ Mr. Hollister said later in the questioning: "I
was plunged rather unexpectedly into this work eight months 
ago." This report was dated January 23, 1956. Mr. Hollister 
assumed his responsibilities on July 1, 1955.
^^Technical Assistance Programs. loc. cit., p. 413.
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the United States foreign assistance to underdeveloped countries
through the binational agreements. But, the report cautioned,
there should be no doubt by now, after more than a decade 
of experience with foreign aid, that the bilateral rela­
tionship seriously limits the effectiveness of our associ­
ation with other countries, especially when it touches on 
the central issues of economic and social policy that 
underlie investment programs and technical assistance pro­jects.5'
The study concluded that the United States was handi- 
capped--actually in some cases debarred--from participation 
and influence in long range decisions because of the "bilateral 
groove" in which most of its efforts in support of economic 
development had been caught. The reasons why United States 
programs of bilateral assistance would not be as effective as 
channeling funds through multilateral agencies were, the study 
noted, not difficult to see. They were:
(1) The crucial policy and programming decisions in eco­
nomic development raise touchy political issues, 
vitally affecting local special interests, in which 
it is wholly inappropriate, and would often be un­
wise, for the United States as a government to be 
directly involved.
(2) Self-respecting sovereign nations, especially if they 
are new and insecure in their sovereignty, will nor­
mally be afraid to let a powerful foreign government 
participate in considering such basic questions,58
There were other reasons, the study noted, why multi­
lateral channels should be used. "There is no reason vdiy the 
United States should bear the whole burden and responsibility
^^U. S. Congress, Senate, A study prepared by the 
Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs for 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Foreign 




of assistance to development.’* The Western European countries, 
Japan, Canada, and other developed nations, it was believed, 
had the same stake in keeping the free world free. Also, these 
Western nations had substantial resources of capital, skills, 
and experience that should certainly be enlisted in the com­
mon effort.
Multilateral programs would, according to this report, 
minimize the danger of ’’development" programs being twisted 
into instruments of commercial rivalry among industrial nations 
outside of the Soviet bloc. Also, it would discredit suspi­
cions that persist in some circles in Europe that the aid of 
the United States was to substitute an American imperialism 
for European Colonialism.^^
The Maxwell Graduate School Study took note of the 
fact that their argument for multilateral assistance for eco­
nomic development ran counter to a widely held view that all 
economic aid, like other overseas operations, should be kept 
available for the managers of United States foreign policy to 
bring to bear on the issues or negotiations of greatest impor­
tance. But, they pointed out, "this is to mistake the purpose 
and value of our participation in economic development." In 
fact, they continued, if United States policy concerning eco­
nomic aid was to express the genuine mutuality of interests 




participation should be conceived as an instrument of long- 
range, rather than short-range strategy. The indiscriminate 
use of economic aid as an all purpose tactical weapon, the 
report said, "blunts and discredits it for its proper function." 
One example of a distressing instance of that kind, the study 
noted, "was the Aswan dam incident and its aftermath, the 
Eisenhower Doctrine: the Soviets had an equivalent (and evi­
dently more lasting) failure in Yugoslavia.
The study concluded with an unequivocal recommendation. 
"The case seems clear," it said, "as a matter of policy, for 
multilateralizing United States efforts (and those of other 
independent countries) to promote world economic development, 
insofar as possible." The study did not, however, recommend 
immediate transfer of all developmental activities to the 
United Nations. The report was critical of the decentralized 
organization of the United Nations Technical Assistance Program 
and concluded: "We cannot put the United Nations machinery to
work on a large scale unless and until it is organized for the
finjob. It is not now so organized."
On June 11, 1956, the United States Senate passed 
Senate Resolution 285, which created the Special Committee to 
Study the Foreign Aid Program. The Special Committee in turn 
made contracts with various research centers or agencies to 




Project Number 2, a study entitled The Objectives of United 
States Economic Assistance Programs. was prepared by the Center 
of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Techno1- 
os..-
The Study pointed out that the United States had not 
yet been able to clarify its interest in the underdeveloped 
areas. Basically, the report noted, "we still lack in the 
underdeveloped areas an equivalent to the balanced economic- 
military approach represented in Europe by the Marshall plan 
and NATO."^^
The MIT scholars felt that aid for development was an 
appropriate method of pursuing the cold war. "The establish­
ment of , . . stable, effective, and democratic societies," 
with the help of United States assistance, "gives the best 
promise of a favorable settlement of the cold war and of a 
peaceful, progressive world environment." In support of this 
position the study offered the following four supporting prop­
ositions;
1. That American assistance can lead to economic growth
^^The study at the Center of International Studies was 
under the direction of Max F. Millikan and consisted of the 
following staff members: Francis M. Bator, Donald L. M.
Blackmer, James E. Cross, Richard S. Eckaus, Everett E. Hagen, 
Charles P. Kindleberger, Lucian W. Pye, Paul N. Rosenstein- 
Rodan, and Walt W. Rostow.
^^U, S. Congress, Senate, A Study Prepared at the Request 
of the Special Committee To Study the Foreign Aid Program by 
the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, The Objectives of United States Economic Assis­
tance Programs. 85th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 1, 1957, p. 15.
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2. That American assistance and consequent economic growth 
can be made to lead to politically mature and stable 
democratic societies
3. That if a majority of the underdeveloped countries, 
notably those of Asia, demonstrate over a 10 to 20- 
year period that they are able to meet and progres­
sively resolve their internal problems without resort 
to totalitarian solutions, and given, still, sustained 
Western deterrence to military adventure, then the only 
rational option remaining to the Soviets will consist 
in a negotiated settlement with strong built-in safe­
guards against international violence
4. That it is an essential American interest, even apart 
from the cold war, that the emerging nations of Asia 
and Africa achieve economic growth and social maturity within a democratic f r a m e w o r k . 65
In exploring the most adequate means of channeling the 
aid, the MIT study pointed out the advantages and disadvantages 
of both bilateral and multilateral approaches. It concluded 
that a solution to the problem might lie in an arrangement 
whereby bilateral aid could be extended within a framework "of 
a consultative multinational organization."^^
Finally, the MIT study noted, initial improvements in 
a given society, brought about by foreign assistance, may des­
troy traditional political and social institutions which have 
previously been blocking economic development. When this hap­
pens, "the society may be particularly responsive to demagogic 
appeals of a nationalist or Communist nature." It is impos­
sible, therefore, to "fashion a xmnning evaluation of success 
in achieving long-run political objectives, which are the prin­
cipal rationale for economic aid."^^




Another study, dealing primarily with the administra­
tion of foreign aid within the United States, and made by the
68Brookings Institution, was published in 1960. An appendix 
to that study, perhaps more than the substance of the report 
itself, is of importance here. Thezre, a position was taken 
which would encourage the United States to consider the more 
extensive use of multilateral channels in providing foreign 
aid. The advantage of such a system is that a multilateral 
organization is not the servant of any state or any one set of 
national objectives, but balances one against the other. In 
addition, such an organization is more likely to be regarded 
by the weaker states as a protective shield against the special 
interests of the more powerful ones. Furthermore, if some 
degree of intervention is necessary, the less developed coun­
tries would be more inclined to accept it from a multilateral 
organization than by an individual country, no matter how well 
intentioned the latter might be.69
Other studies and recommendations with respect to the 
foreign aid program of the United States echoed statements and 
warnings similar to those which have been made above. In Goals 
For Americans. for instance, compiled by a commission appointed 
by President Eisenhower in the late 1950's, readers were told
G^U. S. Congress, Senate, A Study prepared by the 
Brookings Institution for the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
United States Foreign Policy: The Formulation and Administra­
tion. 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 9, 1960, pi 188.
G^Ibid.
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that the United States interest in the less developed areas 
was both economic and political. ”>fore important than the eco­
nomic matters," they said, "are the political and strategic
aspects of a continuing relationship between the industrial
70nations and the less-developed lands."
The President’s Commission on National Goals is no less 
aware of the basic problems of foreign assistance than those 
who wrote these other reports. "Many of the young nations," 
they indicate, "lack political maturity, and in some cases out­
moded social structures create additional problems." As some 
begin to develop, they note, "their political behavior assumes 
a tinge of the irrational." Emotional nationalism may become
so pronounced that assistance from abroad, both public and pri-
71vate, may have to be curtailed.
In still another study, another made by the Center for
International Studies, it was recommended that United States
aid not only be continued for developmental purposes, but en- 
7?larged. Such aid should not, however, be granted except 
upon evidence of long-range carefully planned programs. In 
the absence of such restrictions, the study indicated, the less
^^President’s Commission on National Goals, Henry M. 
Wriston, chairman. Goals For Americans (The American Assembly; 
Columbia University, I960), p . 342.
^^Ibid.. p. 343.
79U. S. Congress, Senate, A Study prepared by the Center 
for Internationa1 Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technol­
ogy, Economic. Social, and Political Change In the Underdevel­
oped Countries and Its Implications for U. S. Policy (Washington, 
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 19607•
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developed countries would tend to request and use aid during 
crisis situations, inhibiting the possibility of aid for long­
term economic growth.
Development Aid Legislation Since 1951
Another phase of the United States aid programs took
shape with the passage of the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954, commonly called Public Law 480,
Primary purpose of the act was to
expand international trade among the United States and 
friendly nations, to facilitate the convertibility of cur­
rency, to promote the economic stability of American agri­
culture and the national welfare, to make maximum efficient 
use of surplus agricultural commodities in furtherance of 
the foreign policy of the United States. . . .'3
The agricultural products were to be exchanged for foreign cur­
rencies which in turn were to be used to "encourage economic 
development, to purchase strategic materials, to pay United 
States obligations abroad, to promote collective strength, and 
to foster in other ways the foreign policy of the United States.
The Food-For-Peace Program, of which Public Law 480 is 
the core, is administered by the Secretary of Agriculture rather 
than the Agency for International Development. Its purpose, 
as indicated above, is two-fold: to provide for the disposal
of American surplus commodities, and to assist friendly coun­
tries toward economic development. Expenditures under this
^^The Act, with amendments, is printed in U. S. Con­
gress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Legislation on 




heading have been running from $1.5 to $1.7 billion in recent
years.75
In one study of Public Law 480 and Indian economic 
development, the author draws the conclusion that the surplus 
disposal program contributed little to development during the 
1954-60 period. But this may have been due primarily, it is 
noted, to inexpedient administration rather than inherent de­
fects of the program.7G
A second major multilateral program to which the United 
States gave its support is the International Finance Corpora­
tion (IFC). This agency came into existence on July 20, 1956, 
as a subsidiary of the IBRD. Purpose of the IFC according to 
its Articles of Agreement was "to further economic development 
by encouraging the growth of productive private enterprise in
member countries, particularly in the less developed areas,
77thus supplementing the activities of the IBRD."
Operations of the IFC have been small compared with 
other programs. Its initial capital stock of the Corporation 
was $100 million, of which the United States subscribed 
$35,168,000,7® According to one authority, the IFC should
75gtatistical Abstract of the United States. 1965. op. 
cit.. p. 860.
7^Mary Fish, "Public Law 480: The Use of Agricultural
Surpluses as Aid to Underdeveloped Countries (With Special 
Reference to India)" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Graduate 
College, University of Oklahoma, 1963), p. 147.
77"Text of Articles of Agreement," Legislation on 
Foreign Relations, op. cit.. p. 394.
7®U. S., Statutes at Large. LXIX, p. 669.
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doubtless be considered an international development agency.
Interest rates are relatively high, 5 to 10 percent, and
79maturity dates are medium-term rather than long-term.
In Article III, Section 9 of the IFC Articles, the
Corporation is clearly identified as one which will approach
its international lending functions with full objectivity.
The section reads:
The Corporation and its officers shall not interfere 
in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be 
influenced in their decisions by the political character 
of the member or members concerned. Only economic con­
siderations shall be relevant to their decisions, and 
these considerations shall be weighed impartially in or­
der to achieve the purpose stated in this Agreement.
In 1957 Congress established the Development Loan Fund
(DLF) by appropriating initial capital of approximately $300
million. Purpose of this Act was to promote the economic
development of "free" Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. It
was to emphasize the principle of self-help, to promote the
cooperation of friendly nations, and to maintain economic and
81political stability in the above areas.
In addition to the general objectives of the new Fund, 
it had at least two specific goals which are of interest to 
this study. First, it was designed to strengthen private
^^Benjamin Higgins, United Nations and United States 
Foreign Economic Policy (Homewood, 111.:, Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1962), p. 89.
^^"Text of Articles of Agreement," Legislation on 
Foreign Relations. op. cit.. p. 397.
^^Legislation on Foreign Relations. op. cit., p. 14.
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enterprise. In the basic law it was stated that
it is the policy of the United States . . .  to strengthen 
friendly countries by encouraging the development of 
their economies through a competitive free enterprise 
system . . • and to facilitate the creation of a climate 
favorable to the investment of private capital.
Secondly, DLF was to place primary emphasis on the financing
of goods and services of United States origin. This reflected
the opinion that other industrialized countries could also
provide some long-term loans on reasonable terms in order to
83export more of their capital goods to the developing areas.
Authority of the Fund, as amended by later appropria­
tion acts, included power to make agreements with nations, 
organizations, persons, or other entities on terms which it 
might determine, but it was required to take certain factors 
into account. These included:
(1) whether financing could be obtained in whole or in 
part from other free world sources on reasonable 
terms,
(2) the economic and technical soundness of the activity 
to be financed,
(3) whether the activity gives reasonable promise of con­
tributing to the development of economic resources
or free economic institutions or to the increase of 
productive capacities in furtherance of the purposes 
of this title, and
(4) the possible adverse effects upon the economy of the 
United States. . . .84
Loans were to be made by the Fund only when the recipi­
ents could fully assure the administrators that the loan would
on Development Loan Fund, Annual Report (Washington: 1959), p. 2.
B^lbid.
Rù.Legislation on Foreign Relations, op. cit.. p. 15.
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be repaid. Furthermore, legislation required the Fund to rec­
ognize that loans would be most effective in those countries 
"which show a responsiveness to vital long-term economic, poli­
tical, and social concerns of their people," in those where 
there is willingness to pursue self-help measures, and in those 
that demonstrate "that such assistance is consistent with, and
makes a contribution to, workable long-term economic develop-
85ment objectives."
Development Loans are currently designed to foster 
long-term economic development and political stability.
TABLE 2








1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Total 5,570 829 522 630 1,087 1,249 1,253
Near East and 
South Asia
3,407 472 353 378 756 758 690
Latin America 1,226 66 29 133 189 342 -467
Far East 402 172 54 48 56 54 18
Africa 399 41 46 53 86 95 77
Europe 137 78 41 18 - -93 -101
Source: U. S. Bureau of the 
the United States: 
ment Printing Office
Census. Statistical Abstract of 
1965 (Washington. D. C.: Govern- 




Loans are made for periods of from 15 to 40 years duration at 
interest rates ranging from less than 1 percent to 5 and three- 
fourths percent. Most of the loans are made at the lower in­
terest rates. Aid projects are periodically reviewed. Final­
ly, with few exceptions, goods and services used for develop-
87ment projects are purchased only from the United States,
In another United Nations program, the Special Fund, 
the United States also makes contributions. The United Nations 
Special Fund was established in October, 1958, by the General 
Assembly, It was originally supported by 41 governments which 
pledged $26 million for the first year of its operation in 1959,88 
By 1965, amounts pledged to the Special Fund had in­
creased to $91,500,747, of which some $37 million represented 
the pledge of the United States, Of the 97 total programs ap­
proved by the Fund in 1964, 44 were in Africa; 18 in the Americas; 
and 27 in Asia and the Far East, Most of the projects involved
pre-investment studies, resource surveys, feasibility studies
89and technical education and training institutions.
In 1959, Congress passed legislation which enabled the 
United States to become a member of the newly created Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB).^^ Membership in the new Bank,
87Agency for International Development, Principles of 
Foreign Economic Assistance (Washington, D, C,: Government
Printing Office, 1965), pp. 17-18,
88united Nations, Yearbook. 1958. pp. 131-36,
®^United Nations, Yearbook. 1964. pp. 235-42.
^®U. S., Statutes at Large, LXXIII, p. 299.
53
open to all members of the Organization of American States, 
was established for the purpose of accelerating economic devel­
opment of the member countries,Congress authorized the 
United States to purchase 35,000 shares ($350 million) of the 
total initial 85,000 shares. In the Fund for Special Operations, 
an agency established to work in close conjunction with the IDE,
Congress authorized the United States to pay $100 million of
92the total subscription of $150 million. United States con­
tributions to both the IDE and the Fund for Special Operations 
have since been increased,
In another_action involving the United States in the 
participation in multinational lending agencies, the Congress
approved United States membership in the International Develop-
94ment Association in 1960, The basic aim of IDA was to pro­
mote economic development and raise standards of living in the 
developing countries. It was established as an affiliate of 
the IBRD, but financing was separate, IDA was expected to 
carefully screen all Association projects, but loans were to 
be made on a more liberal basis than those from the IBRD, and 
a wider range of projects could be covered,Initial United
91"Articles of Agreement Establishing the Inter- 
American Development Bank," Legislation on Foreign Relations,
O P , cit,. p, 414,
92U, S,, Statutes at Large. loc, cit,
^^The Budget of the United States Government. 1967.
O P , cit,. p, 89.
"̂̂ U. S., Statutes at Large, LXXIV, p, 293,
^^"Articles of Agreement of the International Develop-
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States contribution to the IDA was $320 million, an amount 
which has since been increased.
Before Congress took final action in authorizing United 
States participation in IDA, much more soul-searching about how 
development financing should best be channeled took place. In 
Senator Monroney's resolution introduced into the Senate on 
March 24, 1958, one objective of the United States in support­
ing such a program was that economic development in foreign 
areas could be encouraged through a process which would elimi­
nate "any possible implications of interference with national 
sovereignty" of the recipient s t a t e s . I n  appeals before the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, vAiich was considering 
the resolution, Monroney summed up the arguments for its passage 
by pointing out, among other things, that United States devel­
opment assistance through an agency such as the IDA would re­
move "the political stigma attached to loans from the United 
States alone by placing them under international banking facili­
ties." Furthermore, it would place responsibility for passing 
on the feasibility of loans, always a serious problem, "in a 
genuine banking facility." Finally, it would take "the matter
ment Association," Legislation on Foreign Relations, op. cit., 
p. 448; International Development Association, First Annual 
Report. 1960-1961 (Washington, D. C.: 1961), p. 3.
^^The Budget of the United States Government. 1967 « 
loc. cit.
97u. s. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Commit­
tee on Banking and Currency, Hearings on Senate Resolution 264 
(International Development AssociationT7 85th Cong,, 2nd Sess., 
1958, p. 1.
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of economic development of underdeveloped countries out of the
98arena of domestic politics."
Congressional support for a still stronger participa­
tion by the United States in the IDA continues to be a ques­
tion, just as does much support for any multilateral channeling
99program. In the meantime, however, the success of the inter­
national development scheme seems to have been limited only by 
member subscriptions of money.
In still another important action in 1959, Congress 
established the Office for Private Enterprise in the ICA. The 
new Office was expected to help aid recipients plan for maxi­
mum use of private resources in their countries; to assist in 
the utilization of private individuals, firms, institutions, 
and foundations in providing effective management and skills; 
and to implement certain projects which would encourage the 
growth of private enterprise. Finally, the new Office was 
expected to administer the Investment Guaranty Program.
The Investment Guaranty Program, first authorized in 
1948, assumed added significance as the United States began 
to encourage private investors to put their funds into the
^Bjbid.. pp. 5-6.
^^The history and recent events with respect to United 
States participation in IDA is thoroughly covered by James H. 
Weaver, The Internatioml Development Association. 4 New Ap­
proach to Foreign Aid ('New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).
^®®U. S., Department of State, Report to Congress on 
the Mutual Security Program for the Second Half of Fiscal Year 
1959. Publication 6926 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1960), pp. 99-100.
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developing countries. In fact, investment guarantees were 
limited after July 24, 1959, to the economically underdeveloped 
areas of the world. Goals of the program were to insure pri­
vate investors against the political risks of
(1) inconvertibility of local currency receipts from the 
investment, (2 ) loss of all or part of the investment due 
to expropriation or confiscation, and (3) loss due to 
damage or destruction of physical property by reason of 
war.lOl
Under the Investment Guaranty Program,. American inves­
tors could, for a fee of about one half of one percent of the 
coverage provided, guarantee his investment and earnings for 
a period of up to twenty y e a r s . ^^2 foreign investment
as an aid to economic development has long been established, 
the Investment Guaranty Program is evidence that many impedi­
ments to foreign investment exist in the less developed coun­
tries .
The Act for International Development. 1961.
And Subsequent Developments
During the year 1961 the entire foreign assistance pro­
gram of the United States was subjected to intensive and exten-
^Report to Congress on the Mutual Securitv Program 
for the First Half of Fiscal Year 1960. op. cit.. p. 47.
^^^Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program 
for the Second Half of Fiscal Year 1959. op. cit.. p. 100.
^®^Some of these impediments, "political unrest," "at­
titudes and policies which deter investment," "underdeveloped 
human and physical resources," and "adequacy of information," 
are briefly discussed in Report to the Congress on the Mutual 




sive re-examination. As a result of this attention, the foreign 
aid program went through considerable change.
Early in the year. President Kennedy appointed an inter­
departmental Task Force on Latin America to "consider and co­
ordinate policies anà action with respect to measures for eco­
nomic and social development, maintenance of peace, and handling 
of related matters in the inter-American area."^^^
One week after the public announcement of the establish­
ment of the Task Force, Secretary of State Rusk reiterated the 
United States interest in Latin American development. The re­
cent events in Cuba, the Secretary pointed out, were due in 
part to neglect of the aspirations of the Cuban people. As­
pirations for economic betterment were common, he felt, among 
people throughout Latin America. Therefore, the United States 
was now ready to help the other American Republics in finding 
solutions to their basic economic problems, and to enhance the 
growth "of the type of institutions which flourish under repre­
sentative democracy." The United States was prepared, the 
Secretary continued, "to cooperate actively with the other
American states to end tyranny, whether of the left or right,
105and to strengthen the social base of democracy."
On March 13, 1961, President Kennedy released further 
details about the Alliance for Progress at a reception for
^Q^U. S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy. 
Current Documents. 1961. Publication 7808 (Washington, D. G.: 
Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 341.
^^^Ibid.. pp. 341-42.
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Latin American Diplomats and members of Congress. The President 
outlined the need for joint action in bringing about develop­
ment in Latin America, but he did not mislead his listeners by 
indicating that the success of the undertaking would be easy.
If the Alliance is to succeed, he said,
each Latin nation must formulate long-range plans for its 
own development--plans which establish targets and priori­
ties, insure monetary stability, establish the machinery 
for vital social change, stimulate private activity and 
initiative, and provide for a maximum national e f f o r t . 106
To achieve the goals of the Alliance the President 
pointed out the need for political freedom to accompany mater­
ial progress. "Our Alliance for Progress is an alliance of 
free governments," not one in which tyranny will find welcome. 
Furtheimiore, "political freedom must be accompanied by social 
changei" Unless these social reforms,
including land and tax reform, are freely made, unless we 
broaden the opportunity of all of our people, unless the 
great mass of Americans share in increasing prosperity, 
then our alliance, our revolution, our dream, and our 
freedom will fail.10/
On March 22, 1961, President Kennedy, in a message to 
Congress, outlined what he called a new set of basic concepts 
and principles in the overall foreign assistance program.
Among the 8 new concepts and principles which he stated, two 
are of importance here. First, the President indicated that 
aid would be made available to those nations which were willing
^®^Text of the address is carried in Department of 
State Bulletin. V (April 3, 1961), pp. 471-74.
lO^Ibid.. XLIV, p. 474.
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to help themselves, including the making of necessary social 
and economic reforms. Secondly, the President desired to see 
a distinction drawn more carefully between military and econo­
mic aid. Aid for social and economic development, he felt,
TOR"must be seen on its own merits."
On March 31, 1961, President Kennedy appointed a Task 
Force on Foreign Assistance to study and formulate plans which 
might be sent to Congress in order to implement a proper ap­
proach to the undertaking. The Task Force recommendations 
were published in mid-1961, Among the new concepts and prin­
ciples proposed were (1) a more unified administration of the 
overall program; (2) a more flexible set of tools such as 
"long-term loans" repayable in dollars, "supporting assistance" 
for immediate and strategic undertakings, "development grants" 
where loans are unsatisfactory, "food for peace" to meet imme­
diate health needs, and "people" such as administrators, tech­
nicians, advisors, and Peace Corps; (3) a willingness to assist 
in sound country programs where nations had indicated a will­
ingness to make necessary social, and governmental reform;
(4) using research techniques to constantly evaluate the pro­
grams; (5) making extensive use of private enterprise in less 
developed countries by borrowing the tools of free enterprise, 
providing broader guarantees to private investments, and car­
rying on investment surveys; and finally (6) encouraging other
^Department of State Bulletin, XLIV (April 10, 1961), 
pp. 507-14.
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free world countries assist and cooperate by coordinating
multilateral programs, granting more aid, and lengthening
their commitments.»
In August, 1961, the President's proposals for an 
Alliance for Progress were acted upon by representatives of 
all the American Republics, except Cuba, at a meeting of the 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council held at Punta del 
Este, Uruguay. At that meeting, a Declaration to the Peoples 
of America was issued by all representatives. This was fol­
lowed by the signing of the Charter of Punta Del Este.
The Declaration consists primarily of expressed goals. 
They include strengthening democratic institutions, acceler­
ating economic and social development, providing better hous­
ing for urban and rural inhabitants, encouragement of agrari­
an reform, better working conditions through a more effective 
process of labor-management cooperation, higher literacy rates 
through emphasis on education, more and better health programs, 
tax reform, better fiscal and monetary policies so that infla­
tion could be minimized, the encouragement of private enter­
prise in the development scheme, solving the problem of export
^®^The Task Force, directed by Henry R. Labouissee, 
was subdivided into three groups: (1) Legislation and Con­
gressional Presentation, headed by New York attorney and for­
mer Assistant Director, Office of the Director for Mutual 
Security; (2) Organization and Administration, headed by 
George Gant of the Ford Foundation; and (3) Program Develop­
ment, headed by Frank M. Coffin, Managing Director of the 
Development Loan Fund, See Department of State, ^  Act for 
International Development. 4 Program for the Decade of Develop­
ment. Publication 7205 (Washington, D. C.: Government Print­
ing Office, 1961),
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fluctuations, and economic integration of Latin America.
To accomplish these goals the United States agreed to 
provide "a major part of twenty billion dollars, principally 
in public funds," to Latin America over the following 10 
years. The Latin American Republics, on the other hand, 
agreed to channel more resources into economic and social 
development, "and to make the reforms necessary to assure 
that all share fully in the fruits of the Alliance for Pro­
gress.
Title I of the Charter of Punta Del Este outlined the 
objectives of the Alliance for Progress which are roughly the 
same as the goals listed in the Declaration. Some more speci­
fic obligations, such as greatly expanding the level of agri­
cultural productivity, and increasing life expectancy at birth
112by five years, were added.
Congress responded to executive recommendations with 
respect to United States foreign assistance by passing on 
September 4, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The first 
part of the Act was entitled the "Act for International Devel­
opment of 1961." Part II of the Act, dealing with military aid, 
was entitled the "International Peace and Security Act of 1961."
‘'Declaration to the Peoples of America," in U. S. 
Department of State, American Foreign Policy. Current Docu­
ments . 1961. Publication 7808 (Washington, D. C.; Government 
Printing Office, 1965), pp. 393-95.
llllbid.. p. 395.
112"charter of Punta Del Este," in ibid.. pp. 395-409.
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Only the part concerned with development aid will be discussed 
here.
Goals for the Development Act are found in the section 
headed "Statement of Policy," There, the Congress declares 
that it was not only a necessity, but also an opportunity and 
responsibility of the United States to demonstrate that "eco­
nomic growth and political democracy can go hand in hand to 
the end that an enlarged community of free, stable, and self- 
reliant countries can reduce world tensions and insecurity.
The policy of the United States was, the document pointed out, 
to assist friendly foreign countries by helping them develop 
free economic institutions, improve productive capabilities, 
and minimize barriers to the channels of private investment 
capital.
Not only was Congress concerned with economic develop­
ment and cooperation, but it hoped also to promote internation­
al trade, to promote freedom of the press,information, reli­
gion," and other rights without regard to race or religion. 
Furthermore, the Act stipulated, due to the continuing threat 
of world communism, the United States would make assistance 
available to other free countries, at their request, and on 
the basis of long-range continuity, for the purposes of help­
ing them maintain their freedom. The assistance, the Act indi­
cated, should
be based upon sound plans and programs; be directed toward 
ll^U. S., Statutes â£ LsSS&t I-XXV, p. 424.
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the social as well as economic aspects of economic devel­
opment ; be responsive to the efforts of the recipient 
countries to mobilize their own resources and help them­
selves; be cognizant of the external and internal pres­
sures which hamper their growth; and should emphasize 
long-range development assistance as the primary instru­ment of such growth.114
The following amounts for economic assistance were writ*
ten into the 1961 legislation:
1; Development loans $1,112,500,000
2. Development grants 323,900,000
3• Development grants,
special authorization 1 00 ,000
4. Surveys of investment
opportunities 1,500,000
5. International organi­
zations and programs 153,500,000
6 . Supporting assistance 425,000,000
7. Contingency Fund 275,000,000
8 . Administrative
Expenses 47,500,000
During the same month that the above legislation was
passed, the Congress also approved, in Public Law 87-293, the
Peace Corps program. Legislatively defined purpose of the
Peace Cozrps was to make available to inteirested countries
skilled men and women from the United States who could help
the countries in need train their own manpower, and to provide
a better understanding between the American people and other
peoples of the w o r l d , A n  appropriation not to exceed $40
117million was authorized for the fiscal year 1962,
114ibid.. pp, 424-25. 3-15xbid., p, 717,
^^^Ibid., p, 612,
117The relationship between the Peace Corps and a coun­
try's development is discussed in Robert B, Textor (ed,). Cul­
tural Frontiers of the Peace Corps (Cambridge: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 1966), pp. 309-22,
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The ever present search to adequately explain and jus­
tify the foreign assistance policy of the United States did 
not stop with the passage of the Act for International Develop­
ment, and related legislation, in 1961. As a result. President 
Kennedy appointed a committee to give further study to all 
phases of the aid program. The Committee, commonly called the 
Clay Committee, published its reports and findings in March,
1963.118
The Clay Committee pointed out that foreign aid may be 
an appropriate instrument for pursuing the national interest 
of the United States. United States aid is well spent, it was 
noted, when it assists developing couDtries to achieve political 
and economic stability. Achieving the latter, however, is not 
as simple for the less developed countries as it was for the 
European countries where long established economic, political 
and social systems could effectively absorb such aid. Further­
more, the report continued, while some aid recipients are not 
always in agreement with us on international political issues, 
there is justification for the aid provided it is not given for 
projects which are government-ovmed and in competition with 
private endeavors. While the United States should not expect 
recipient governments to wholeheartedly adopt the American 
system of enterprise, it should, nevertheless, "not extend aid
^^®The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the 
Free World, The Scope and Distribution of United States Mili­
tary and Economic Assistance Programs (Washington: Department
of State, 1963).
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which is inconsistent with our beliefs, democratic tradition, 
and knowledge of economic organization and consequences."
The Committee reiterated the arguments for channeling 
more aid through multilateral channels, but made no specific 
recommendations with respect to amounts, and mentioned only 
one agency, IDA, through which more action might be taken* In 
another very general recommendation, the Committee suggested 
that the overall amounts currently spent for aid should be re­
duced .
The Report singled out the Alliance for Progress program 
for special emphasis. The Committee recognized the urgent 
need for reform in Latin America, yet it also recognized the 
existence of a myriad of obstacles to such development. In 
the words of the Committee,
The Alliance for Progress— predicated on a joint en­
deavor to achieve for the Latin American peoples economic 
progress and social justice with free institutions and 
political liberty--was b om in the face of a formidable 
inheritance. Political and economic instability, habits 
of government, and social rigidity in Latin America, am­
bivalent emotions toward Ui S. power and influence in the 
hemisphere, deteriorating Latin American terms of trade, 
vacuums of political leadership and technical skill, the 
absence of U. S. and Latin American institutional struc­
tures adequate to deal with these problems, and increasing 
Communist efforts to exploit them--these and other condi­
tions combined to argue for both the urgent necessity and short-term impossibility of the Alliance.^21
The Report was mildly critical of the recipient countries 
in Latin America for not having been willing to fully implement
llSlbid.. pp. 5-6. 120Ibid.. pp. 15-20.
121ibid.. p. 11,
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the goals of the Declaration to the Peoples of the Americas 
and the Charter of Punta Del Este. The Committee did, however, 
distinguish between the problem of being unwilling to act 
properly, and the problem of being unable to honor their com­
mitments. The United States should, the Committee felt, be 
more and more specific about the reforms it seeks, and concen­
trate assistance on those countries in which progress is being 
made.
Summary and Conclusions
The United States Point Four program, initiated in 1949, 
marked a turning point in the United States foreign assistance 
programs. It constituted a clear manifestation of the United 
States interest in directly assisting the less developed coun­
tries of the world in solving some of their basic problems.
In addition to setting up a bilateral program of technical as­
sistance, the United States vigorously supported the adoption 
of an expanded program (ETAP) in the United Nations.
Throughout the 1950's, the search for the proper direc­
tion of United States development aid programs continued. A 
number of studies were made. These studies were concerned with 
the goals of American foreign assistance and the best approach 
to take in channeling the aid in order to meet these goals.
There was near unanimous opinion that granting aid to develop­
ing countries was in the long-range security interest of the
122Ibid.. p. 12.
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United States; there were also other objectives as well. There 
was not unanimous opinion about how the aid should be channeled, 
At least two of the studies, the Rockefeller Report and Maxwell 
Graduate School Study, spoke strongly in favor of using multi­
lateral channels. In a third, the first of two made at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a bilateral approach was 
favored, but one which operated within a framework of multi­
lateral consultation. The issue of bilateral versus multilater-
123al channeling continues until this day.
Some of the studies on foreign assistance also dealt 
with conditions to be attached to the receipt of this aid, a 
factor closely tied to the issue of how it should be channeled. 
As early as 1950, the Bell Report suggested that the Philippine 
government should, in order to get United States development 
assistance, pursue some basic reforms such as overhauling tax 
collecting machinery, improved agricultural production methods, 
promote education and public housing, and improve public admin­
istration. Other studies at least touched on the issue, and 
the idea of self-help in the Mutual Security Act of 1951 speci­
fied that aid should be administered in such a way as to elimi­
nate barriers to free enterprise participation in tiie develop­
ment process.
The United States became a participant in several mul­
tilateral aid organizations during the 1950's. These included
l^^See, for instance, Senator Fulbright's comments in 
his The Arrogance of Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1967),
especially Chapter 11, pp. 223-41.
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the International Finance Corporation, the United Nations 
Special Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the 
International Development Association* During the same period, 
some bilateral programs were started. The latter include the 
Food-for-Peace Program under Public Law 480, and the Develop­
ment Loan Fund. In addition, an office of Private Enterprise 
was established in the International Cooperation Administra­
tion, and the Investment Guaranty Program was extended.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is a milestone in 
the development of United States foreign aid principles and 
concepts. The Act was passed after further study had been 
made, and after the special program known as the Alliance for 
Progress had been agreed upon by the participating countries. 
>fore clearly than ever the Congress stipulated the responsi­
bility of the countries receiving aid. Social development, as 
well as economic development was declared a goal.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 did not expressly 
declare social factors to be impediments to economic develop­
ment. These factors as impediments were more precisely stated 
in the Alliance for Progress documents. There, in language 
which had not previously been used in such clear and unmistake- 
able terms, social reform in the areas of agricultural produc­
tion and land reform, education, and political stability, were 
singled out as factors influencing economic development.
The history of United States aid to developing countries 
is one in which the intent of Congress appears to be nebulous.
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The lack of national consensus in support of foreign assis­
tance has undoubtedly contributed to this situation. The 
Congress did, in 1961, and especially in authorizing the 
Alliance for Progress, manifest a clearer concept of the ob­
jectives and direction which such aid programs should take.^^^ 
In one of the most recent studies of United States 
foreign assistance, the Clay Report, it was also pointed out 
that social reform in Latin America must go hand in hand with 
economic development. The Committee realized, however, that 
conditions being vdiat they are, the short-term possibility of 
rapid development in many of the Latin American countries is 
out of the question. This latter problem is the subject mat­
ter of succeeding chapters.
Similar conclusions about the foreign assistance 
program of the United States have been made by Arthur H. 
Darken, "The Struggle Over Foreign Aid: Major Issues and
Competing Theories in the Formulation of United States Foreign 
Aid Policy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia Univer­
sity, 1965), p. 170; Sister Nary Mangan, "The Congressional 
Image of Aid to the Underdeveloped Countries (1949-1959) As 
Revealed in the Congressional Hearings and Debates" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1964), pp. 356-57, 
p. 364 and 372; and Heyward Moore, "Congressional Committees 
and the Formulation of Foreign Aid Policy" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of North Carolina, 1964), p. 239 and 
240.
CHAPTER III 
THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES
The state of economic development in those countries 
which are the recipients of United States foreign assistance 
is of fundamental importance. Therefore, this chapter will 
consist of a description of the regional economy of Latin 
America, plus brief case studies of Mexico and Peru.
The Regional Economy
The living standard of the Latin American people is 
relatively low. Using the per capita gross product figure as 
a standard of measurement, this amounted to approximately 
$371 in 1961 based on 1960 prices. In 1960, it was $366 or a 
little less than one-eighth that of Canada and less than one- 
third that of Europe. While this figure was three and a half 
to four times that of parts of Africa and as much as five times 
that of underdeveloped Asia, it is still low enough that Latin 
America in general must be considered a part of the less devel­
oped world.^
In Latin America there is a considerable variation
^victor L. Urquidi. The Challenge of Development in 
Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 5.
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from country to country, just as there is in other parts of 
the world. In only three of the countries, which include 
about 15 percent of the total Latin American population, does 
the figure rise above $400.% Seven other countries, with 
about two-thirds of the total regional population, have per
3capita products between $300 and $400 annually. The remain­
ing republics have an average of less than $300 annually, with 
the figure probably being closer to $150 or $200 than it is to
$300.4
During the decade of the 1950's the average annual 
growth rate of Latin America's gross product was 4.5 percent. 
Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil had growth rates in excess of 7 
percent, while in Argentina and Peru it was less than 2 percent. 
When compared with the annual population growth of 2.5 percent, 
it shows that the per capita product went up, on the average, 
about 2 percent per year. The growth was more rapid in the 
first half of the decade because in the latter half agricultural 
production declined rather sharply.^
Agriculture in Latin America remains a principal eco­
nomic activity. It alone accounted for about 20 percent of
^They are Argentina, Venezuela and Costa Rica.
^These include Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay,
Chile, Panama and Cuba.
^Urquidi, 0£. cit.. p. 6 .
^Ibid.. p. 9, and Table 8 , p. 164. See also Committee 
for Economic Development (CED), Cooperation for Progress 
Latin America (New York; CED, 1961), p. 46.
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the gross domestic product during the L950's. It was second 
only to manufacturing which accounted for approximately 24 
percent of the total product. The latter activity, however, 
employed only 16 percent of the employed, while the former 
accounted for roughly half. Between the years 1951 and 1960 
the per capita Increase In agricultural production rose about 
11 percent. During the same period per capita Increase In 
Industrial output rose by some 54 percent.^
One of the chief characteristics of the Latin American 
countries Is that they are single product export economies. 
Some 14 of the 20 countries have been relying upon more than 
50 percent of their total export earnings from one commodity.^ 
In the remaining 6 , which Includes Peru and Mexico, the per­
centage Is between 23 and 50 percent. These major export com­
modities Include coffee, meat, bananas, tin, sugar, cotton, 
timber, wool, petroleum, and copper. World markets for these 
primary commodities show In general wider short-term fluctua­
tions than those of the Industrial countries. Price Instabili­
ty has not been confined to any single country or commodity,
Qrather It Includes foodstuffs, minerals, and other products. 
One of the major causes of price Instability Is the
^Urquldl, 0£. cit.. p. 9 and 164; and CED, op. cit.,
p. 18.
^International Monetary Fund (IMF), International 
Financial Statistics (Washington, D. C.: IMF, 1960), XIII 
(May, I960), pp. 36-37.
^United Nations, World Economic Survey 1962 (New York; 
United Nations, 1963), p. 49.
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cyclical variations in income and output that continue in the
industrially advanced countries which are the main markets for
the primary commodities entering international trade. While
in the postwar period there have not been upheavals in the
developed economies comparable to those of the 1920*s and
1930*s, it only takes a mild recession to create pronounced
qchanges in the demand for primary commodities. The export 
record of the oil producing countries and those countries whose 
exports have been more diversified have at times been more sta­
ble than some of the developed countries. On the whole, however, 
export fluctuations before and after World War II have varied 
considerably more for the primary producing countries than for 
the developed ones.^® It is obvious that such fluctuations are 
serious impediments to governments which are attempting to 
maintain a steady rate of growth.
For almost a decade, and particularly since the Korean 
War boom, there has been a general decline in world prices for 
products of the low income countries. The average export price 
of manufactured goods has tended to increase, while the average 
export price of primary commodities has tended to decrease.
The ratio of prices of primary products to those of manufac­
tured goods declined more than 20 percent during the 1950*s.
9lbid.. p. 48.
Annual Report. 1963 (Washington, D. C.: IMF,
1964), p. 56.
lllbid.. p. 58; see Table 1.
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TABLE 1
EXPORT AND II-IPORT PRICES FOR SELECTED YEARS*
(1958 = 100)
Export Prices Import Prices
Country Indexes 1953 '55 •57 •61 •63 '53 '55 '57 '61 '63
United States 94 94 100 103 102 100 102 105 98 98
Canada 97 96 102 99 96 93 93 101 98 101
Latin America
Argentina 137 119 104 107 9 9I 111 104 113 99 108Brazil 119 111 108 85 81 - - - -Colombia 110 116 118 84 78 98 100 103 100 102
Costa Rica 109 117 120 83 80, 94 94 100 103 103Dominican Rep, 95 94 117 80 9 9I - - - -
Ecuador 104 102 103 82 77 89 92 97 101 »
El Salvador 100 120 120 78 74, 99 96 101 100 102
Guatemala 109 122 126 80 81^ 92 93 98 101Honduras 104 114 110 89 117 93 94 100 102 104Nicaragua 109 117 116 88 91 94 94 100 103 103
Panama 100 113 103 83 93 94 94 100 103 103Peru 106 115 119 100 108 99 104 107 -
Uruguay 140 129 128 111 124 - - - -
Venezuela 90 94 100 92 92 97 96 100 106 127
Weighted Average 108 108 108 93 93 100 97 102 98 96
Western Europe
Weighted Avg. 100 102 103 98 101 103 102 108 97 96
^Figures are for 1962
Commodity Indexes
Cacao 85 86 70 52 58
Coffee 118 119 119 77 73
Copper 128 162 113 116 118
Cotton 128 131 105 96 94
Meat 126 117 99 135 110Petroleum 90 94 100 92 92
Sugar 97 93 147 83 242Wheat 162 114 100 104 103Wool 133 119 135 114 130
Weighted Average 110 110 109 95 108
Without Sugar 94 95
^Compiled from IMF, International Financial Statistics 
(Washington, D. C.: IMF, 1964), XVII, Nos. 3 and 5; IMF,
International Financial Statistics. Supplement to 1964-65 
Issues (Washington. D. C.: IMF, 1965), pp. xiv, xv.
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During recent years, most of the major regions in the 
less developed group of nations,, the Middle East Excepted, 
have been affected by the downward trend in the terms of trade. 
There were differences, however, in degree of change, Latin 
America suffered the most pronounced decline, 1? percent since 
1952; the figure being 11 percent in the African countries 
and 5 percent in Asia,^^
Taking into account the population increases, the 
Middle East and Africa were the only two areas to show appre­
ciable increases in per capita importing power of exports be­
tween 1950 and i9 6 0, where the increase amounted to some 15 
percent. The 20 percent increase in aggregate buying power in 
Asia was just sufficient to maintain the per capita buying 
power of exports. In Latin America the per capita buying 
power declined. 13
Balance of Payments Trends
The balance of payments problems in Latin America 
have been quite serious. The over-all balance for the years 
1961 and 1962 are shown in Table 2, Figures for other years 
are not included because estimates of errors and omissions 
which are generally quite large were usually not included in 
the earlier reports.





LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUMMARIES^


















1961 -292 269 159 -87 49
1962 -480 33 112 -125 -3881963 -218 30 176 -123 -135
Chile -280 93 84 -9 -112
-157 83 136 -82 -20
-185 -10 115 51 -29
Colombia
-142 -9 4 18 -129-119 10 80 -13 -42
-137 129 15 -81 74Mexico
-82 169 127 -249 -35
64 131 135 -316 14
-215 -216 85 37 123Peru
18 - -2 18 34
-22 -12 41 -1 6-59 36 50 -8 19
Venezuela
375 -247 -94 -71 -37
331 -226 —89 -18 -2
564 -266 -111 -24 163
Other°
-757 291 253 43 -170
-471 272 94 -263 -368
Total
-1135 540 526 -373 -442-810 291 524 -833 -828
-259 186 623 -242 308
*IMF, Annual Report. 1963. o^. cit., p. 150. For 
other summaries see IMF, Annual Report. 1962. and the United 
Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs, ECLA. 





(Value in millions of U« S. dollars)
1953 1956 1958 1960 1961 1962 1964
u. s.
Exp.(fob) 15782 19102 17920 20584 21000 21688 26582
Imp.(cif) 11846 13987 14619 16508 16069 17764 20251
Germany
4389 7358 8807 11418 12690 13267 16221
3771 6617 7576 10107 10948 12289 14618
Argentina
1125 944 994 1079 964 1216 1410
795 1128 1233 1249 1460 1357 1077
Brazil
1539 1482 1243 1269 1403 1214 14331319 1234 1353 1462 1460 1475 1263
Chile
408 542 386 488 506 532 623
355 353 415 500 585 518 609
Colombia
596 599 461 466 435 463 537
547 657 400 519 557 540 586
Costa Rica
80 67 92 86 84 85 113
74 91 99 110 107 114 139
Ecuador
92 116 133 144 125 137 148
75 108 105 114 107 111 169
El Salvador 89 113 116 117 119 136 178
72 105 108 122 109 125 191
Guatemala
100 123 108 117 113 114 158
34 36 48 48 52 57 202
Mexico
585 880 736 765 826 931 1054
807 1072 1129 1186 1139 1143 1493
Nicaragua
46 58 64 56 61 82 118
51 69 78 72 74 98 137Peru
219 308 281 430 494 538 666
293 384 382 373 468 534 571
Uruguay 270 211 139 129 175 153 179
193 213 151 244 208 230 198
Venezuela
1445 2116 2321 2432 2413 2594 2742
916 1249 1599 1188 1092 1096 1272
a IMF. lĵ y.nflj:ior!ffll Fing.9&lal 5£atiSti£&i XVII 1964), pp. 34-35; and XVIII (October, 1965), pp. 36-37
(March,
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an annual average of about $1 billion. Excluding Venezuela, 
whose exports place her in a balance of payments position that 
is not typical of Latin America, the figures would be even 
greater. As shown in Table 3 only about three small countries 
(still excluding Venezuela) have enjoyed continuous balances 
during the past 10 years* The major deficits have occurred 
in the larger countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Uruguay, and in the smaller countries of Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Haiti, Nicaragua,, and Panama. Peru^s problem of the early 
19 5 0’s was somewhat better in the mid-l950*s, again de­
teriorating in the later years of that decade.
In 1962 world prices for primary products were lower 
than they were in the period five years earlier.14 In that 
year, nonetheless, the volume exported showed increases which, 
in some cases, were sufficient to offset the deterioration in 
prices. At least over the short term, however, the gains in 
one country’s exports were at the expense of another country 
because of rather well defined limits to which exports can 
expand for the region as a vrtiole. Such has been common during 
the last 10 years, particularly with such commodities as 
coffee and cotton. This situation has apparently worked to 
the advantage of the smaller countries, "whose total exports 
may be regarded as marginal in relation to the volume of the 
region’s exports as a whole."15
l^see Table 1.
^^United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
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As a result of successive declines in prices on the 
New York market, the average price of Brazilian coffee in 1962 
was 37 percent below the annual average of 1950-53 and 30 per­
cent below that of 1958. World exports and consumption has 
increased but not in proportion to the increase in production. 
To limit this production, there have been several international 
coffee agreements in recent years, but the export quotas gener­
ally agreed upon were invalidated by large stockpiles since 
there was no direct effort to link export quotas with minimum 
price levels, as the tin agreements had done. Furthermore, 
the original coffee agreements included only Latin American
exporting countries, leaving the principal African exporters
16outside. The latter, however, have since been included.
The export prices of wheat, cotton, maize and oil have 
remained about the same in the last few years. Other products 
declining significantly in price include cacao, quebracho, 
lead and bananas. Showing significant increases were tin, 
silver and sugar. Several commodities have suffered erratic 
price movements in the intexmational market, Wool is a good 
example, and may be one of the Latin American commodities to 
be affected by technological change. The expanded use of 
artificial fibers has been limiting consumption of wool for 
some years. The United Kingdom, for example, used considerably
Affairs, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Econo­
mic Bulletin for Latin America. VIII (October, 1963), p. 115.
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less in 1962 than in 1959. An increased demand in Japan, 
however, was partly the cause of a slight world increase in 
consumption in 1962*17
Most of the Latin American exports go to the United 
States, Canada,, and Western Europe., An average for the years 
1957-59 shows that the United States and Canada received 47 
percent of them, while another 30 percent went to Western 
Europe. By way of imports for the same period, 53 percent 
came from the United States and Canada and 28 percent from 
Western Europe. There were, nevertheless, wide variations 
in the general pattern, Argentina, for instance, shipped 
only 12 percent of her exports to the United States and 
Canada, while 94 percent of Panama’s exports and 72 percent 
of Colombia's went to the United States.!#
The effects of foreign trade on the economy of a 
country are not due solely to the fluctuations in exports. 
Increases in the latter may be more than offset by the terms 
of trade* So, in evaluating a change in foreign trade as 
favorable or unfavorable, it is necessary to study the 
terms-of-trade•
Using 1955 as a base year, export prices in 1962 
dropped 15.1 percent from those of 1961* Those of imports 
dropped only 3.7 percent* As a result of this disparity, the 
terms-of-trade in 1962 were 12.7 percent lower than in 1955*^9
l^Ibid. l^CED, 0£* cit*.p*34*
^9por a partial schedule see the United Nations,
World Economic Survey. 1962. op* cit., pp* 23-30.
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Such deterioration in the terms wipes out a large percentage 
of the improvements which increases in the quantum of exports 
would otherwise have implied from the external purchasing 
power of Latin Americans exports.
The import deficit in Latin America is sometimes fi­
nanced by reserves, the import of foreign capital, loans and 
grants or drawings from the international financial institu­
tions. With respect to reserves, Latin America’s total has 
declined appreciably since 1953»̂ *̂  Significant declines took 
place in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay. Among the 
larger countries, Mexico and Venezuela showed some increases.
Foreign Investment
Most of the foreign investment in Latin America since 
1929 has come from the United States.21 This flow generally 
has been in the form of direct investments rather than the 
portfolio type. Book value of these investments rose from 
about $2.7 billion in 1943 to $9.0 billion in 1959* Actually, 
the Latin American percentage of total United States direct 
investments has declined from a pre-war figure of about 50 
percent to about 30 percent at the present time. This is due 
to the fact that much of the present United States direct 
foreign investments are going to Canada and Western Europe. 
Total United States private (net) investment in Latin America
20see Table 4*
^^U.S. capital accounted for approximately 60 per­
cent of the total worth of foreign direct private investments 




(Gold, Fund Gold Tranche Positions, and Foreign-Exchange, End 
of Period: Millions of U. S. dollars)
1953 1955 1957 1959 1963 1965
United States 23,458 22,797 24,832 21,504 16,838 15,762
Canada 1,902 1,985 1,926 2,029 2,577 2,815
Latin America
Argentina 531 457 286 349 304 117
Bolivia 25 7 6 13 6 26
Brazil 605 491 476 483 370 520
Chile 68 86 51 131 82 120
Colombia 202 136 145 215 97 84
Costa Rica 19 21 13 15 14 16
Cuba 493 505 441 257 « -Dominican Rep 30 38 48 42 29 42
Ecuador 40 35 39 44 43 38
El Salvador 44 39 42 38 45 68
Guatemala 42 56 75 44 56 69
Honduras 23 20 16 12 14 31
Mexico 250 440 475 458 465 518
Nicaragua 17 14 11 12 30 57
Panama 52 42 29 40 38 28Peru 55 58 40 59 127 207
Uruguay 368 235 197 192 188 204
Venezuela 484 534 1,459 724 665 822
Continental Europe
10,195 13,480 14,320 18,165 28,300
All countries 53,325 56,025 58,550 60,230 68,435
^Compiled from IMF, International Financial Statistics 
(Washington, D. G.: IMF, 1964), XVII (March, 1964), and XVIII
(October, 1965).
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for the years 1950-62 is as follows:
Year (Millions of $)
1950  ........... $ 122
1953 .................... 546
1955 ...................  600
1957 ..................  1566
1958 ...................  479
1960 .................... 539
1962 .................... 227
More than one-third of United States direct private 
investments in Latin America during the 1950's were for petro­
leum, most of which was in Venezuela. Petroleum was followed 
by manufacturing, mining and smelting, and public utilities.
In 1960, about 20 percent of the total United States private 
investment in Latin America was in Venezuela.^^
The long-term capital flow of United States government 
(net) investment increased from $78 million in 1954 to $272 
million in 1957. It rose to $331 million in 1959 and topped 
$500 million in 1962.2* In the meantime, some loans were
95being made to Latin American countries by the World Bank.^*'
According to vfctor L. Urquidi, the Latin American 
economies are not "condemned to an endless future of simply 
trading primary products for manufactured goods. Its own
22ceD, 0 2. cit.. p. 38.
23united States Department of Commerce, United States 
Business Investments in Foreign Countries (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 19o0), p. 90; Urquidi, og. cit.. 
p. 47.
2^CED, log. ci£.
25por a country by country summary of these loans and 
repayments from 1947-63, see IMF, Internationa1 Financial Sta­
tistics (Washington, D. C.: 1964), XVII (March, 1964).
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struc ture of output is changing and will continue to do so,
just as the structure of demand in the more advanced countries 
is being transformed."’26 But, he continues, "Latin America's 
dependence, through trade and tourism, on the economic devel­
opment of other countries will continue indefinitely," It 
would be to Latin America's advantage, he adds, "to diversify 
both export products and markets and to send abroad products 
with a higher degree of processing,"27 The fact is, he thinks 
that this could be partially realized through a successfully 
operating Latin American common market,20
Inflation
Another general characteristic of the Latin American 
economies is their tendency toward inflation, Urquidi notes:
In just the ten years from 1950; to I960, the over-all 
price level in Bolivia went up 91& times, or at a com­
pound annual rate of 57*3 percent. In Chile, it rose 21 
times, or by 36,4 percent a year. Prices in Paraguay in­
creased l6i times, or 33»3 percent each year. In 
Argentina, the price level was multiplied by lli, for 
an annual increase of 27.7 percent. In Brazil^ it went 
up 7 times, or 21,0 percent per annum. The price level 
in Uruguay rose more than kh times or by 16,7 percent 
a year. These are cases of acute inflation,29
In some of the other countries, inflation was far less
^^Urquidi, og. cit., p. 16,
Z^Ibid,. p„ 2 6,
At the American Presidents' conference at Punta del 
Este, April, 1967, basic agreement was reached that a Latin 
American common market should be established. Based upon the 
existing Latin American Free Trade Area and the Central American 
common market, the new organization is to begin operating in 




serious. Peru, for example, had a I960 price level only 2.6 
times that of 1950, with an annual average increment of 10.2 
percent. The increase in Colombia and Mexico rose at an 
average annual rate.of 7 percent. Inflation in Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic 
and Venezuela was practically unknown.
Inflation in Latin America has largely resulted from 
increases in money and credit encouraged by government budget­
ary deficits, without corresponding increases in the production 
of goods and services. Some of the governments have attempted 
to finance development through inflationary methods. That is, 
development expenditures have been allowed to exceed revenues 
by more than could be borrowed directly from residents of these 
countries or obtained from other countries in the form of loans 
or grants. They have, therefore, borrowed from the banking 
system. While moderate credit expansion would have had few
serious effects, the extent to which many governments have used
31the banking system has created inflationary pressures.
War and postwar reconstruction encouraged inflation. 
Interruption of trade, complications in the demand and supply 
schedules and other similar factors caused inflation to proceed 
at different rates in different countries. In Latin America, 
as in most of the less developed countries, prices and export 
receipts tended to be high during the early post-war period.
SOlbid.. pp. 37-38.
31ihf, Annual Report. 1963. og. cit.. p. 54.
86
Since then, other factors such as wage-price tying arrangements, 
supply bottlenecks in some sectors, and attempts to hold prices 
on certain goods by using subsidies supported by budgetary defi­
cits, have encouraged inflation.
Inflation diminishes the amount of resources available 
for private domestic investment, A countiry's savings are re­
duced, and quite often a significant amount of these reduced 
savings go abroad into foreign investment, at the same time 
that capital from abroad is discouraged. Much of the reduction 
in private domestic investment goes into the production of 
luxury type products such as expensive houses, swimming pools, 
and motor boats, which are not of the highest social and eco­
nomic priority. Further, inflation encourages the accumulation 
of large inventories and short term profitable investments which 
distort the productive structure. The authorities, attempting 
to control the price level, will often resort to controls which 
are likely to encourage uneconomic private domestic produc­
tion,^^
By way of final comments on the economies of Latin 
America in general, it is perhaps worthwhile to take some note 
of the general pattern of income and expenditures. One study 
made in 1955 shows that, with the exception of Venezuela and 
Argentina, the tax burden was less than 15 percent of the gross 
national product,^3 In some countries, including Brazil,
32lbid.. p, 55.
^^United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Af­
fairs, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) Governmenta1 
Income and Expenditures « 1947-1954 (New York: 1955),
Ô7
Honduras and Mexico, it was less than 10 percent* In the 
United States and some of the European countries the figure 
was between 20 and 30 percent. Most of the tax systems are 
inefficient and "have accentuated the inflationary process and 
helped perpetuate forms of consumption that unfavorably affect 
the balance of payments, or do not contribute to economic 
development* . * *"^^
As the following figures will show, taxation has been 
guided along indirect and regressive lines:
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGES OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAXES FOR 
SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES®




Argentina • • . . 48 ........ 52
Brazil. . . . . . • • • • • • 25 . . . . .  75
Colombia. . . . . # # # # * # 45 • • • • • . . . . .  55
Costa Rica. . . . # # # # # # 28 # e # » # ........ 72
Chile . . . . . . 56 • • • # • . . . . .  44
Ecuador ........ « • • • • • 29 • • • • • . . . . .  79
El Salvador . . . 39 • • • • • . . . . .  61
Guatemala . . . . 27 . . . . .  73
Honduras........ 24 . . . . .  76
Mexico.......... • • • • • • 47 . . . . .  53
Nicaragua . . . . • • • • • • 13 • • • • • . . . . .  87Peru. . . . . . . 34 • • • • • . . . . .  66
Venezuela . . . . • • • • • • 58 # e # # # . . . . .  42
^United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Af- 
lomic Survey of Latin America. 1956 (New York:fairs, (ECLA) Econom < 
United Nations, 195/), p. 138*
With respect to expenditures, military and other non-
^^Urquidi, 0£, cit.. p. 42.
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productive areas constitute a high proportion of the govern­
ment's total budget. It is customary to spend from 20 to 25 
percent for the military forces in most of the countries, but 
in some it is as high as 30 percent.
In this brief general view of the Latin American eco­
nomies, selected economic indicators have been presented.
Data indicates that per capita incomes, relative to the indus­
trial countries, are low. In addition, while the gross domes­
tic product has continued to increase, it has not always done 
so steadily, and its increase has been diminished somewhat by 
population increases.
The agricultural sector accounts for about one-fifth of 
the total gross domestic product, only slightly lower than the 
figure for manufacturing. The latter activity, however, employs 
only about 16 percent of the total number of persons employed, 
while the agricultural sector takes more than half. Further­
more, the per capita production in manufacturing has far out­
stripped that for agriculture.
Of principal concern to the Latin American countries 
has been their dependence on a single export commodity. More 
than half of the 20 republics depend on one commodity to pro­
vide 50 percent or more of their export earnings. Compounding 
this problem is the fact that they often produce commodities
^^Ibid.i see also Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics ju 
Latin America (2d ed. rev.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., 1961), p. 170; and Harry Stark, Social and Economic Fron­
tier^ in La|in ̂ merica (Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Co.,
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which are also produced in neighboring countries. They sell 
these products to the industrial nations which in turn sell the 
Latin American countries manufactured goods. Accompanying this 
exchange of primary products for those of a finished nature,
has been a downward trend in the terms of trade, unfavorable
to the primary producing countries. The problem has been at­
tacked, possibly due to the lack of suitable alternatives, by 
increasing the quantities of the primary products exported.
The deterioration in the terms of trade has been pairt-
ly responsible for the chronic balance of payments deficits. 
These deficits have been financed primarily by various exter­
nal sources, including loans, grants and foreign direct private 
investments. Most of the latter have come from the United 
States, even though a decreasing percentage of the United States 
direct foreign investments in recent years has gone to areas 
other than Latin America.
Most of the Latin American countries have had to fight 
a bout of inflation in recent years. Its force ranged from 
extreme in Bolivia, to mild or nonexistent in Venezuela.
While currently in the process of change, many of the 
Latin American countries have, in the past, relied heavily upon 
indirect taxes as the major sources of governmental income.
At the same time, much of the expenditures has been for nonpro­
ductive activities such as national defense.
The seriousness of the economic situation varies from 
country to country. In the following paragraphs, an attempt
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will be made to describe and compare conditions in Mexico and 
Peru.
Present State of Development in Mexico
Mexico is undergoing rapid economic development. As 
the following figures will indicate, the per capita real 
national income has steadily risen since 1939:^^
Year Per Capita Real National
Income (1953 pesos)
1939  ................  1,159
1941 ..................  1,370
1943 ..................  1,661
1945 ..................  1,601
1947 ..................  1,870
1949 ..................  1,891
1951 ..................  1,952
1953 ..................  1,789
1955 ..................  2,001
1957 .  ..............  2,111
1961 ..................  2,324
This increase came about at a time when the population 
was growing steadily. It increased from 19.5 million in 1939 
to 31.4 million people in 1960. Thus on the average the domes­
tic product during the period of 1939-1957 has increased about 
6 percent annually; with an annual population growth of 2.8 
percent this gives an annual rise in the per capita real income
^^Compiled from Banco de Mexico figures as found in 
Anuario Estadistico. 1938-1954, Gompandio Estadistico. 1949- 
1955, and Enrique Perez Lopez, "El producto national," in 
Cincuenta anos de revoluci6n. I, economia. (Mexico, D. F.: 
1959), p. 558, The 1961 figure is an estimate compiled from 
various sources.
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37of some 3*3 percent. The annual growth rate of the gross pro­
duct dropped to 3,5 percent in 1961, but then increased to 5,0 
percent in 1962 and by 1963 was back to the mid-1950*s level 
of 6,0 percent,^®
Other statistics also support the position that the 
Mexicans are living under considerably better conditions than
they were in the late 1930's. Per capita consumption of selec-
39ted foods for the two periods are as follows:
1937-1944 1957-1960






The Mexican economy is diversified; therefore, fluctu­
ations in the price of a single export commodity has not been 
as serious for Mexico as it has for other countries in Latin 
America, The country has relied, and continues to rely, on 
exports of cotton and coffee, copper, lead, and zinc for its 
main export earnings. In 1955, cotton and coffee accounted 
for about 40 percent of total merchandise exports expressed in
®^Ifigenia M, Navarrete, La distribuei6n del ingreso jg 
el dessarollo econSmico de Mexico iMexico City: Escuela
Nacional de Economia, 1960), p. 1,
^^United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, (ECLA), Economic Survey o£ Latin America. 1963 (E/CN, 
12/696/Rev, 1, 1965) (New York: 1965), p, 14,
^^Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico's Development 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p, 92.
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dollar terms. This figure had declined to slightly below 30 
percent by 1961. Approximately 19 percent of the value of 
exports in the former year were copper, lead and zinc. The 
figure had dropped to less than 10 percent by 1961. In the 
meantime, exports of sugar, shrimps and tomatoes had increased. 
The dollar value of all exports increased from some $800 mil­
lion in 1960 to $982.5 million in 1963, and went above $1,000 
million in 1964.^®
As shown in Table 2, Mexico has not had the serious 
balance of payments difficulties which has been so common in 
Latin America. Its most serious deficits during the past 20 
years took place immediately after World War II. It recorded 
impressive surpluses during the war years, and surpluses 
emerged again during the late 1940's and in the mid-1950's. 
During more recent years Mexico has experienced a mild deficit. 
The ever increasing tourist and border trade, along with the 
recent increases in exports, are primarily responsible for 
keeping the payments in near balance.
Foreign investment has not always found the welcome in 
Mexico that it has in other Latin American countries. After 
the uneasy period in the balance of payments of the early 
1950's, however. President Ruiz Cortines turned a more sympa­
thetic eye to this source of funds. Direct foreign investments
40united Nations, loc. cit.: see also IMF, International 
Financial Statistics, various years.
^Vernon, o£. cit.. p. 105.
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moire than doubled in 1954 over those for 1953, and climbed 
steadily for the next three years. By 1958 and 1959, the old 
hostilities showed up again, and total net private foreign 
direct investment began to decline,
After the slump in the early 1960's, the Mexican 
government again began to court foreign investors, particular­
ly those in the United States. In 1962, President Lopez 
Mateos sent an economic team to tour the United States, hoping 
to arouse interest in support of a $1.6 billion industrial 
development program scheduled to run for the next three years. 
Certain incentives were promised, but the President made it 
clear that it wasn’t a program of "industrialization at any 
cost." He did not, for instance, want foreign investors to 
produce commodities which would compete with those already 
being produced in Mexico. Furthermore, there was no promise 
of government relief from the Mexican law which requires that 
51 percent of the ownership of basic industries be under 
Mexican control.
By 1965, President Diaz Ordaz asked the Congress of 
Mexico to pass further legislation vAiich would assist the 
government in its control of foreign capital. Dealing specif­
ically with the banking system, the new law provided that the 
Finance Minister would have the power to withdraw, at his
42lbid.. p. 113-14.
^^Christian Science Monitor. June 8, 1962, and June 27,
1962.
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discretion, the right of foreign investors to participate in 
Mexican banking, investment or credit institutions. These key 
institutions in the economic system, the President indicated, 
"must be reserved for Mexican investors.
Mexico had an inflation problem after World War II, 
similar to the problems that existed in other Latin American 
primary producing countries. But its central bank, the Banco 
de Mexico, whose powers in 1941 were extended from that of a 
central bank to those of a governmental institution with 
powers to enforce policy, used several monetary devices to cope 
with the problem. It instituted a fraction reserve system, and 
stiffened reserve requirements as credit expanded. It bought 
securities of industrial users and diverted them to industry.
In spite of the many restrictions, some inflation developed, 
but it was mild compared with that of most other Latin American 
countries
The development of an effective Latin American common 
market could be a significant factor in Mexico's future develop­
ment.^^ Such an association is widely supported in Mexico, and 
would give the country large scale markets which its internal
^^ e w  York Times. December 12, 1965, p. 21.
^^Vemon, gg. cit.. pp. 98-99.
46yor a recent progress report on LAFTA's development, 
see United States, Congress, Latin American Development and 
Western Hemisphere Trade. o p . cit.. p p . 57-71. For more recent 
developments leading to an enlarged common market see New York 
Times. April 9, 1967, pp. 10, 11, 13 and IE; April 16, 1967, 
p. 32.
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markets have so far been unable to do. Mexico's exports to 
member countries, consisting mostly of manufactured goods, more 
than doubled between 1961 and 1963.^7
Present State of Development in Peru 
The per capita income in Peru in 1960 was about half 
the figure for Mexico, near $150. The amount has been increas­
ing steadily since 1942, yet it is low even by Latin American 
standards. Some 15 of the countries in the region had higher 
per capita incomes in 1960.^^
The annual growth rate of the gross domestic product 
during the period since the end of World War II has not been 
steady. It was approximately 3 percent during the period 
1945-51. The growth rate from 1951-55 was considerably higher, 
in excess of 5 percent. By 1957, however, the growth rate took 
a turn downward. External demand and export prices weakened 
at the same time. A serious balance of payments disequilibrium 
resulted, and there was some depletion of monetary reserves.
This was followed by a certain amount of internal disequilibrium 
which included inflationary pressures, "a greater amount of dis-
49saving on the part of family units and a heavier fiscal deficit." 
Further weakening of economic development came to a head
47united Nations, (E/CN.12/696/Rev., 1965), 0£. cit.,
p. 18.
^^Urquidi, op. cit., p. 162; and Stark, op. cit.. p. 169.
^^United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Af­
fairs, (ECLA), Economic Survey of Latin America « 1958 (E/3244/ 
ST/ECA/60) (New York, 1959), pp. 145-47.
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in 195#; the ye ar in which the per capita gross product actu­
ally registered a decline. The deficit in the balance of pay­
ments continued, and prices continued to move upward. This 
situation continued until the early 1960’s,50 At that time, 
and up until 1963, high growth rates for both product and in­
come were registered. By the latter date, however, production 
was continuing to rise, but the rate of growth of the gross 
product dropped from a hi^ of 9.2 percent in 1961 down to 
3,6 percent,51
By August of 1964, approximately a year after the new 
president, Belaunde Terry, had taken office, there was a re­
covery from the I963 slump. The annual growth rate of the 
gross product was near 7.0 percent. Due in part to a recent 
boom in exports, banks were bulging with record deposits and 
credit was described as "lively," The national currency—  
the sol— was backed by $16$ million in reserves, a figure 
which was 70 percent higher than it was when Belaunde took
office, 52
Peru is still basically an agrarian economy. In the 
late 195 0*s 6 0 ,2 percent of the labor force was engaged in 
agriculture and stock raising. Some 19 percent were employed
^^United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, (ECLA), Economic Survey of Latin America, I960 
(E/3 501/Rev, 1/ST/EC A/68) (New Ÿorïc7 1961), Part'ï, TiBTe II-3 ,
^^United Nations, (E/CN,12/696/Rev,1,196$), op, cit.,
pp. 13-1 4 .
^^New York Times, August 2, I9 6 4, p. 22, and October 
4, 19 6 4, pTIl.
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in industry. During the period 1950-58 there were increases 
in the number employed in both agriculture and industry, with
COa slightly larger increase in the latter.
By 1963, the sectoral composition of the domestic pro­
duct in Peru was 21.5 percent in agriculture and related areas; 
20.7 in trade and finance; 18.9 in manufacturing; 8.1 percent 
in government; and 8.0 percent in mining and quarries. As 
compared with the year 1950, the agricultural percentage had 
declined from 26.2 percent, while increases had been registered 
in trade and finance, manufacturing, and mining and smelting.^^
Peru, as Mexico, does not depend solely on a single 
export commodity. Various minerals such as copper, lead and 
zinc, account for approximately 37 percent of her exports. 
Cotton, which has been its single largest export crop, accounted 
for about 26 percent of the total exports in 1958, while sugar 
accounted for 12 p e r c e n t . T h e  pattern has changed somewhat 
in recent years. The principal export commodity in 1963 was 
fishmeal (23.7 percent of the total) and was followed by cotton 
which accounted for only 17.5 percent of total exports.
About one-third of Peru's exports go to the United 
States and Canada, another one-third go to Western Europe, and
^^Banco Central de Reserve del Peru, Actividades Pro­
duct ivas del Peru (Lima, Peru; 1961), p. 18,
^^United Nations, loc. cit.. p. 32.
^^Banco Central de Reserve del Peru, op. cit.» p. 31.
^^United States, Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
O P . cit.. p. 135.
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about one-sixth to other Latin American countries. About 40
percent of her imports come from the United States, some 10
percent from Canada, about one-third from Western Europe, and
57about one-twelfth from other Latin American countries.
Foreign investment in Peru has never been as large as 
in such countries as Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Mexico and 
Venezuela. United States direct private investment in Peru 
grew from $129 million in 1929 to $427 million by 1959. The 
latter figure accounted for approximately 5 percent of all 
United States direct investments in Latin America, about half 
the figure for Mexico. Most of the United States investment
COhas been in the mining sector.
During the period 1946-56 Peru's average rate of in­
flation amounted to approximately 12 percent. This was the 
sixth largest in Latin America.Inflation has been less 
severe in more recent years.
Development in Mexico and Peru, a Summary 
The above paragraphs have described the general charac­
teristics of the Mexican and Peruvian economies. More specific 
information about these two systems will be included in the 
following chapters. At this point, however, certain general
^^IMF, International Financial Statistics. XIV (Febru­
ary, 1960).
^^United States, Department of Commerce, og. cit..
Table 4.
59Stark, og. cit., p. 127.
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comparisons may be made.
The level of living, as determined by per capita income, 
is considerably higher in Mexico than In Peru. In addition, 
both per capita gross product and per capita real income have 
grown, in recent years, at a steadier rate in Mexico, even 
though both have grown.
Both countries rely on multiple rather than single 
export commodities. This is partly the reason why recent 
balance of payments deficits have been relatively mild for both 
systems. The volume of exports has grown considerably in re- — 
cent years for both countries, but the growth has been greater 
in Mexico than in Peru. With respect to imports, Mexico's 
power to import has been increasingly enhanced because-of dol­
lar accumulations from United States tourist spending.
Neither country has suffered from serious inflation 
problems in recent years, although both had some difficulties 
in the early post-war period. The inflation problem was more 
acute in Peru than in Mexico.
Foreign investment is not so extensive in either Mexico 
or Peru that it has had significant economic effects. Both 
countries are currently welcoming direct foreign investments, 
under certain conditions, and both have received funds from 
other international sources, including loans from the World 
Bank and funds under the Alliance for Progress.
Both Mexico and Peru are members of the Latin American 
Free Trade Association. The immediate advantages of membership 
in this organization, however, appear to be weighted on the
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side of Mexico, Because of the latter's more developed indus­
trial capacity it is in a better position to export manufac­
tured goods to the other member countries.
Recent indices of growth in both countries have been 
impressive, but Mexico has had an important advantage in that 
economic development began much earlier there than it did in 
Peru. Development in Mexico has had an intimate tie with the 
Mexican Revolution, a phenomenon which will be described below. 
Modernization in Peru has been primarily a post-World War II 
development.
Rostow's classification of Mexico as a country at the 
"take-off" stage appears to be justified on the basis of infor­
mation available. Peru cannot be so classified at this time. 
Whether the latter country is still a "traditional society," 
or one meeting "the pre-conditions for take-off," remains to 
be seen. Even if it is accomplishing the latter, the basic 
question raised in this study remains the same: why does
Peru find itself a stage or two behind Mexico?
CHAPTER IV
GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Governments of the less developed countries must share 
much, if not most, of the responsibility for the state of eco­
nomic development. Some of these same governments, however, 
may be limited by conditions which they are trying to over­
come.^
"Politics," also may be an obstacle or asset to econo­
mic development. After summaries on the conceptual theories of 
government and politics, this chapter will analyze the systems 
of Mexico and Peru to determine the degree to which these fac­
tors may influence development, and to what extent, if any, 
they have had on successfully implementing the Alliance for 
Progress.
Albert 0. Hirschman has noted that "little attention 
appears to have been given by economists and other social scien* 
tists to any analysis, systematic or casual, of the behavior of
^Governments may, for example, be temporarily unable 
to unify the many diverse elements found in a given country. 
Among these elements would be geography, religion, ethnic 
groups, ideology, and political organizations. A "centralized 
national state" is a pre-condition to take-off. Rostow, ££. 
cit.. 19. National unity is "the first prerequisite" to devel­
opment. Millikan and Blackmer, £p. cit.. 76.
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governments of underdeveloped countries as revealed by their 
economic policy decisions over a period of time,” Even so, he 
continues, in view of the important role played today by govern­
ments in the development process, "it is clear that governmental 
behavior should be subjected to just as close scrutiny as is
2being given to the motivations and conduct of entrepreneurs."
Without knowledge about what to expect from a particu­
lar government, the economists and social science "experts" 
may think, at the beginning of their work, "that the principal 
problem they are going to be confronted with will be that of 
determining what ought to be done. . . . "  They soon realize, 
however, that most of their time is consumed not in determining 
what should be done, but in "energy-consuming and often frus- 
trating efforts to put their ideas and proposals across."
The government may take an active role in economic 
development as in Japan after 1870 and in the Soviet Union after 
World War I. On the other hand, it may play a more passive 
role as did the governments of England and the United States. 
Even in the latter cases, however, the general governing frame­
work within which development took place cannot be overlooked.
With respect to modern development, Meier and Baldwin 
point out that most students currently agree that "more vigor­
ous governmental action is necessary to accelerate development
^"Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," Éco­




in the poor countries.Especially in those countries that 
have remained stationary for so long, "many believe that posi­
tive governmental intervention is essential to get these coun­
tries off dead center."^ At the minimum, Kindleberger con­
cludes, "a government can plan the environment in which busi­
ness enterprise operates, lay down the rules, build the neces­
sary institutions, and preserve law and order.
In emphasizing the legislative side of the government 
with respect to development, Urquidi has pointed out that "at 
any given moment in the process of trying to establish a 
clearly defined development policy . . . there is a body of 
existing legislation that has to be taken into a c c o u n t . W h e n  
countries adopt development programs, he continues, a first 
step should be "to revise critically all economic legislation, 
beginning with constitutional provisions, in order to determine
Oits compatibility with a development policy or a program."°
Urquidi further points to several specific areas which 
would probably require legislative action. An important one 
is the field of investment. Here, "it is not enough for a 
government to proclaim the need for private investment. A
^^ier, and Baldwin, og. cit.. p. 361.
5Ibid.
^Kindleberger, op. cit.. p. 140.
^"Legislation for Economic Development in Latin America," 
Dynamics of Development, ed. Gove Hambidge (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 96-107.
^Ibid.. p. 97.
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whole series of legal provisions and administrative policies
should, as a consistent whole, attempt to induce the desired
9volume of private investment.” In manufacturing, mining, and
utilities, the problem involves not only the general political
atmosphere, but also
the adequacy of tax incentives, rates of taxation on profits, 
labor legislation, social security contributions, tariff 
protection and import controls, equitable treatment of 
foreign private capital, utility rates, and, in some cases, 
special legislation regulating the integration and expan­
sion of an industry through both publicly owned and pri­
vately owned plants. It is obvious that failings in any 
one type of measure, the adoption of contradictory legisla­
tion, or the application of mutually inconsistent opera­
tional policies will result in delays in private industrial 
investment and a falling short of desired targets.10
In the agricultural sector, the legislature must face 
the basic question of land reform, understood not only as the 
redistribution of large holdings among the rural population,
"but of redistribution plus fuller and better use of land, im­
proved farm methods and higher productivity, and retention of
11earnings in the hands of the rural mass itself.” In the area
of human resources it may be necessary, in Latin America, to
reappraise the educational system, the industrial legislation,
"parts of labor and employment legislation, the social security
regimes, and the general welfare policies affecting the ability
12of families to keep their children in school.”
With respect to consumption, ”a development policy 
should aim at raising consumption, which is the ultimate purpose
9lbid.. p. 99. lOlbid.
lllbid.. p. 101. IZlbid.. p. 102.
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of an economic system," A policy to increase consumption would 
have important implications for tax policy. There would be "a 
need to reform the tax structure, particularly through the adop­
tion and extension of full progressive personal income taxation." 
In addition, taxes on capital gains and possible net wealth, 
would have to be considered. Finally, "the alleviation of in­
direct taxes, including local taxes, on basic commodities, and
the creation of special purchase taxes on goods and services
13consumed by higher income groups," might be necessary.
Legislation is an instrument, a very important instru­
ment, with which to determine and carry out policy. There may 
be any number of reasons why legislation is inappropriate to 
encourage the development which is being sought. Legislators 
may not understand what type laws are needed, and even if they
14do, there may be reasons why they would refuse to support them.
Economic development requires not only favorable laws 
and a Constitution to give direction, but "it requires also an 
appropriate administrative system to follow through with the 
plans laid down in the laws."^^ Kindleberger would agree that 
"most plans require governmental administration," but, he adds, 
"honest administrators are one of the scarcest resources in
l^Ibid.. p. 103.
^^Ibid., pp. 106-07; see also Urquidi, "Legislation for 
Economic Development," Latin America. Evolution or Explosion, 
ed. Mildred Adams (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1963), pp.
143-58.
^%erman Finer, "The Role of Government," in Williamson 
and Buttrick, o£. cit.. p. 371.
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underdeveloped countries.”
In addition to the government's role in providing prop­
er legislation and administration, the question is often raised 
whether government should act as the central and chief develop­
ment agent, or limit itself to establishing the proper climate 
within which private enterprise may so act.
Kindleberger points out that private enterprise may be 
an advantage because people may find it "more painful to pay 
taxes to government for capital formation because of the ele­
ment of compulsion than to allow entrepreneurs to drain off a 
comparable amount as profit for reinvestment." But when prof­
its are high, and spent on "lavish consumption instead of re­
invested in productive enterprise, there may be little to be 
said for free enterprise on the ground of either equity or 
growth. " 1-7
Another point often made in defense of private enter­
prise is that it has a tremendous capacity for innovation. 
Governmental bureaucracies, it is assumed, become proponents of 
the status quo. In other words, it is sometimes charged, they 
"pass the buck, dodge responsibility, and cling to proved
methods."18
l^Kindleberger, og. cit.. p. 147.
17Ibid., p. 134.
18Ibid.. p. 135; see also August Maffary, "Some Prob­
lems of Economic Development," in Shannon, og. cit.. pp. 276- 
80; Meier and Baldwin, og. cit.. p. 362ff.; Okun and Richardson, 
OP. cit.. Part viii, pp. 417-77; and Finer, og. cit., pp. 369-
74.
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Other weaknesses of government as the major development 
agent would include the possibility that the politicians and 
civil servants "may attempt too much, interest themselves un­
duly in the showy and monumental venture, canda neglect fruit­
ful but important t a s k s F u r t h e r m o r e , governmental person­
nel may be less frugal with public funds than those in an in­
centive system would be.
The government must, however, intervene to produce 
savings "if none are forthcoming," and if "productive invest­
ment is to be undertaken." If there are no "investment or com­
mercial bankers to direct the flow of investment, and even in 
some instances where there are, government machinery is needed 
to allocate capital.
Since the issue of government versus private enterprise 
as the prime mover in development remains unsettled, no further 
attempt will be made to develop it here. On the other hand, 
there is a strong consensus with respect to the government's 
role in promoting a proper climate, passing appropriate legis­
lation, and establishing an effective administrative system, 
roles which only a politically developed system could adequate­
ly execute. The concept of political development, a relatively 
new term in political science, will be discussed below.
Political Development
Frederick W. Frey has said that the concept of politi­
cal development "seems to be a rather natural extension of the
^^Kindleberger, 0£, cit.. p. 136. ZOlbid.. p. 137.
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popular idea of economic development, which has been widely 
and effectively employed.There" is a greater consensus, he 
notes, on what constitutes economic development than what is 
meant by political development. The latter has been defined 
as including certain "specific political institutions and pro­
cedures --a national legislature, an independent judiciary, free 
elections, political parties and civil rights, all of which are 
commonly fo<md in Western c o u n t r i e s «"^2
Others have seen political development as the absence 
of violence, governmental stability (or the absence of politi­
cal instability), and greater and more general satisfaction 
with the political system. Still others, notably some of the 
economists, view it as an adjunct to economic development, and
they see it as constituting an impediment to economic growth
23if certain desired changes fail to develop.
Leonard Binder, noting that "at present there is little 
agreement among scholars as to the meaning or direction of poli­
tical development," says there is one feature common to all of 
the attempts to define the term: the "teleological emphasis.
That is, it is assumed that in its terminal state, we know 
what political development is. But, according to Binder, "direc-
O 1"Political Development, Power, and Communications in 
Turkey," Communicat ions and Political Development, ed. Lucien 
W. Pye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 229,
ZZlbid. 23lbid.
24"The National Integration and Political Development," 
American Political Science Review. LVIII (September, 1964), pp. 
622-23.
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tion may be given by an open-ended social process as well as by 
some irresistibly magnetic pole." It is, he thinks, "prefer­
able to search for the meaning of political development in 
terms of an open-ended process that we know is going on rather
o ethan in terms of some speculative terminal state."
Harold D. Lasswell has recently written that "the con­
ception of power plays the same role for political scientists 
and jurists that wealth plays for e c o n o m i s t s . H e  proposes, 
therefore, the following definition of political development:
"A sequence of approximations toward a self-sustaining level 
of power accumulation."27 A self-sustaining level of power 
accumulation is reached "when the nation is able to furnish its 
own trained personnel, to achieve structural innovations with 
minimum resort to coercion, and to mobilize resources for 
national goals."28
The political development model, Lasswell thinks,
"should be explicitly preferential." The preferred model should 
require "an ideology of progress and commitment to wide parti­
cipation in power as a long-run goal." He views the function 
of a model as that which "provides a guide for taking sides in 
controversies over basic objective," and then places himself 
along side those "who recommend a conception that gives expres-
25ibid.
26»»xhe Policy Sciences of Development," World Politics. 
XVII (January, 1965), p. 288.
2?Ibid. 28lbid.. p. 290.
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sion to the overriding goal of human dignity and that defines
this phase to include effective general participation in the
ogdecision process."
Lasswell's model of political development emphasizes 
the importance of "obtaining sufficient power to maintain na­
tional independence," and would therefore include "effective 
political demands not only for economic development, but for 
growth in all the value-institution sectors of the body poli­
tic." Such development would be understood to include "willing­
ness and capability to play a responsible role in world politics," 
and would call for an "internal process of decision whose 
structtires--both formal and informal, organized and unorganized 
--constitute a system of public order capable of creative, 
realistic problem-solving in pursuit of a rising level of par­
ticipation in all v a l u e s F i n a l l y  his model would "provide 
strategic guidance for timing the component elements in sequen­
ces of development."31
In a somewhat similar vein, another authority says 
political development means "the growth of institutions and 
practices that allow a political system to deal with its own 
fundamental problems with greater effectiveness for the short 





popular demands for the longer run."^^ The traditional oppo­
site evils "of tyranny and anarchy must be avoided, and every 
country must find its own combination of authority and inhibi­
tion of power appropriate to its traditions and to its present 
needs.
Recently Lucien W. Pye, after surveying ten definitions 
of political development, concluded that there is great confu­
sion about the meaning of the term. Nevertheless, he extracts 
from the ten definitions three similar themes which he thinks 
characterize the general thinking about the concept. The first 
broadly shared characteristic "is a general spirit or attitude 
toward e q u a l i t y . T h i s  actually involves not only mass popu­
lar participation in political activities, but also an equality 
characterized by laws of a universalistic nature. Furthermore, 
equality would mean "that recruitment to political office should 
reflect achievement standards of performance and not the ascrip- 
tive considerations of a traditional social system.
Pye sees a second important theme as that of the capa­
city of the political system. This means that the government 
may not only act, but it may do so with effectiveness and effi-
^^Howard Wiggins, "Foreign Assistance and Political 
Development," Development of the Emerging Countries. ed. Robert 
E, Asher (Washington, D. 0.: Brookings Institution, 1962), p.
182.
33lbid.
34»The Concept of Political Development," The Annals o^ 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. CCCLVII 
(March, 1965), pp. 1-15.
35ibid.. p. 12.
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ciency. Further, "capacity is related to rationality in ad­
ministration and a secular orientation toward policy.
A third basic concern of those who have dealt with 
political development as seen by Pye, is that of differentia­
tion and specialization. "Offices and agencies tend to have 
their distinct and limited functions, and there is an equiva­
lent of a division of labor within the realm of government."^7 
Accompanying differentiation, there is "increased functional
38specificity of the various political roles within the system,"
Finally, "differentiation involves the integration of complex
39structures and processes," This does not mean that differen­
tiation is fragmentation "and the isolation of the different 
parts of the political system but specialization based on an 
ultimate sense of integration."^^
Progress toward these three dimensions may proceed at 
different rates, depending on a number of variables. Further­
more, there are no sharp and distinct stages of development.41 
Pye has not attempted to equate political development 
with democracy, but he has noted that others have done so. On 
the other hand, he points out, there are those who think that 
political development is close to, but not quite the same as, 
democracy. Still others have claimed that development and
democracy are two basically different things, and that attempts
36lbid. 3?Ibid.
3Blbid. 39lbid.
40lbid. 41ibid.. pp. 12-13.
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to implement the latter may be an impediment to the former.
The government's power to persuade or coerce are key 
factors in Karl von Vorys' concept of political development,^^
A basic characteristic, then, of the underdeveloped system 
would be the lack of governmental power to carry on these func­
tions. Political development is, therefore, a process "which 
is more specific than political change and one which is dis­
tinct from modernization,"^^ It is a process "whose goal is a 
political system which can provide for the functional require­
ments of long-term persistence, a system which will probably 
meet the tests of modernity, but which does not have to do 
so."^^ The process may include social and economic changes, 
but the focus "is the development of the governmental capacity 
to direct the course and the rate of" such change. It is a 
process, he continues,
which will rest largely upon social and economic accomplish­
ments , but whose progress is measured by increments in the 
government's capacities to coerce and persuade. Above all, 
it is a political process which, in fact, will accomplish 
its political goal.4&
42ibid.. p. 9; see also his chapter on "Democracy and 
Political Development" in Lucien W. Pye, Aspects of Political 
Development (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 71-88,
The view that the democratic process is appropriate to econo­
mic development in Latin America is expressed in Charles W, 
Anderson, Politics and Economic Development in Latin America 
(Princeton, N, J.: D. Van Nostrand Co,, 19677, pp. 372-76,
43iiTowards a Concept of Political Development," Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 
CCCLVII (March, 1965), pp. l4-19.
44lbid.. p. 19, 45lbid.
®̂JÇbld-
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A. F. K, Organski's view of political development is 
similar to that of von Vorys. By definition, it is an "in­
creasing governmental efficiency in utilizing the human and 
material resources of the nation for national g o a l s . T h e r e
AOare four stages of political development, and the basic func­
tions of the government change "as a nation moves from one 
stage to another, and at each stage the national government, 
if it is to qualify as 'developed,' must fill the new function 
as well as consolidate the gains of the past."^^ Development 
in the first stage required only national unification. Today, 
not only is national unity necessary, but the additional ingredi­
ents of economic modernization and welfare provisions are re­
quired.^®
According to Organski, there is no one form of govern­
ment which must be used during a particular stage. In the past, 
he notes, three different types of government have been used to 
lead a system from the first stage of primitive unification to 
the second stage of industrialization: Western democracy, com­
munist , and fascist. Currently, developing nations have a 
choice of any one of these plus any variant which they may 
choose to use.^^ Only by analyzing conditions in a particular
47'phe Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1?65), p. 7.
^®His four stages are (1) the politics of primitive 
unification, (2) the politics of industrialization, (3) the 





country can one hope to speculate on what route will be fol­
lowed in a given system,
Martin Needier has noted that a politically developed 
society may be transformed into a dictatorship but, he thinks,
"a dictatorship in a developed society is characteristically
COdifferent from its counterpart in a traditional society."
The traditional dictator rules over "apathetic and indifferent 
subjects who merely demonstrate no overt signs of disobedience."
The modem dictator, such as Hitler, Mussolini, and Peron,
"starts from the assumption that the citizens will participate 
in politics." Rather than attempting to eliminate popular par­
ticipation, "totalitarianism accepts the fact of popular parti­
cipation, but forces it into channels of support for the regime."54 
With these concepts and definitions of political devel­
opment as guides, the term will be used in this paper to des­
cribe conditions similar to those that exist in the industrial­
esized countries. More specifically, it will denote the exis­
tence of a legitimate power center capable of giving direction, 
through effective use of its human and material resources, to 
achieving national goals. It will not assume a movement toward 
democracy, unless mass participation in the political arena
5^Ibid.. ch. vii.
53latin American Politics in Perspective (New York; D.
Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 17-18.
54ibid.. p. 18.
^^This would not, however, rule out certain less indus­
trialized nations.
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could be so construed.
There is strong evidence that there is a correlation 
between economic development and political development.^^ This 
may be explained by the fact that a responsible government, 
with the capacity to act effectively, either initiates measures 
designed to promote the general well-being, or it is responsive 
to public aspirations for a higher standard of living, and acts 
accordingly.
Government and the Political Process 
In Mexico and Peru
The Nature of "Politics"
Harold D. Lasswell says the study of politics "is the
57study of influence and the influential." The influential 
"are those who get the most of what there is to get." Hans 
Morgenthau calls politics "a struggle for power over men," and 
points out that "whatever its ultimate goal may be, power is
CQits immediate goal." Lasswell and Kaplan use a definition 
similar to Morgenthau's. Participants in the political arenas 
are, they say, "seeking to maximize power and other values in-
56gee Asher, og. cit.. pp. 2-5; Dick Simpson, "The Con­
gruence of the Political, Social and Economic Aspects of Devel­
opment," International Development Review. VI (June, 1964), 
pp. 21-25; and Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Political Effects of Eco­
nomic Programs: Some Indicators for Latin America," Economic
Development and Cultural Change « XIV (October, 1965), pp. 1-19.
57politics. Who Gets What. When. How (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1936), p. 3.
^^Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 195.
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59fluencing outcomes."
Veimon Van Dyke, Quincy Wright and Bertrand De Jouvenel 
have given similar definitions to the term " p o l i t i c s V a n  
Dyke calls it "a struggle among actors pursuing conflicting 
desires on public i s s u e s . W r i g h t  has called it "the art of 
influencing, manipulating, or controlling cgroupsa so as to 
advance the purposes of some against the opposition of others.
In another publication Wright adds that "politics exists only 
when ends or means are controversial."^^ De Jouvenel says 
"political phenomena appears essential as relations between 
individuals." He adds: "politics consists of nothing other
than human behavior « . . candn . . .  we should regard as poli­
tical every systematic effort, performed any place in the social 
field, to move other men in the pursuit of some design cherished 
by the mover."
Leslie Lipson has made a distinction between "politics" 
and "institutions." The state, he says, "is the institution in 
and through which men made up their mind • . . and choose between
^^Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society: 4 Frame­
work for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press,195̂), p.1321
GOpolitical Science; A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 128.
^^4 Study of International Relations (New York: Appleton-
Century-Grofts, 1955), p. 130-35.
^^"Political Science and World Stabilization," American 
Political Science Review. XLIV (March, 1950), pp. 1-13.
^^The Pure Theory of Politics (Cambridge: At the Uni­
versity Press, 1963), pp. x and xi.
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the possibilities availableBut, "the process of selection, 
the reasons and reasoning that prompted it--all this is the 
material of politics." Through politics, he continues, "men 
formulate their preferences, determine the goals for which 
they strive, and appraise the values that they cherish or re- 
sret."^
The "struggle" may be at the ballot box, or it may be 
in the legislature or constitutional convention when the laws 
regulating voting and elections are being written. It may 
take place among interest groups; it will surely manifest it­
self in a competitive party system. On the other hand, the 
struggle may be at level of the chief executive, and it may 
involve his selection, his powers, his actions, and the laws 
that govern all of these factors. In other words, government 
evolves out of and to a great extent operates through politics. 
Both institutions and politics reflect the state of political 
development--or underdevelopment--and therefore influence eco­
nomic development. According to the officers of the Agency 
for International Development, the principle of self-help, which 
is a cornerstone of U. S. aid programs, applies also to measures 
for strengthening political democracy. While such measures are 
not always easy to define, they include
measures to broaden participation in the political system;
^^The Great Issues of Politics (New York; Prentice- 
Hall, 195477”PP. 95-96.
^^This would be determined in part by the extent to 
which the democratic method of governing is used.
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for example, by extending voting rights, developing effec­
tive channels for expression of political views, or insti­
tuting more representative political procedures. They 
also include measures,to improve the efficiency of public 
administration. . .
For these reasons, the political institutions and proces­
ses of Mexico and Peru will be described.
Voting and Elections
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 declares "the preroga­
tives of citizens" to be, among other things, "to vote in popu­
lar elections," and "to be voted for," provided one has the 
"qualifications established by law." The prerogatives include 
the associating together "to discuss the political affairs of 
the country," and the exercising "in all cases the right of 
petition.
Duties under the Constitution include registering "in 
the electoral poll-books," voting "in popular elections in the 
electoral district to which they belong," serving "in the elec­
tive offices of the Federation or of the States," and sejrving
68"in municipal council positions where they reside."
The constitutional provisions were supplemented by the 
federal election laws of 1918 and 1945. These laws provided 
for universal adult male suffrage with an age requirement of 
18 for married persons and 21 for the unmarried. Proof of
GGy. S. Department of State, Agency for International 
Development, Principles of Foreign Economic Assistance (Washing­
ton; U. S., Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 30.
^^Article 35. ^®Article 36.
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literacy is not required. Women were extended the right to 
vote in municipal elections during President Aleman's adminis­
tration in the 1940's, and by constitutional amendment in 1954 
the right to vote in national elections was affirmed.
Under present provisions of the basic electoral law, 
failure to vote may result in a fine of 300 pesos ($24) or 
three days in jail. The law sets up a National Registry of 
Voters at the capital, whose duty it is to maintain the lists 
of eligible voters and election records. Heading the national 
electoral machinery is the Federal Electoral Commission, in 
turn headed by the Minister of Government. Sitting with the 
minister on the Commission is one senator, one deputy, and 
three representatives of the political parties. The Commission 
is primarily responsible for the conduct of national elections.
There is also an electoral commission for each state. 
Its three members are chosen by the Federal Electoral Commis­
sion. In addition, each state is subdivided into districts, 
each of which has a district committee. Membership on the dis­
trict committees is also determined by the Federal commission, 
after recommendations of the state commissions have been re­
ceived.
Elections are held every three years in Mexico. By 
April 30, all electoral commissions invite filings which may
^^William P. Tucker, The Mexican Government Today 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), pp. 64-65.
7°Ibid. forbid.
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continue until May 15. On May 25, Diario Of icial and two other
papers publish an official list of candidates. On the first
Sunday in June there is published, by the district committees,
the name of polling places and personnel. In between the first
and the third Sunday, when the final listings are made, objec-
72tions to these procedures may be filed with the committee.
Election day is the first Sunday in July, from 8 a.m. 
to 5 p.m. Australian-type ballots are used, and the marking 
is supposed to be done in secret. Watchers for the parties and 
candidates may be used, and armed or intoxicated persons are 
excluded. Write-ins are permitted. When the polls close, 
votes for the local deputy are announced. These records are 
then sent to the district, state and national committees where 
the votes for other officials, such as senator, are made pub­
lic. Votes for the president are announced finally by the 
Chamber of Deputies, which has the final decision with respect
70to the new chief executive.'
In the 1961 non-presidential elections, when registra­
tion was high and "with opposition parties fielding far more 
candidates than previously," the government promised the voters 
that it would make a determined effort to hold honest elections, 
including an accurate count of the votes. For the first time, 
in this election, the government experimented with the "thumb 
stain" method of providing honest decisions. The experiment, 
confined to the Federal District and the state of San Luis
72lbld.. p. 66. 73Ibid.
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Potosl, consisted of rolling indelible ink on the left thumb 
when the ballot was deposited. Use of the ink, which was sup­
posed to remain on the finger for at least four days, was pro­
tested as invasion of privacy by some individuals and the 
74press.
As the 1964 presidential election was approaching, one 
report summed up the proceedings this way; "The maintenance of 
order during the campaign, particularly in the provinces is 
viewed here as setting a new high in Mexican political maturi­
ty There was, the report continued, "a notable lack of bit­
terness in the campaigns waged by the two principal candidates." 
In writing about the same election, Martin C. Needier has said 
that the Partido Revolueionario Institutional (PRI) now gains 
its victories fairly and squarely. After the 1964 election, he 
says, it was "the first time in Mexican history that a losing 
candidate for the presidency has formally conceded victory to 
his opponent."76
Not only have the elections in Mexico become more respec­
table, but there appears to have been earnest attempts to get 
cut the vote, even the illiterate vote. According to Scott, 
when the voters list was about to be closed on February 15, 1958,
only about 25 percent of those eligible to vote had registered.
7^New York Times. July 2, 1961, p. 10.
7^Ibid.. July 5, 1964, p. 16.
76"Changing the Guard in Mexico," Current History. XLVIII 
(January, 1965), p. 26.
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A month's extension was immediately granted, during which time 
intense publicity was directed to the prospective registrants. 
Registration booths were kept open long hours, and many mer­
chants offered discounts to customers who could show proof of 
registration. PRI, professional organizations and other na­
tional groups pressed"their members to comply with the registra­
tion laws. At the close of the second period on I'larch 15, when
there were still less than seven million registered voters, the
77period was extended again for two weeks.
While it has been said that there was little voter 
choice in the 1958 elections, it must also be b o m  in mind that 
this was the first presidential election in which women parti­
cipated. And, according to Howard F. Cline, there had been 
some fears that once women began to vote, they would flock "to
reactionary, or Church-oriented parties," a possibility which
78did not develop.
At the end of the registration period in 1958,
10,443,465 persons had registered, which was about 80 percent 
of those eligible. Of that number, 4,649,983, or 44 percent,
were w o m e n . I n  the non-presidential election year of 1961,
80the number dropped to about 9.5 million. In 1964 the figure
^^Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government In Transition 
(Urbana, 111.; University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 223-26.
^^Mexico: Revolution to Evolution. 1940-1960 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 167.
79gcott, o£. cit.. p. 226.
80New York Times. July 2, 1961, p. 10.
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was back up, this time near 13.5 million, 70 percent of whom,
8Lor 10 million, actually voted.
In Peru, "the right of suffrage is enjoyed by citizens
oowho know how to read and write." Citizens are defined, in 
Article 84 of the Peruvian Constitution, as "male Peruvians of 
age, married persons over eighteen years and those emancipated." 
The document was amended in 1955 in order to permit women to vote 
in national elections. Prior to that time, women could vote
Q Oonly in municipal elections. Persons may not vote if their
citizenship has been suspended, or if they are members of the 
84armed forces.
The Peruvian Constitution makes registration and voting 
"obligatory for persons until the age of sixty, and optional 
beyond that age." The "vote is secret," and the system of 
elections "shall give representation to minorities, with a 
tendency to proportionality.The register is permanent.
There is a national registry with offices in all of the 
provinces. Registrants are given a libreta electoral (electoral 
credential) which serves as a means of identification, and also 
assists the authorities in enforcing the compulsory voting re­
quirements. According to one authority:
81
p. 27.
Needier, "Changing the Guard in Mexico," 02« cit..
B^Article 86, Peruvian Constitution of 1933. 
^^Article 86. ^‘̂Article 87.
G^Article 88.
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The libreta is a very important personal possession 
since it is necessary to present it to enjoy any privi­
lege or service which the government controls; employ­
ment, travel, public documents, marriage, admission to a 
university, professional license, and so f o r t h . 86
The Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (National Electoral
Jury), a body of seven appointed men, serves as the principal
governmental agency supervising the elections. The parties,
however, provide the ballots. Voting is in secret, after which
the participants deposit "all ballots in an envelope supplied
by the government," whi^h is in turn "deposited by the voter
in a box at the voting table." Indelible markings are used to
87discourage double voting.
One observer who witnessed the Peruvian elections in 
1956 feels that the literacy requirements were not too well en­
forced in the northern coastal town of Talara, Persons known 
to be unable to read and write voted nonetheless. On the other 
hand, most of the qualified residents, according to this source, 
gladly went to the polls and were willing to stand in line for
OOa long time in order to vote.
In the 1962 elections, there were some 2,220,000 regis­
tered voters, some 1.8 million of whom voted. The number of 
actual voters in the 1963 elections were only slightly higher,
®^Rosendo A. Gomez, "Peru," Political Systems of Latin 
America. ed. Martin A. Needier (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nos­
trand Company, 1964), p. 309.
G^Ibid.. p. 310.
®®Mary Cast, "The Government of Peru," (Unpublished 
paper. West Texas State University, 1962).
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89amounting to about 12.3 percent of the total population.
In the 1963 presidential election, just as in the one 
held in 1962, charges of fraud were made. APRA charged fraud 
in two north central states, Ancash and Cajamarca, both of 
which are centers of Aprista strength. After some investiga­
tion, the National Election Jury confirmed the fraud charges. 
Some of the ballots, the Board noted, had been removed from 
packages of election materials shipped to the two states.
"Blank papers and newspapers were stuffed back into the pae­
onkages,"
The election boards suspended voting for some ten days, 
but there were reports that local election officials permitted 
the voters to mark their preferences on blank pieces of paper. 
When the blank sheets were discovered by APRA supporters they 
demonstrated, and some 20 persons were arrested at Cajamarca. 
APRA leaders protested that officials searched and closed their 
headquarters in Cajamarca. Although the arutôd forces were not 
permitted to vote in the 1963 election, the elections were un­
der their supervision for the announced purposes of maintaining
91order and guarding against fraud.
There are two major differences between the operation
B^New York Times. June 10, 1962; Christian Science 
Monitor. June 1^, 1962; New York Times. June 16, 1963; Alexander 
T. Edelmann, Latin American Government and Politics (Homewood, 
111.: The Dorsey Press, 1^65), pp. 346-47.
^^Christian Science Monitor. June 11, 1963.
91lbid.
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of elections in ïfexico and Peru. In the latter country, due 
to the literacy requirement and the fact that many of the Indians 
do not speak and write Spanish, many of the people are auto­
matically prohibited from registering. The illiteracy rate, 
according to one source, is around 60 percent.^2 The other 
main difference is that in Peru there continues to exist a 
greater likelihood of fraud than in Mexico. When such charges 
are heard in Peru, the armed forces, which supervises the elec­
tion, may find it an excuse to declare the entire election il­
legal.
Political Parties
In every Mexican presidential election since 1940, the 
nominee of the Partido Revolueionario Institutional (PRI) has 
received more than 76 percent of the votes cast. In only one 
of the elections, in fact, has the nominee of the official 
party won with such a small percentage. That election was the 
one in 1952 when Ruiz Cortines, encountering strong carry-over 
opposition from Aleman's administration, received only 76.4
Q-apercent of the vote.
Âvila Camacho pulled a whopping 93.1 percent of the 
total votes in 1940; Alemân received 80.1 percent of it in 1946. 
By 1958, L6pez Mateos secured 90.4 percent of all votes cast,
^2James C. Carey, "Encouraging New Spirit," Current 
History. XLIX (December, 1965), p. 323.
93ciine, op. cit., 166; and Frank R. Brandenburg, The 
Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1964), p. 107.
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only slightly more than Diaz Ordaz' 89 percent in 1964.^^
Political parties are defined by law in Mexico as "asso­
ciations for electoral purposes and political orientation, by 
law made up only of Mexican citizens in full exercise of their 
civil rights." Such groups "are agents of the electoral agen­
cies and share with them responsibility for the enforcement of 
constitutional provisions concerning election matters."95
The laws are administered by a central government agen­
cy, the Secretaria de Gobemacién. Parties which propose to 
participate in national elections must register with Gobernaci6n. 
which determines if a party has met the minimum qualifications 
set by law. The agency may also withdraw registration privi­
leges if a party is no longer able to comply with the laws. 
Recognition, after which a party must wait one year before par­
ticipating in a national election, requires parties;
I. To have at least 2,500 members in each of no less than 
two-thirds of the country's states and territories 
and, in any case, a minimum of 75,000 members;
II. To pledge obedience to legal and constitutional pro­
visions, to prohibit subordination of the party to 
foreign political parties or international organiza­
tions, and to engage to participate only in peaceful 
political activities;
III. To hold in at least two-thirds of the federal enti­
ties a meeting to select delegates to a national 
constituting convention of the party. At both the 
state-level and the national meetings, a notary must 
attend, in order to attest to the legal number of mem-
9^Cline, loc. cit.; Needier, "Changing the Guard in 
Mexico," 02# cit.. p. 27.
^^Lev Electoral Federal. Diario Oficial. January 7,
1954, quoted in Scott, og. cit., p. 148.
96scott, op. cit.. p. 149.
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bers and to the fact that decisions were reached by 
vote of a majority of delegates.
IV. To adopt a statement of party principles and, as
required by the national constitution, a distinctive 
name that does not allude to race or religion.
After registration, laws require national parties to be 
governed by a National Assembly, meeting periodically, under the 
leadership of a permanently established National Executive Com­
mittee. In states where party membership is in excess of 2,500, 
an Executive Committee must also head the state organization. 
Finally, "each national party must issue a monthly publication, 
have permanent offices, and provide cultural and civic centers 
in which its members may meet."^?
Five parties were registered in the presidential elec­
tion of 1958. Three of them, in addition to the official party, 
supported the nominee of PRI. Only PAN put up an opposition 
candidate. Some of the others did nominate congressional can­
didates .
The Partido de Accion Nacional. or PAN, has nominated 
or supported presidential candidates in every presidential 
election since its organization in 1939. In only two of the 
elections, however, has its candidate polled more than ten per­
cent of the vote.^® Originally a small organization of "con­
servative intellectuals and professional men," it worked from
97lbid.. p. 150.
^®In 1946 PAN supported Ezequiel Padilla who received 
18.7 percent of the total votes cast. The Party's nominee,
José Gonzalez Torres, received slightly more than ten percent 
of the total vote in 1964.
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a broader base of support in the 1952 and 1958 elections.
Failing to attract any large public following in those elections, 
internal feuding between the right and left factions became more 
pronounced, until by 1959 the forces on the right appeared vic­
torious. In that year the rightist majority faction declared 
open political warfare on the party in power, and elected Jose
Gonzalez Torres, the president of three Catholic lay organiza-
99tions, as its president.
Gonzalez Torres was also chosen by the PAN to oppose 
Ordaz in the presidential election of 1964. A very active cam­
paign was waged by the PAN nominee and his supporters, but one 
report noted that "there was a notable lack of bitterness in 
the campaigns waged by the two principal candidates."^®® Na­
tional Action emphasized, in its appeal to the voters, the need 
for less government intervention in business, social, and reli­
gious matters. Dias Ordaz, meanwhile, was emphasizing national 
problems and proposing various means of solution.
The Partido Nacionalista de Mexico, or PNM, is another 
of the "opposition" parties, although it chose to support the 
nominees of the major party in the presidential elections of 
1952, 1958 and 1964. Known by various names, and led mostly by 
pro-Church spokesmen, the PNM as an organization can be traced
99scott, ©2 . cit.. pp. 184-85.
^OQNew York Times. July 5, 1964, p. 16.
^®%ispanic American Report. (HAR). XVI (February, 1964),
p. 1134.
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back to 1927. With a relatively small membership, the party
has pressed for repeal of Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution,
spoken out in favor of clerical authority and espoused a pro-
102gram of anti-communism.
One of the more recently legally recognized parties in 
Mexico is the Partido Auténtico de la Revoluciôn Mexicana. or 
PARM. It was officially b o m  in 1958 through the leadership of 
two generals, Jacinto B. Trevino and Juan Barragan. The new 
party included some of the older revolutionaries, among whom 
were two of Francisco I. Madero's brothers. According to Scott, 
these leaders apparently felt the revolution had become side­
tracked, and they wanted to help guide it back to its proper 
c o u r s e . 103 Due to a close alliance with the major party, whose 
nominees it supported in 1958 and 1964, indications were that
i t  would be a short-lived o r g a n i z a t i o n . 104
The fifth currently recognized legal party of Mexico is 
the Partido Popular. or PP, formed in 1947. The establishment 
of the leftwing PP grew out of the uncompromising attitude of 
Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the well-known Mexican labor leader, 
and the then president, Miguel Alemân. The PP probably reached 
its zenith in the presidential elections of 1952, when its for­
merly dissatisfied elements, ranging from moderately liberal to 
orthodox communist, nominated Toledano as its candidate for the
l^^Ibid.; Scott, og. cit.. pp. 186-87. 
lO^Scott, op. cit., p. 188.
1Q4h a r. XVI (January, 1964), p. 1040.
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highest office.
Between 1952 and the presidential election year, 1958, 
the PP was torn between its extreme factions. In the 1957 
meeting of its National Assembly, the hard-core communists were 
expurgated, and the delegates decided to support Adolfo Lôpez 
Mateos for the presidency in 1958. The name Partido Popular 
Socialiste. PPS, was adopted as the new name for the old PP at 
the 1960 convention. In the meantime, the organization drew 
ideologically more and more closely to PRI. By late 1963, 
after PRI had announced Ordaz as its nominee for 1964, PPS 
leadership indicated it would support his candidacy. Formally 
endorsing Ordaz at its December meeting, Toledano and the PPS 
leadership campaigned for the PRI during 1964, referring to the 
major party as "the new democratic and popular party.
While the PPS moved toward a more moderate position in 
Mexican politics, the far-left was attempting to reorganize 
itself in order to speak with a stronger national voice. One 
such movement was that led by former President Cârdenas, who 
was primarily responsible for calling delegates to the Latin 
American Conference for National Sovereignty, Economic Emanci­
pation and Peace, held in Mexico City, March 3-8, 1961. While 
the meetings were held in secrecy, reports at the time and 
since have indicated that the general theme was pro-Castro,
^®^Scott, op. cit., p. 189.
^^^HAR. XVI (January, 1964), p. 1039; and XVI (February,
1964), p. 1133.
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pro-communism and anti-American. Still further reports indi­
cate that Cârdenas may have taken a more moderate position at 
the Conference than some of the others on the more militant
Cârdenas attempted to justify his work with the new 
leftist movement on grounds that he and other influential
108Mexicans believed that the revolution was losing its momentum.
The former president first jolted Mexico in 1959 when on
October 1, he addressed the anniversary celebration of the
founding of the Chinese Communist People's Republic in Peiping,
109and praised the government of Communist China.
Growing out of the 1961 "peace" conference was the group
generally referred to as the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional 
(MLN). With support from intellectuals, writers and painters, 
its membership in 1965 was estimated to be only about 6,000.^^®
The development of the MLN split the leadership of the Mexican
left between Cardenas and his long-time friend, Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano, The split went all the way to Moscow. Rival dele­
gates representing both the MLN and the PPS were sent to the 
Soviet-sponsored World Peace and Disarmament Congress in 
Moscow in 1962. Moscow decided to receive the MLN representa-
p. 26.
^®^New York Times. March 26, 1961, and June 11, 1961,
lOSibid.
109Ibid., October 18, 1959, p. 24,
p. 4.
^^^Los Angeles Times. November 7, 1965, Section H.,
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111tives.
cârdenas gave no public encouragement to the develop­
ment of MLN into a full-fledged political party. With the for­
mation of the newly communist backed Frente Electoral del 
Pueblo (People's Electoral Front, or FEP), however, some of the 
MLN supporters also gave support to it. The FEP applied for 
registration as an official party in July, 1963, claiming the 
support of 84,113 members, mostly peasants. Gobernacién. then 
headed by Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, considered the application and 
in the fall of 1963, denied it. Among the reasons the govern­
ment gave for its action was that the signatures had been se­
cured in haste, and that the FEP leadership had not thoroughly
checked the signatures because such names as Jose Stalin, Fidel
Castro, and Pedro Infante, a famous singer who died in 1956,
112were among the supporters.
After being denied official recognition, the leaders of 
FEP vowed to enter candidates in the 1964 elections anyway, and 
they did. At their November, 1963, convention, Ramon Danzos 
Palomino was chosen to run as FEP's write-in presidential candi­
date. Palomino had helped found the MLN, the FEP and the small,
*1 I Oleft-wing Central Campesina Independiente (CCI)• He received 
less than one percent of the votes in the presidential election
^Christian Science Monitor. August 31, 1962,
^^^HAR. XVI (September, 1963), p. 655; and XVI (October, 
1963), p. 942.
^^^HAR. XVI (January, 1964), p. 1039.
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of 1964,
The Mexican Left was father split when shortly before 
the presidential election in 1964, Cârdenas met Diaz Ordaz at 
a public reception and praised him for his stand and work in 
agrarian reform, education, honesty in government and patriot­
ism among civil servants. His leftist followers immediately 
labeled him "reactionary;" those on the far right suspected a 
booby trap. The moderately left magazine Siempre is reported 
to have said: "if the Mexican revolutionaries can thus remain
united, no one can change our direction.
The Mexican government has been fairly tolerant of 
communists, except when they have encouraged agitation activi­
ties. Their actual number is small, but it is difficult to 
determine the number of sympathizers or non-Communist Party 
Communists. The Partido Communista Mexicana (PCM) was never 
able to attract more than about 20,000 followers, and in 1962 
was reported to have only 2,500 members. Some of the member­
ship in PPS is undoubtedly "Communist," but the entire party 
number is currently less than 75,000, and its influence in recent 
elections has been moderate.
A communist splinter party, the Mexican Farmers and 
Workers Party, or POCM, was formed about 1950 and has openly 
acknowledged its sympathy for international communism. Its
^^^New York Times. June 21, 1964, p. 21.
^^^Karl M. Schmitt, "Communism in Mexico Today," Western 
Political Quarterly. XIV (March, 1962), pp. 111-24.
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membership is, however, small, numbering about 1,000 to 1,500,^^^ 
Finally, there is the Central Campesina Independiente (CCI), 
one of the most extreme left-wing movements that grew out of 
the MLN. Its membership is composed mostly of rural people, 
making the active membership difficult to determine, but esti­
mates range from 15,000 up.^^^
Fragmentation on the Right has been somewhat similar to 
that on the Left. Recent developments include the creation of 
the Partido Democrata Cristiano (PDC) by Mario Guerra Leal, who 
in 1960 had founded the Partido Nacional Anticomunista. which 
later became the Partido Revolue ionario Constitucionalista.
Guerra Leal later joined the Frente Clvico Mexicano de Afirma- 
cion Revolue ionaria (FCMAR), a rightist group organized by for­
mer President Miguel Alemân as the rightist answer to Cârdenas' 
MLN. Still other recently organized rightist groups include 
the Movimiento Civico Social Mexicano (MCSM), and the neo-Nazi 
Frente Patriota de Mexico (FPM). The latter group, which the 
newspaper Excelsior claimed was anti-Semitic, has indicated that
it has contacts with right-wing groups in other American coun-
118tries, including the John Birch Society of the United States.
There is very little popular participation in the nomi­
nating process in Mexico, Most of this work is done by conven­
tions at the national, state and local levels. In an experiment
llGlbid.. 113.
ll^Los Angeles Times, op. cit. 
^^^HAR. XVI (October, 1963), p. 749.
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initiated in 1959, a plan was adopted whereby a specified num­
ber of party regulars (PRI) could propose a slate of candidates 
in addition to those drawn up by the local or state party con­
vention, These slates had to be sent, however, to the next 
higher echelon of party organization which would in turn, after 
granting approval, resubmit them to the local conventions. The 
state or municipal nominating convention would then make its 
selection from among no more than two slates, the one prepared 
by the local official conventions, the other through the process 
just described. The Plan, although weighted in favor of nomi­
nations by party regulars, had some success in three states and
was at least a mild concession to pressures for more rank-and-
11 Qfile participation in the nominating procedure,
Thus it can be concluded that the party system in 
Mexico is presently in no way a detriment to development, with 
perhaps two mild exceptions. The latter would consist in the 
way decisions are made to determine the legal status of politi­
cal parties. If these decisions are made fairly, that is, if 
future developing parties are permitted to register as provided 
by law, thereby assuring the legitimacy of the major party, one 
could hardly find grounds on which to criticize the perpetuation 
of the one-party system. The other exception is that the elec­
tion law tends to centralize the whole party structure at the 
national level under national leaders, leaving little for rank- 
and-file initiative. On the other hand, such centralization
^^^Scott, og, cit.. pp, 134-44, and 152,
13 Ô
may be helpful in creation of a national consensus, the merits 
of which have already been described.
Neither the far-Left nor the far-Right in Mexico are 
organized in such a way that they may exert serious influence 
on the present course in ffexican development. As long as PRI 
is guided by the spirit of the Revolution, and continues to act 
responsibly within the legal framework of the system, it may 
be assumed that continued development will be Mexico's reward. 
In Peru, one authority has pointed out, the presiden­
tial election of 1939 was typical in that Prado won because of 
support which "came from a coalition of twelve conservative 
parties," There is in Peru, he continues,
a great multiplicity of political groups, each bearing some 
high-sounding name and each able to claim the allegiance 
of but a small fraction of the voters. Government by coali* 
tion has always been necessary, because no one party has 
been able to obtain a majority. In one recent election a 
candidate for senator proudly announced that he had been 
pledged the support of fifteen parties,120
In the 1945 election, the victorious Bustamante was 
supported by the National Democratic Front, a large number of 
different groups which were united in name only. The Front in­
cluded conservatives from the Revolutionary Union, Communists,
121followers of Marshal Benavides and the Apristas, By 1948, 
disunited even more by internal fighting and APRA domination, 
the civilian government gave way to military control under the
^^^Austin F, Macdonald, Latin American Politics and 
Government (New York: Thomas Y, Crowell Co., 1954), p, 355.
IZllbid,. p, 361,
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leadership of General Manuel Odrla. Rule was by decree until 
the elections of 1950, an election in which such out-of-favor 
parties as APRA, the Communists, and the right-wing Revolution­
ary Union were denied participation. Due in part to the ac­
tions of the government controlled National Election Board,
Odrfa became the only national candidate in 1950 and of course
won.122
Odrxa had at least the tacit support of the National
Alliance, the conservative answer to the National Front of the
1940's. The Alliance was made up of the
Revolutionary Union, the Republican Socialist Party, the 
Authentic Socialist Party, the Christian Socialist Party, 
the groups comprising the National Democratic Coalition, 
the Liberal Party, the Nationalist Party of Peru, the 
Constitutional Party, the Radical Party, the Democratic 
National Union, the National Front of Women, the Democratic 
Party, the Independent Civic Movement, and various small groups comprising the National U n i o n . 123
By 1955, President Odrla announced his intention to re­
tire and to turn over the presidential office to the winner of 
the 1956 elections. In the latter year, former President 
Manuel Prado y Ugarteche (1939-45) was again elected to the 
high office. APRA, which had been declared illegal in 1948, but 
was "at the same time the only sizeable permanently organized 
political party in the country,supported the Prado candi­
dacy along with the president's organization, the Moderate
122ibid.. p. 363 123%bid.. p. 355.
^2^Martin Needier, "Cabinet Responsibility in a Presi­
dential System: Peru," Par1iamentarv Affairs. XVIII (Spring,
1965), pp. 156-61.
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Conservative Party, part of the Peruvian Democratic Movement 
(MDP). On the day of Prado's inauguration, the Peruvian Cong­
ress legalized APRA.
During the next six years, a number of groups formed a
permanent opposition. Included were:
the Popular Action Party of Belaunde, the Odrîa Party, the 
Christian Democratic Party, seven left-extremist groups-- 
Communists, two Trotskyite factions, the APRA Rebelde, the 
Progressive Socialists, the Leninist Committee and the 
Socialists--as well as interest groups in which these par­
ties had a controlling position; the Federation of Students 
of San Marcos University, the Federation of Bank Clerks, 
the Lima Union of Construction Workers and a number of others.125
While Prado's second term has been described as conser­
vative, it was not traditionalist in the Peruvian sense. The 
latter term, referred to as the convivencia. was so named be­
cause of "an agreement with the apristas. probably conceived as 
a transitional arrangement to make the apristas respectable."
As payment for Aprista support in 1956, Prado "was, apparently, 
to try to bring the Apristas forward in 1962 with their own 
candidate, 126
Besides APRA, which has been described above, there were 
two major parties and a few smaller ones active in the elec­
tions, without the support of President Odria who wanted to see 
Hernan Lavalie succeed him in office. AP received some general 
support in the election, but Prado and his Aprista supporters
James Payne, "Peru: The Politics of Structural
Violence," The Journal of Politics. XXVII (May, 1965), pp. 362- 
74.
126Gomez, o£. cit.. p. 289.
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were too much for the young AP to seriously c h a l l e n g e . ^^7 Dur­
ing Prado's administration, Belaunde campaigned, wrote, and 
traveled over most of Peru. In 1959 his book, Conquista
TOOdel Peru nor los Peruanos. was published. In this book, 
which is not what the title might imply, there is not only a 
plea for the development of Peru, but a program or general plan
for such development. He calls for such things as industriali-
1-2.9 *'zation, road building, and national integration.
During the 1962 campaign, Belaunde traveled throughout 
the country, constantly charging that the Prado government was 
giving its support to Haya de la Torre and his APRA followers.
There is some indication that he thought they would win. After
the military intervention, there was widespread opinion in Peru 
that Belaunde had actually been the choice of the military. 
According to one observer, "the military apparently gave Belaunde 
their secret assurance that he would be elected," after which 
Belaunde announced "that he had been e l e c t e d . S u c h  was not, 
however, the findings of the National Elections Jury which, even 
under constant army pressure, declared none of the three major
127lbid.. p. 305.
^^^(Lima: Ediciones "Tawantinsuyu," 1959).
especially chap. vi, pp. 141-71.
^^^Gomez, 0£. cit.. p. 305.
IS^Richard W. Patch, ^ Note on Bolivia and Peru (Ameri­
can Universities Field Staff, West Coast South America Series, 
Vol. XII, No.2; New York; American Universities Field Staff,
1965), p. 38.
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contenders had received the necessary one-third for direct elec­
tion. Under the Peruvian Constitution, this meant that a deci­
sion would have to be made by the Congress. Shortly before the 
latter body assembled, Haya de la Torre and Odrla announced 
that their followers in Congress would get together to cast 
their votes for Odrla as president and Manuel Seoane of APRA 
for the vice-presidency. After about a month of indecision
when constitutional procedure would have moved Odrla into 
the president's chair, when Haya de la Torre voluntarily 
had bowed out of the political picture, and when Belaunde 
was left without further claim on the presidency--that the 
armed forces suddenly cried "fraud" and installed a mili­
tary junta in the seat of government. The only candidate 
benefiting from the coup was Belaunde, who was given another 
chance in the promised new elections. The charges of fraud 
by Belaunde and the armed forces were not substantiated.. . .132
Midway between the 1962 and 1963 elections, Belaunde's 
AP which had come in second in 1962 with some 543,322 votes, 
signed a pact with the small but influential Partido Democrata 
Cristiano (PDC), which had closed out the same election with 
48,810 votes. The PDC, composed of influential groups and in­
cluding many progressives within the Catholic Church, would 
give AP support in its attempts to throw off the rightist at­
tacks on it as a socialist party. For PDC, it would make pos­
sible for the "nonreactionary members of the Catholic Church an
1 ooalternative to right-wing candidates,"
The UNO came in third in both of the elections of 1962
132lbid.
^^^HAR. XVI (March, 1963), p. 62.
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and 1963. The party, whose primary aim is the support of 
General Odrla, has found most of its support in the coastal 
area, primarily Lima and a few other cities. He appealed to 
the middle and upper-income groups particularly, but he also 
got some of the support of Lima's desperately poor, who remem­
bered that conditions had improved during his earlier years in
o f f i c e . 1 3 4
Odrla, in a desperate bid to reach more voters in the 
months preceding the 1963 election, carried his campaign into 
the countryside, and appeared to be more liberal than he had 
been in 1962. His platform called for "political socialism," 
which, according to one source, meant "little more than civil 
rights and liberties without implying that there would be any
IOCfundamental social change." His hope was to win former APRA 
supporters, thanks to the agreement which was supposed to have 
been made between UNO and APRA earlier in the year. As one 
source put it, "Odrla was generally considered to be the same 
opportunistic demagogue of the past."
By the close of registration on March 11, 1963, the 
coalition of Belaunde's AP and the PDC had 112,000 registration 
signatures, more than any other group. APRA, whose candidate 
was, as usual, Haya de la Torre, came in second with 100,200. 
Odrla's UNO and Mario Samame Boggio's Union del Pueblo Peruano
IS^Gomez, o£. cit., p. 306.
^^^HAR. XVI (June, 1963), p. 380.
ISGlbid.
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(UPP) followed. The letter's entry into the race had been 
launched by Eudocio Ravines, a Communist-tumed-rightist, who 
had the support of the newspaper La Prensa. The UPP hoped to 
be able to take advantage of another three-way split such as
1 97occurred in 1962.
There were a number of other small, mostly leftist par­
ties, active in the recent election years. They include the 
Communist-dominated Fidelista party Frente de Liberacion Na­
cional (FLN), whose leadership has included a general, Cesar 
Pando Egusquiza, its presidential nominee in 1962, and a Father 
Bolo, a young priest who has since been suspended from his
1.38parish duties and is now a full-time pro-Communist worker.
Other leftist groups include the student FederaciOn 
Universitaria de San Marcos (FUSM), headed by the Fidelista 
leader Juan Campos Lama; the Fidelista-oriented Movimiento ^  
Izauierda Revolue ionaria (MIR), one of whose leaders, Walter 
Palacios, heads the national student Federacion de Estudiantes 
del Peru; and the Trotskyist Partido Obrero Revolueionario. 
led by Ismael Frias Torrico.^^^
Communist Party membership in Peru was estimated to be 
about 6,000 members in 1 9 5 8 . Nevertheless, the Interior
^^^HAR. XVII (May, 1963), pp. 280-81.
3-38h a r . XVI (April, 1963), p. 156; and Gomez, og. cit.,
p. 307.
^^^HAR. loc. cit.
^'^^Edwin M, Martin, "Communist Subversion in the Western 
Hemisphere," Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Pub­
lication No. 2 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1963).
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Minister, General German Pagador Blondet, announced in early 
1963 that the junta would not authorize the participation of 
the FLN, the Communist Party, or "any other Communist groups," 
in the upcoming 1963 elections. The junta was, the General 
pointed out, acting under a Constitutional provision. Article 
53, which denies parties with international affiliations the 
right to participate in elections. Leaders from both APRA and 
AP quickly indicated that they had worked for repeal of the 
provision since 1933 and 1956 respectively.
As the elections in 1963 neared, it became obvious that 
Odrîa had some support from the military who wanted to maintain 
conservatives in control of the Peruvian government. Odrîa's 
strongest backer, however. General Ricardo Perez Godoy, was no 
longer on the junta. The most acceptable candidate to the mili­
tary generally appeared to be Belaunde, His support came from 
younger members of the armed forces, as well as from the 
President of the Junta, Nicolas Lindley. Their support for him, 
one observer points out, crme forth because they liked his con­
cept of a centrally planned econony, which called for an impor­
tant place for the military in such projects as road-building 
and educating the illiterate masses.
APRA's congressional candidates accused Belaunde's par­
ty and platform of being communistic, but the letter's associa­
tion with Cardinal Landazuri of the Church helped him throw off
141RAR. XVI (April, 1963), p. 157.
142lbid.. (July, 1963), p. 485.
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such allegations. At the same time, APRA and UNO were accused 
of having made a secret agreement, whereby the combined strength 
of the two would assure a coalition victory over AF-PDC. Both 
Haya de la Torre and Odrla dismissed the charges as foolish,
At the close of the elections on June 9, 1963, some 
1,814,568 voters had distributed their votes as follows:
Fernando Belaunde Terry, AP-PDC 708,662
Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, APRA 623,501
Manuel A, Odria, UNO 463,085
Mario Samame Boggio, UPP 19,320
The figures indicated that Bela(inde had not only the support of 
the military, and the implication that it was the "official" 
party, but also the leftist groups who were prohibited from 
nominating candidates, and from some otherwise APRA supporters 
who were convinced that the military would never consent to an 
APRA victory.
On the basis of the foregoing description of political 
parties in Mexico and Peru, one must conclude that in practice
the former is still basically a one-party state while the latter
is a multi-party system. Both countries rely on conventions 
for making nominations. The question of legitimacy may be 
raised with respect to party government in both countries; in 
Mexico because of the close association between PRI and the 
government, in Peru for reasons described below. With respect
143lbid.
^^^Ibid.. (August, 1963), pp. 597-98.
145ibid.
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to the total effects of party competitiveness versus the lack 
of it in a developing country, many observers would agree that 
in the latter case it could be more of an impediment during 
the transition period than an a s s e t . I t  is quite possible 
that the mild question of legitimacy in Mexico is offset by 
the advantages such an association between party and government 
provides.
The three major parties in Peru are classic examples of 
the well-known personalist parties which have been so prevalent 
in the Latin American countries. APRA, for instance, is still 
closely associated with its founder, long time leader, and 
perennial presidential nominee, Haya de la Torre. One can only 
speculate what the future of APRA will be now that its leader 
is becoming quite elderly. To what extent Accion Popular repre­
sents the "new spirit" in Peru is also difficult to determine. 
Certainly the leadership of the dynamic, charming and capable 
Belaunde is currently one of its greatest assets. Furthermore, 
it must be kept in mind that its acceptance of the PDG support, 
plus the military favoritism it currently enjoys, account to 
some degree for its success. The UNO, finally, is the next 
thing to a pure example of personalist party politics. While 
he does have a record-in-office basis for presenting himself to
146gcott, for instance, says of the one-party system 
in Mexico: "Unless some such aggregating mechanism had evolved,
Mexico might have been forced to continue relying upon caudillis» 
mo for political integration, as the only alternative to the 
dividing tendencies embodied in the doctrinaire and personalis- 
tic factions which had controlled early revolutionary politics." 
Scott, o£. cit.. p. 146.
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the voters, Odrîa's platform is extremely weak.
With respect to APRA, there still appears to be wide­
spread question inside and outside of Peru as to whether the 
military would permit the election to the presidency of an 
APRA candidate. The role of the military in Peru is still a 
force to be reckoned with in Peruvian politics.
The above points indicate clearly that the operation 
and make-up of the political party system in Mexico places this 
segment of the Mexican governing system in a rather advanced 
stage of political development. In Peru, on the other hand, 
this is not true. There, the major political party, APRA, has 
been denied legal existence throughout much of its history, and 
it has been denied the fruits of office when, as in 1962, it was 
a legal participant and received more support than any other 
party. As long as the interpretation of APRA's legitimacy is 
left to the armed forces, assuming that the party maintains its 
current numerical strength, this will impair unity in the govern­
ing system of Peru, making it less efficient and effective in 
performing the authoritative functions of the system. This will 
in turn make it more difficult to inclement decisions regarding 
the economic development of the country.
Belaunde appears to have won fairly in the 1963 elec­
tion and, he appears to be very serious in his attempts to see
Peru develop economically. On the other hand, his party sup­
porters constituted a minority in his first Congress, and there 
is still a question about the extent to which he may lead the
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country if he loses the support of the military.
The Legislatures
The Mexican Constitution establishes a Congress of two 
chambers, one of Deputies and the other Senators (Art, 50).
The Chamber of Deputies is composed of representatives all 
elected every three years (Art. 51). There is one Deputy for 
each 200,000 inhabitants, with a minimum of two to a state, 
and one for each territory with less than 200,000 people (Art. 
52).
Prior to the 1961 Congressional elections, the laws 
were amended in order to increase the lower house membership 
from 162 to 178.^^^ At the same time the Congress provided, 
through a proportional representation scheme, that representa­
tives in addition to the single-member district seats, might 
sit in a Chamber of D e p u t i e s . B e f o r e  the 1961 elections,
PRI delegates held 157 of the 162 seats. Three belonged to the 
opposition, and two were vacant. After the 1961 elections, PRI 
strength was the same. After the 1964 elections, the first in 
which the proportional representation system was in operation,
^^^New York Times. July 2, 1961, p. 10.
Brandenburg notes: "The new election law of Decem­
ber, 1962, provides that any political party winning 2.5 percent 
of the national vote, whether five of its candidates actually 
win or not, will automatically obtain at least five deputy 
seats. Any party will acquire another seat for each additional 
one-half of 1 percent of the total national vote. The new for­
mula . . . will prevail up to a maximum of twenty seats. No 
similar provision was written into the new law on senatorial 
districts." Brandenburg, op. cit.. p. 155,
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the PAN received 20 seats, PPS got 10, and the PARM was given 
5^149
The Senatorial Chamber is composed of two members for 
each State and two for the Federal District, all directly elec­
ted every six years (Art. 56). All Senatorial seats have been 
held by PRI members in recent years. Brandenburg has stated 
that
all senators-designate share the comfort of knowing that 
32 years of precedent will not be reversed to seat any op­
posing candidates. Furthermore, the government minister, 
election commission. President of Mexico, presidente- 
designate, and Mexican army are at hand to guarantee their 
election. Regardless of what happens on election day, of­
ficial-party nomination guarantees a seat in the s e n a t e .
The Congress meets in annual sessions on September 1 
(Art, 65), but cannot be "prolonged beyond December 31 of the 
same year" (Art. 66), The President attends the opening of the 
regular sessions and submits a report, in writing, which indi­
cates the general state of the administration of the country 
(Art. 69).
A quorum in the Senate consists of two-thirds of the 
total members; in the Chambers it takes "more than half" to 
open sessions and exercise their duties (Art. 63). If members 
fail to attend for 10 consecutive days, "without justifiable 
cause or previous leave from the president of their respective 
chamber," they renounce their attendance and their alternates
l^^Needler, "Changing the Guard in Mexico," 0£. cit.. 
pp. 28-29.
^^^Brandenburg, o^. cit.. p. 155.
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“will be called at once" (Art. 63). Furthermore, if Deputies 
and Senators, without cause or permission, fail to attend the 
sessions, they “shall have no right to rémunération for the 
day on which they were absent" (Art. 64).
Introduction of bills and decrees belongs to 1) the 
President of the Republic; 2) the Deputies and Senators of 
Congress; and 3) to the legislatures of the states. Bills sub­
mitted “by the President of the Republic, by the legislatures 
of the States or by deputations thereof shall be referred at 
once to Committee." Other bills, namely those introduced by 
Deputies and Senators “shall be subject to the procedure pre­
scribed in the Regulations on Debate" (Art. 71). Under the by­
laws of Congress, individual citizens or groups may petition
151the legislative body to consider their proposals.
When bills are introduced they are normally sent to a
committee. Members on the standing and special committees are
appointed by the Gran ComisiSn. which is composed of one member
from each state. Members on standing committees are appointed
for three-year terms. The seniority rule which is so well
known in the United States Congress is not the basic criterion
for making the selection. Committees must report on bills with
152a recommendation for passage or rejection.
Each house chooses its presiding officers who serve for 
one month. They carry on the usual functions common to such
ISlTucker, op. cit.. p. 93,
152lbid.. pp. 91-95.
152
offices, but the short tenure does not contribute to making
the job a strong one. The majority leaders tend to be in a
153stronger position than the presiding officers.
After passing the committee stage, bills are placed on 
a calendar and taken up according to the priorities assigned to 
them by the party leaders. To pass, a bill must receive the 
approval of a majority of a quorum. The bill then goes to the 
President who signs it and has it published in Diario Oficial. 
Ordinarily, laws will become effective three days after publi­
cation (Art. 72).
The general powers of Congress are found in Articles 
73 through 77 of the Constitution. They are quite detailed, 
covering about eight pages of single-spaced regulation size 
typewriting paper. Another page, including Articles 78 and 79 
deal with the Permanent Committee. The powers include legis­
lative, executive and electoral functions.
In evaluating the role of the Mexican Congress, most 
authorities do not hesitate to point out its weaknesses even 
though the Constitution makes it co-ordinate with the other two 
branches. Scott says that "the president's domination of the 
national legislature is almost absolute," and notes that in 
the Forty-first Congress in which 138 bills were passed, only 
"seven were initiated in the Congress i t s e l f O t h e r  obser­
vers, agreeing that the Congress is to a great extent what the
IŜ Ibid.
154Scott, op. cit.. pp. 262-64.
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president wants to make it, but who nevertheless see it as 
something of a force, have described it as a "silent, potential 
censor."
The control of the Mexican Congress by the President 
reflects somewhat the advanced degree of political development 
found in that country. By way of example, the 1961 session of 
the legislature, upon recommendation of President Lôpez Mateos, 
"passed more reform legislation than any Congress since that in 
President Lazaro Cârdenas' administration." The reason for the 
new measures dealing with income tax reform, abolition of the 
inheritance tax, the social security system, profit-sharing 
between labor and corporations, lowering the legal hiring age 
of children and providing for the setting of a minimum wage, 
was to make Mexico available to receive the new Alliance for 
Progress aid grants. While the Alliance was not mentioned in 
the "debates," most of these measures were indirectly connected 
with the full implementation of the p r o g r a m . ^^6
The Congress of Peru is also bicameral. The number of 
deputies, which is currently 53 in the Senate and 182 in the 
House, is determined by law (Art, 91). Members of both houses 
are elected for periods of six years, terms which coincide with 
that of the President, and both deputies and senators "repre­
sent the nation and are not subject to any imperative mandate" 
(Art. 91).
^^^For example, see Tucker, o^. cit.. p. 100.
^^^New York Times. December 31, 1961» p. 21,
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Present laws provide for two deputies to a department 
with population up to 100,000, up to a maximum of 24 deputies 
for departments with a population in excess of two million. The 
legislative article of the Constitution makes provision for a 
"functional" Senate, but until it is organized, laws give each 
department at least one senator. Those in excess of 400,000 
may have up to the maximum of nine.^^^
The legislative session begins annually on July 28 
(Independence Day). The Constitution provides that it may con­
vene even though the President fails in his constitutional duty 
to call it into session, and that it may open even though the 
President might not attend, as he is required by the Constitu­
tion to do (Arts. 108 and 110).
The ordinary session lasts 120 days. Special sessions 
may be called by the President of the Republic with the consent 
of his Council of Ministers. Special sessions may also be 
called when one-half plus one of the available members of 
Congress ask it. Congress is supposed to give preference to 
the business that occasions the call of a special session (Arts. 
107 and 108).
Each house chooses its own officers vdiich consists of 
at least a president, two vice-presidents, a secretary and a 
treasurer. Collectively, these officers become a steering com­
mittee which directs the day-to-day routine of the legislative 
process. The president of each house appoints members to the
^^^Edelmann, o£. cit.. pp. 436-39.
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permanent committees, which are not very important in the legis­
lative f l o w . 158
The Constitution of 1933 does not give the President of
Peru a veto power. Article 128 stipulates that: "Within ten
days following the receipt by the President of the Republic of
a law approved by Congress, the former must promulgate it and
order its observance." If he doesn't, "it shall be promulgated
and its observance ordered by the president of Congress, who
shall order its publication in some periodical." (Art. 129).
According to Miguel Jorrin, this has brought about considerable
friction between the legislature and the executive, for the
latter has at times taken the liberty of returning bills to
which he objects, and the Constitution makes no provision for
159over-riding this unofficial veto.
Because of Peru's multi-party system, the President 
does not always enjoy the support which is taken for granted 
in Mexico. At the close of the 1963 elections, Belaunde's AP- 
PDC coalition held slightly less than half of the seats in the 
Senate, and slightly more than one-third of those in the Cham­
ber of Deputies. In other words, APRA and UNO delegates con­
stituted majorities in both houses.
When Belaunde began picking his cabinet, he apparently
^^^MacDonald, o£. cit.. p. 380.
^59Governments of Latin America (New York: Van Nostrand,
1953), pp. 104-05.
^60h a r . XVI (August, 1963), p. 598.
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tried to bargain off a few posts to the opposition in return 
for their support in Congress, Both Haya de la Torre and Odrla, 
however, prohibited their members from accepting ministerial 
posts, thereby keeping their right to openly oppose the govern­
ment's programs. When the Belaûnde-opposition talks broke up 
on July 26, 1963, leaders of APRA and UNO signed an agreement 
which assured their representatives in Congress of all impor­
tant Senate and Chamber posts. The pact, to run through the 
1963-64 and 1964-65 congressional sessions, gave the Senate 
presidency to Julio de la Piedra, a UNO member, with three more 
Odrifstas filling the remaining posts, Fernando Leon de Vivero, 
a loyal Aprista. was to continue serving as president of the 
Chamber of Deputies. Of the seven remaining offices, four would 
be filled by Aoristas and three by Odrilstas, Furthermore, the 
APRA-UNO agreement stipulated that every committee chairmanship 
in the congress would go to one of their followers, leaving the 
less important posts for the AP-PDC members,
While the Mexican Congress was quick to enact legisla­
tion to put in motion United States-aid supported programs, the 
Congress of Peru was hesitant. In mid-summer of 1960, President 
Eisenhower announced that United States aid in an amount exceed­
ing $53 million would be granted to Peru for certain social- 
purpose projects such as roads, housing, agriculture and land 
reform. Bills were introduced in the Peruvian Congress in Sep­
tember to provide for the implementation of the programs. The
IG^Ibid,. (September, 1963), pp. 705-06,
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following March, the bills were still bogged down in Congress.
In commenting on the situation. Tad Szulc reported that "some
members of Congress want to delay the reform measures because
169of the interests of the groups they represent."
Thus the make-up of the Peruvian Congress, perhaps more 
than its structure, plus the ideological orientation of its 
membership in past Congresses, has accounted for a situation in 
Peru which would be quite novel in Mexico, Further elaboration 
of the Legislative-Executive relations will be discussed in the 
section which immediately follows.
The Executives 
The President of Mexico is chosen by direct election 
for a term of six years (Arts. 81, 83). He assumes the duties 
of office on December 1 of the election year, and he may never 
again be elected to that office (Art. 83). While his powers 
are broad, emphasis here will be on those dealing with the 
legislative process.
As indicated above, the President has the constitutional 
power to introduce laws and decrees. His bills appear to have 
a constitutionally preferred status (Art. 71). Most of the 
bills introduced and passed are introduced by him. When passed 
in the two houses, bills are sent to him for approval. If he 
refuses to approve a bill or a part of a bill, it must be re­
turned, "with his objections, to the Chamber of origin." If the
^^^New York Times. March 19, 1961, p. 28.
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house of origin again approves the measure by a vote of two- 
thirds of the total membership, it goes to the other house where, 
in order to pass, it must receive a similar vote. When the lat­
ter house has acted affirmatively, the bill "shall become a law 
or decree and shall be returned to the Executive for promulga­
tion" (Art. 72),
There are other Constitutional grants of power, such as
calling the congress into special session (Art. 89, XI), but
these grants tell only part of the story. Most authorities on
Mexican government indicate that without question the President
is the chief legislator. Scott, for instance, says that "poli-
cy--or law making--has been assumed by the president almost in
toto." Policy making resides in Congress only "in the most
sterile, legalistic sense, depriving the senators and deputies
of even this small pretense of independence with which to salve
their bruised egos."^^^ While the president has the power to
cast vetoes, only twice since 1917 has he had to use it, and
164then only in minor, technical issues.
Frank Brandenburg has drawn conclusions similar to 
those of Scott. The President of Mexico, he says, "delivers 
the definitive word on every matter." Rule throughout Mexico 
is from the top down, and the President is at the t o p . 165
Scott offers two basic explanations for the power of
163gcott, 0£. cit.. p. 262. , p. 263.
165i/{^xico: 1966 and Beyond," Current History. L
(January, 1966), pp. 32-37.
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the Mexican President. Both reasons may be deduced from the in­
formation which has already been presented in this study. The 
first reason is that the Mexican people recognize the leadership 
as legitimate, including the machinery through which it works. 
Secondly, the mechanism through which the president works can 
be used to influence rebellious individuals, groups, or other 
political u n i t s . S c o t t  concludes:
So long as the president continues to provide fairly 
easy access to the political process, there probably will 
be no really violent struggle by interests outside of the 
PRI to win seats in Congress or to give it the true legis­
lative function the constitution describes.1°/
Brandenburg, who has referred to the Mexican political 
system as "Machiavellian," and who has noted that its "present 
system insults the intelligence of the Mexicans however much it 
may convince the foreign scholar that it works in the way propa­
ganda says it does," still concludes that such a system offers 
some advantages. First, he notes, it works. Then he says:
Despite its sharp contradictions of fundamental provi­
sions in >fexico's constitution and electoral laws, it pro­
vides political stability, peaceful transfer of power, a 
fair measure of political freedom and a workable formula 
for the eternal problem of patronage. The system has helped 
Mexico achieve notable social and economic progress, and 
has resulted in an improved tolerance among the Mexican people and between them and their g o v e r n o r s . 168
The Peruvian president is elected by direct suffrage 
for a six year term (Arts. 135, 139). The term begins on July 
28th of the year in which the elections take place, and ends
166scott, op. cit., p. 258. IG^Ibid.. p. 266. 
168»Mexico: 1966 and Beyond," p. 34.
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six years later (Arts. 139, 142). One who has been president 
may not again be elected until after the expiration of a presi­
dential period (Art. 143).
The president of Peru is required constitutionally to 
attend the opening of Congress in ordinary session, and he has 
the power to convoke Congress to special sessions (Art. 154).
The president has power to initiate bills, but not the power to 
veto them (Arts. 124, 129). If he has not promulgated a law 
and ordered its observance within ten days after having received 
it, "it shall be promulgated and its observance ordered by the 
president of Congress, who shall order its publication in some 
periodical" (Art. 129). Finally, the president has authority 
to make regulations "in respect of laws, without transgressing 
them or mutilating them and, with some restriction, to issue 
decrees and resolutions" (Art. 154, (8)).
Chapter II of the Peruvian Constitution deals extensive­
ly with the Ministers of State. The number, now 13, is deter­
mined by law. Collectively the ministers of state form the 
Council of Ministers. A president of the Council is appointed 
by the President of the Republic. The latter appoints and re­
moves the ministers "on the proposal and with the agreement, 
respectively, of the president of the Council" (Art. 158). The 
President of the Republic "convokes extraordinarily and presides 
over the council of ministers." He also presides over it when 
the meeting is called by the president of the Council (Art. 163).
The acts of government and administration of the national
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president are countersigned by the ministers of departments 
(Art. 166). The Council of Ministers is required to attend 
Congress together, or separately, to explain general policy of 
the executive power (Arts. 167, 169). Interpolation is made 
in writing (Art. 170), and a vote of censure against one or all 
of the ministers may be moved by any deputy or senator (Art. 172). 
If censured, a minister must resign, and the President of the 
Republic must accept his resignation (Art. 173).
During Prado's second administration (1956-62), two 
members of the cabinet resigned after serious criticism of them 
had developed in the Congress. According to Needier, Prado 
sacrificed them in order to build a better relationship with 
the legislature.While actually there was no motion of cen­
sure, it did leave evidence that Prado did not have the kind 
of control over the Peruvian Congress in the same way that a 
Mexican president would have over the Mexican legislature.
While Belaunde has been quite successful with the Peru­
vian Congress, he has also had some problems. On August 14,
1963, after a series of land seizures by peasants and Indians, 
he issued a decree ordering the expropriation of 78,417 hec­
tares of land in the departments of Junfn and Cerro de Pasco.
His plan contained a provision, which had to have the approval 
of Congress, for repayment of the lands in 20-year bonds draw­
ing five percent interest. The land's^ value was to be deter-
lG9"Cabinet Responsibility in a Presidential System,” 
Parliamentary Affairs. XVIII (Spring, 1965), pp. 156-61.
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mined by its productivity during the five year period preceding 
its expropriation. The UNO members of Congress protested, say­
ing they preferred payment in cash or short-term negotiable 
bonds. The Aoristas took no immediate action, explaining that 
they needed more time to think it over.^^^
At the close of the regular session of the Peruvian 
Congress in November, Congress had passed a constitutional re­
form bill, the first step in implementing the president's agrar­
ian reform measure. The bill itself, however, had not been 
passed, so Congress called itself into special session on Decem­
ber 2 to consider the bill, along with the 1964 budget. In the 
meantime, a committee of 13 deputies had been meeting in an at­
tempt to work out a compromise agrarian reform program. The 
make-up of the committee included six members from AP-PDC, the 
government coalition, six from the APRA-UNO coalition, and one 
representing the communist-dominated Frente de Liberaci6n Na- 
cional (FLN).171
The bill which the special committee members finally 
agreed upon was described as a compromise between the adminis­
tration's proposal and that of APRA and UNO. The Congress re­
sponded favorably by setting up a program which was to begin in 
January, 1964. By October, Beladnde was able to report that
172Negotiations with large land holders were moving along well.
17Qh a r . XVII (October, 1963), pp. 798-99.
171lbid.. (January, 1964), p. 1082.
^7^New. York Times. October 6, 1963, p. 32.
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Belaunde continued to find considerable opposition in 
Congress. His Prime Minister, Oscar Trelles, resigned under 
censure motion. The Lima neuro-surgeon, blamed for a football 
stadium disaster in which some 500 people lost their lives, 
was actually removed because "of his inability, or unwilling­
ness, to deal severely with campesino uprisings against land-
173owners and local authorities." Trelles was believed to be 
sympathetic to the views of the protesters.
In October, 1964, Education Minister, Francisco Miro 
Quesda, resigned under censure. He was charged on some 16 
counts, most of them involving accusations that he had been 
soft on communists and atheists. There were reports that after 
the censure, certain members of AF might support the calling of 
a national plebiscite in order to get a new congress. Belaunde 
himself, however, did not give the proposal his personal sup­
port. Instead he continued to "consult regularly with opposi­
tion leaders, modifying important legislative measures and re­
shuffling personnel to meet opposition demands.
Executive power is curbed in Peru in ways that are un­
known in Mexico. In the latter country, the chief law-maker is 
the president. Not only is he given adequate constitutional 
power to perform this role; it is also reinforced by custom. 
Furthermore, the president of Mexico is a product of, and the 
chief spokesman for the major party which has been overwhelming-
173patch, 0£. cit.. p. 22.
174î ew York Times. October 4, 1964, p. 31.
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ly victorious in recent presidential and congressional elections. 
In addition, recent presidents in Mexico have been the chief 
promoters of the Revolutionary goals, which in themselves give 
impetus to political and economic development. Finally, the 
Mexican executive power enjoys a solid legitimate base. That 
is, the elections have become less and less corrupted until by 
1964, even Diaz Ordaz' opposition conceded that the Mexican 
voters had made a choice about which there were no grounds for 
challenge.
In Peru the president has an opposition, a very decided 
one, both in and out of Congress. Within Congress, it is per­
haps more of an opposition to his having become president than 
it is an opposition to his reform proposals, although there are 
the latter kind too. This is due to the entire spectrum of e- 
vents surrounding the 1962-63 elections, as well as historical 
factors surrounding the presidential office in that country.
The president of Peru has not, in recent years, spoken 
for all of Peru. Only during Prado's recent administration, 
and now Belaunde's, is this less so. Even in the latter case, 
the President cannot be labeled the chief legislator. Bills 
which he has introduced have been delayed or amended in Congress. 
From a slightly different angle, the semi-parliamentary system 
of Peru, vdxile not a serious limiting factor, is at least a 
means whereby the Congress may embarrass him, a means which 
has been used repeatedly.
Finally, with respect to executive leadership in Peru,
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it must be pointed out that even when progressively minded 
presidents such as Belaunde, Prado, and to some extent Odrla, 
are in office, it may not be so much the man, but the institu­
tions, or the system, which constitute the major inqpediment to 
political and economic development. In other words, in a sys­
tem of "structured violence," no single individual, not even 
the president, may be blamed single-handedly for lack of prog­
ress.
Administrât ion 
Probably more attention has been given in developing 
literature to the role of administration than to that of poli­
t i c s . A,dam Smith is reported to have said that if govern­
ment would provide "law, honesty, peace, and easy taxes," eco­
nomic development would f o l l o w . ^^6 students of the development 
process since Smith have obviously extended the list, as well 
as modified some of the factors.on it, especially the "easy 
taxes" part. With respect to the "law" category, it would re­
main on the list with the qualification that it be a "proper" 
type of law which would encourage development. The political 
process will to a great extent determine such a law's appropri­
ateness. But to pass an appropriate law is only part of the 
problem. Effective implementation will depend greatly on the
general summary of administrative studies that 
have been made in many countries may be found in Fred W. Riggs, 
Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Houghton Miff­
lin Company, 1935), Part III, pp. 241-393.
17ÔQuoted by Kindleberger, cit.« p. 73.
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administrative system.
Public administration in Latin America has been des­
cribed generally as a "survival from times past, with additions 
and adjustments, but without basic changes." There has been a 
"background of inertia," a "perpetuation of inefficiency, which 
is preventing the public administration in Latin America from
adapting itself to the requirements of economic development,
177except in a few special cases."
One of the special cases is Mexico. Top echelons of 
administration there include some dozen "ministries," among 
which are those of Foreign Relations, Finance and Public Credit, 
National Defense, Navy, Agriculture and Stockraising, Communi­
cations and Public Works, Economy, Public Education, Health and 
Assistance, Labor, Hydraulic Resources, and National Property 
and Administrative Inspection. Sharing the top spot with the 
ministries are two "departments" which include the Agrarian, 
and Federal District. The position of the Attorney General, 
defined neither as a ministry nor a department, is on a par with 
the ministries.
The Law of Ministries and Departments outlines a general 
structure for each agency. In addition to the head minister 
(secretario). there is an under-secretary (subsecretario) and
17?United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America 
(New York; United Nations, 1963), pp. 56-57.
178l u c1o Nendieta y Nunez, 1& Administracion Publica 
en Mexico (Mexico: Imprenta Universitarla, 1942), pp. 79-126.
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a chief clerk (oficial mavor)• Departmental organization is 
similar. These officials are appointed by the president, and 
it is he who determines their functions. The agency heads, 
theoretically equal in rank, may work collectively with the 
president or, as is more often the case, individually with him. 
They are required to countersign all laws and decrees, and are 
Constitutionally required (Art. 93) to make annual reports to
the Congress.179
The ministers, department heads, attorney general, and 
secretary to the president constitute an advisory group common­
ly known as the Cabinet. It meets on call of the president,
180who also presides, and performs primarily an advisory function.
In addition to the ministries and departments there are 
a large number of decentralized agencies (organismes decentrali- 
zados). Operating under a different set of laws, the Law of 
Decentralized Agencies, 1947, they number about 85. Owned part­
ly or entirely by the government, they include eight in banking 
and general finance; five dealing with pensions, social securi­
ty and insurance; fifteen in banking, subsidies, and agricultural
promotion activities; and the largest group, some 34, are con-
LSIcemed with industrial problems.
Justification for such agencies is akin to those used 
to explain the existence of similar agencies in the United States;
179-rucker, o£. cit.. pp. 124-26. 
^®®Mendieta y Nunez, o£. cit.. pp. 120-21 
^®4ucker, o£. cit.. p. 142.
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namely, that activities performing primarily technical, adminis­
trative, entrepreneurial, or welfare functions should be pro­
tected from direct governmental control. Others have suggested 
that they were set up "as a consequence of the conflict between 
state intervention and private initiative, since in this type
of institution, government combines with private individuals to
182provide a public service."
Opinions with respect to the government's control over 
the decentralized agencies are not unanimous. One student of 
)^xican administration believes that the relationship is inti­
mate because, with one exception, the managers or boards of
directors of the agencies are "composed of administrators of
183the executive branch." This position could be strengthened 
by the fact that the Secretary of Hacienda and the Secretary of 
National Property, both national ministries, were empowered 
under 1947 legislation, to "supervise closely the activities of 
these institutions." On the other side, Eduardo Bustamenta, 
Secretary of the National Patrimony, has referred to the decen­
tralized system as feudalistic. "Each one," he has said, "man­
ages its own affairs for its own account and risk, only occa-
184sionally giving notice of its activities. This has to stop."
It has become something of a standard practice for
IB^Castellanos Coutino, of the Mexican Public Adminis­
tration Institute, quoted by Glade and Anderson, 2£. cit.. p. 
135.
IB^Delfano Solana Yanez, quoted by ibid.. p. 136.
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Mexican presidents to offer administrative posts to former 
heads of state. In March of 1962, seven ex-presidents held 
various posts. Aleman became chairman of the National Tourism 
Consultative Board; Cardenas was executive director of the 
Balsas River Commission; Rodriguez was chairman of the Fisher­
ies Bureau of the Commerce Department, and Ruiz Cortines was 
special advisor on non-metallic mineral resources. At the same 
time Portes Gil was heading the National Insurance Commission; 
General Pasqua1 Ortiz Rubio was governmental representative on 
the National Association of Mexican Engineers, and Roque Gonzalez
1 Q CFarza was coordinator of public works in the State of Hidalgo.
The practice, which has continued into the Ordaz administration, 
not only permits the president to check some of the more active 
political maneuvers of the ex-presidents, but also makes good 
use of a considerable pool of administrative experience.
The civil service of Mexico operates under congressional 
directives passed in 1938 and amended in 1941. The basic sta­
tute divides the public employees into two groups, "base work­
ers" and "confidence workers." Positions in the latter category, 
involving about one-third of Mexico's 200,000 civil servants, 
include those of minister, department head, other chiefs, assis­
tant chiefs, heads of important divisions and some specialized 
areas, all of \diom are appointed by the president. The base 
workers fall into several classifications and are the primary
185|jgg York Times. March 18, 1962, p. 40.
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L86concern of the regulatory statute.
There is no government-wide placement policy with re­
spect to those in the "base worker" category. Each ministry, 
department or agency handles its own assignments. Likewise, 
promotions are made on an agency basis. The basic law does, 
however, cover such things as working conditions, hours of
work, vacations, salaries, pensions, and union organization
187and operation.
Government employees may unionize, although union mem­
bership is not required by law, and there may be no more than 
one union per agency. The union may, by majority vote, expel 
a member, and by a similar vote, decide on a "temporary suspen­
sion of work," or strike. The law determines the justification 
for a strike, sets up a Tribunal of Arbitration to settle it,
and prohibits strikers from resorting to violence. Few strikes
X88by government workers have taken place.
The Law of Responsibilities for Officials and Employees 
puts certain responsibilities on the shoulders of public employ­
ees. In an attempt to avoid graft, the law requires that em­
ployees reveal their personal assets before taking office, at 
anytime during office, and after leaving their government jobs.
The law, at one time all but ignored, has been more seriously
189enforced since about 1953.
ISÔErnesto Lobato, "La Burocracia Mexicans," Revista 
de EconSmica. XIV (October, 1951), pp. 307-13.
187lbid.
IB^Tucker, op. cit.. pp. 133-35. ^ ^ Ibid.. p. 132.
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The administrative organization in Peru is also quite 
centralized under presidential control. In addition to his 
power to appoint the president of the Council of Ministers and 
the ministers of state. Article 154 of the Constitution gives 
him power to administer the national treasury (9); to appoint, 
remove, and grant leave of absence, in conformity with the law, 
to public officials and employees whose appointment or removal 
does not devolve on other officials or corporations (11); to 
grant, in conformity with the law, retirement and super­
annuation pensions and gratuities (12); to decide conflicts 
which arise between the departmental councils (13); to exercise 
the national patronage in accordance with the existing laws and 
practices (21), and to exercise the other functions of govern­
ment and administration which the Constitution and the laws en­
trust to him (27).
The Cabinet, or Council of Ministers, is second only to 
the president in the Peruvian administrative set-up. There are 
some 13 ministries: Government and Police, Finance and Commerce,
Foreign Affairs, Justice and Worship, War, Navy, Aeronautics,
Labor and Indian Affairs, Education, Development and Public Works, 
Health and Social Assistance, Agriculture, and Transport and 
Communication.^^0
190sources on the administrative organization in Peru 
are scarce. Those used here include James L. Payne, Labor and 
Politics in Peru (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp.
3-26; Edwin £. Erickson, &!., United States Army Handbook 
for Peru (Prepared for the Department of the Army by the Foreign 
Area Studies Division, Special Operations Research Office, The 
American University; Washington, D. C.: United States Govern­
ment Printing Office, May 1965), pp. 292-95.
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As in many of the Latin American countries, the Ministry 
of Government and Police is one of the most inçortant. The head 
of this agency assists the president in appointing other offi­
cials, and in supervising the departmental, provincial and dis­
trict agencies of the government.
In addition to the regular ministries, there are a 
number of special agencies and offices. Some of these, similar 
to the decentralized agencies of Mexico, are concerned specifi­
cally with development.
The Congress passed a civil service law in 1950. It 
was implemented by decree in 1960. It covers many public em­
ployees, but there is a notable list of exceptions. The exclu­
sions include employees of the judicial and legislative branches, 
foreign service personnel, members of the armed forces, school 
teachers, and political appointees, all of whom are chosen un­
der other laws. The basic statute calls for a career civil 
service, con^etitive examinations, and promotion based on merit. 
In turn, it prohibits public employees from participating in 
political activities and from making contracts with state agen­
c i e s . xn practice, the full in^lementation of the law has 
been spotty, but a start has been made.
In summary, administration is more highly centralized 
in Mexico than in Peru. The president in Mexico has more dis­
cretion in namiing his ministers and other governmental policy­
makers. In Peru, the president must be more careful to fill
19l£rickson, o£. cit.. p. 295.
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posts with personnel acceptable to Congress, to opposition 
parties, and to the armed forces. In addition, the Mexican 
president has considerable control over the decentralized devel­
opmental agencies, making it easier to coordinate the entire 
program of economic development. The development of similar 
agencies in Peru has only begun at this time. Finally, the 
Mexican government has a more highly developed civil service 
program than does Peru, to administer the government programs. 
In both systems, however, the presidency is the apex of the 
administrative organisât ion.
Goals and Implementation of U. Foreign Assistance 
Programs £o Latin American Countries
One of the greatest challenges that the United States 
and the Latin American Republics have ever faced is the success­
ful in^lementation of titxe Punta del Este goals. The task of 
accomplishing the revolution, under freedom, vdiich the Charter 
of Punta del Este called for, was described by President 
Kennedy as "probably the most difficult assignment the United
192States has ever taken on."*
Speaking at a White House reception for Latin American 
Diplomats on March 13, 1962, President Kennedy described the 
Alliance as a success in that it had already brought about a 
shift in thinking and attitudes about development in the
19%U. S., Office of the Federal Register, Public Papers 
of, Presidents ^  ̂ le United States: John £• Ke n edy. 1962 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp.
883-84.
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Western Hemisphere. People throughout the Americas, he noted, 
had accepted the goals of the Alliance. For the first time in 
Inter-American history, energies were being concentrated "on 
the central task of democratic development." But, the Presi­
dent hastened to add, there were obstacles in the patli of 
progress. Social reform had to take place. Such reforms "are 
at the heart of the Alliance for Progress. They are the pre­
condition to economic modernization." Yet, the United States 
understood, the President continued, that deeply rooted tradi­
tional social structures do not die easily. A good start,
193however, had been made.
Implementing, the goals of the Alliance was subject to 
considerable evaluation throughout the latter part of 1962. In 
October, Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dillon, spoke about 
the problem to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council 
Meeting at Mexico City. A solid beginniiig had been made, he 
told the delegates, but there were also two serious defects in 
its operation up to that time. First, the pace of self-help 
and reform was not proceeding satisfactorily. Secondly, the 
role of private enterprise, both foreign and domestic, was 
becoming obscure. There had been no progress during the past 
year, he noted, in the area of private investment. "The plain 
fact of the matter is," he said, "that private enterprise has 
not always been made to feel that it is truly a part of the
l-^3ameri£âS Foreign Policy. Current Documents 19^^, o£. 
cit.. pp. 484-86.
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Alliance," The situation was serious, he continued, because 
there simply did not exist sufficient public funds to adequate­
ly finance the proposed undertaking. He proposed, therefore, 
that the Latin American governments encourage growth in the 
private sector, reassure private enterprise in the soundness of
investment, and grant the private sector whatever advantages
194had been granted the public one.
In a report approved by the delegates to the Mexico 
City meeting in October, 1962, it was pointed out that self- 
help and reform in Latin America should be given greater im­
pulse, Especially in the areas of tax reform, land reform, 
and administration, the report stated, more attention should 
be speedily given. Therefore, the lA-ECOSOC recommended that 
participants in the Alliance "hasten the fundamental structural 
changes in the economic and social fabric necessary to convey
the benefits of progress and equal opportunities to the great
195majority of the people of the Americas,"
Two months later, in an address before the Economic 
Club of New York, President Kennedy stated: "I think that the
situation in Latin America is very critical," The President 
briefly compared the Alliance for Progress with the Marshall 
Plan, and concluded that problems in implementing the former 
were staggering. The attempt by the Latin American countries
194ibid.. pp. 511-12,
l^^The text of the Report is in Department of State 
Bulletin. XLVII, No; 1224 (December 10, 1962), pp. 897-901,
176
to accomplish social revolution under freedom, the President 
pointed out, was being confronted with serious obstacles.
A similar theme characterized the analysis of the 
Alliance made in a report of the National Advisory Council on 
International Monetary and Financial Problems in mid-July, 1963. 
Accelerated growth, the Report noted, should take place immedi­
ately in the areas of development planning, land reform, taxa-
197tion, education, and improved opportunities for exports.
By 1964, more optomistic views of the progress of the 
Alliance were being stated. Calling for still greater concen­
tration and dedication to the program. President Johnson pointed 
out that foundations had been laid, and some significant changes 
had taken place. In his report to the Congress, the President 
noted that ten of the nineteen Latin American Republics had 
met or surpassed their goal of a 2.5 percent per capita growth 
rate in 1963; all of the countries had recently improved their 
tax administration systems; eight of them had passed major tax 
reform legislation; eight had prepared development plans; and 
twelve had at least introduced agrarian reform legislation. In 
addition, the President noted that June 30, 1964, the Alliance 
had
helped construct 222,600 homes, 23,400 classrooms, 1,056 
water systems and wells, and 2,900 miles of roads; produce
^Public Papers of jgig Presidents gf United SEâÎÊSî 
JofaP £• Ssxmsdx, 1962. loc. cj^.
19?U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, National 
Advisory Council Report. House Document 144, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess., July 23, 1963, pp. 26-28.
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6,810,000 schoolbooks, build 554 health centers, hospitals 
and mobile health units; make 207,000 agricultural credit 
loans; train 47,930 teachers and 5,660 public administra­
tors; and establish or expand the resources of 16 develop­
ment banks or funds. 910 credit unions, and 74 savings and 
loan associations.198
In the President's 1965 Annual Report to the Congress 
on the foreign assistance program, still further successes were 
catalogued. Two more countries had submitted development plans; 
two more, making a total of 14, had instituted land reform pro­
grams; more classrooms and homes had been built; additional 
textbooks had been distributed; the number of teachers trained 
had doubled; and the number of savings associations and credit 
unions had grown considerably. The Latin American region had 
received more than 30 percent of total AID country assistance 
commitments during 1965, and the Latin American countries, it
was reported, were making a stronger effort to implement self- 
199help measures.
President Johnson was still optomistic when he spoke at 
the Pan American Health Organization in Washington, D. C., on 
August 17, 1966. The Alliance, he noted, was designed to build 
democracy, and that it was currently a revolution at work. Its 
success had shattered the myth that communism was the wave of 
the future in Latin America. This progress was building "demo-
^9Spresident Lyndon B. Johnson, The Foreign Assistance1964 (WatProgram. Annual Report to tdie Congress Fiscal Year 1964 (Washing­
ton: U. S. Government Printing Office), pp. 45-46.
199p2egidea2 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Foreign Assistance 
Program. Annual Report %o the Congress Fiscal Year 196§ (Washing-
ton: U. 8. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 13-14.
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cratic stability” in which man "can labor without upheavals and 
without chaos.
Implementation in Mexico and Peru 
United States aid to Mexico and Peru has not been as 
much as it has been for some other Latin American countries.
In order of amounts received 1945-1964 are Brazil, Chile, 
Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru. The amount
granted to Mexico during the period was $365 million while Peru
received some $222,201
Typical of the agreements between the United States and 
Mexico concerning the implementation of the foreign assistance 
program is one vrtiich entered into force November 15, 1961,
dealing with technical cooperation. In the exchange of notes
which established the conditions under which the grants were 
authorized, the Government of Mexico agreed, through its Qentro 
Industrial de Productividad. its agency for administering the 
program, to "specify in writing the type of work to be under­
taken, its objective, methods of financing, and such other mat­
ters as the parties may deem pertinent." The Centro, the 
Mexican Government further agreed, would submit a final report
200u, s. Department of State Bulletin (Washington: U.
S. Government Printing Office), LV, No. 1419 (September 5, 1966), 
pp. 330-34.
201u. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Abstract j&S 12É&# S£* Sit'» P* 865; fora more coisplete breakdown of aid to Latin America see U. S. 
Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Resources Survey for Latin American Countries (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1965).
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on any project completed. This summary would contain such items 
as "a record of the work done, the objectives pursued, the ex­
penditures made, the technical problems solved, and any other
202basic data related to the project."
Because of the state of development which currently 
exists in Mexico, few direct obstacles to the successful imple­
mentation of foreign assistance programs exist. This state of 
affairs is reflected in a joint communique issued at Mexico 
City by President Lbpez Mateos and President John F. Kennedy, 
during the latter*s visit to Mexico in June, 1962. In the 
document, both goveimments declared a willingness to "streng­
then the democratic institutions which their peoples, in the 
exercise of their sovereign rights, have constructed. . . . "  
President Kennedy recognized that the goals of the Alliance 
were the same as tiiose of the Mexican Revolution. Finally, both 
Presidents agreed that "government has an essential role in
stimulating and supplementing the efforts of private enter-
203prise" for attaining their objectives.
Carrying out the foreign assistance program in Peru 
has not been as easily accomplished as it has in Mexico. On 
July 18, 1962, the Director of the Office of News in the Depart­
ment of State read a statement to newsmen concerning events
S. Department of State, United States Treaties 
aaâ other International Agreements (Washington: U. S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1963), XIII, Part 2, pp. 1882-1888.
203u. S. Department of State, Bulletin. XLVII, No.
1204 (July 23, 1962), pp. 135-37.
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which had recently taken place in Peru. The Peruvian armed 
forces had, according to the release, deposed President Prado 
and assumed control of the Government. "We deplore this mili­
tary coup d'etat," the statement continued, "which has over­
thrown the constitutional government of Peru." The United States 
was, it was pointed out, watching developments in Peru. "Mean­
while, our diplomatic relations with Peru have been suspended."
The following day, President Kennedy's Press Secretary, 
Pierre Salinger, read the following statement to newsmen:
The President has noted developments in Peru with great 
concern. It is his belief that the action taken by the 
Peruvian military to depose a democratic, constitutional 
government has contravened the common purposes inherent in 
the inter-American system and most recently restated in the 
Charter of Punta del Este, which the former Government of 
Peru and other hemisphere Republics pledged themselves to 
support a year ago. At that historic meeting, the signa­
tories agreed to work together for the social and economic 
welfare of the hemisphere within a framework of developing 
democratic institutions.
The Declaration to the Peoples of America adopted at 
Punta del Este sets forth the aim to improve and strengthen 
democratic institutions through the application of the prin­
ciple of self-determination by the people. In the case of 
Peru, this great cause has suffered a serious setback.205
On August 17, 1962, the State Department announced that 
diplomatic relations would soon be resumed. The about face had 
come about, it was noted, because the governing Military Junta 
had given assurances that free elections would be held in June 
of the following year. As proof of their sincerity, the Junta
20^U. S. Department of State, Bulletin. XLVII, No. 1206 
(August 6, 1962), pp. 213-14.
^Q^American Foreign Policy. Current popum^nM» 
• cit.. p. 497.22
lèi
agreed to admit witnesses at the future elections. In the mean­
time, the Junta had agreed to carry out any prior governmental 
commitments, including their responsibility under any previously 
signed "loan, grant, and other agreements of our economic assis­
tance programs, . , Political activity in Peru after
this coup has been described above.
Summary
It can hardly be disputed that the role of government 
in economic development is a crucial one. The extent to which 
the government should or should not act in specific areas, how­
ever, remains open for further investigation. Nevertheless, it 
is generally agreed that at the minimum, "political stability" 
or "government stability" is an inducement to economic develop­
ment.
The concept of political development is a recent addi­
tion to the literature on development. While not often precise­
ly defined, it has been used in this study to mean that a legit­
imate government has the capacity to act effectively in pursuing 
its national goals. This is not, however, the way in vdiich the 
term is used in foreign aid legislation passed by the United 
States Congress. Political development there, and as it has 
been used by certain presidents, means development toward a 
democratic method of governing. It is sometimes used to denote 
an end in itself, other times as an impediment to economic devel*
206u. s. Department of State, Bulletin. XLVII, No. 1210 
(September 3, 1962), pp. 348-49.
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opment. But regardless of whether it is used to mean democracy 
as known in the Western world, or whether it is used to mean an 
ability to act effectively, the same conclusions may be drawn 
about the systems of Peru and Mexico.
It has been shown above that a more advanced state of 
political development exists in Mexico than in Peru. While the 
formal structure of the two systems, as described in their 
respective constitutions, are similar, the informal processes 
of decision-making and decision-executing are not.
The base of support as determined by voter registration 
and turn-out, is much more extensive in Mexico. In Peru, few 
of the sierra Indians participate at all in national politics.
Mexico is basically a one-party state while Pezru is a 
multi-party system. Most authorities agree that Mexican Par- 
tido Revolueionario Institutional has been an asset to develop­
ment. Through its close association with the formal government, 
it has provided support and encouragement to the central author­
ity, while at the same time building a legitimate base through 
the use of democratic procedures. Other political parties do 
exist in Mexico.
The party system of Peru consists principally of three 
major groups, each having provided, in recent years, formidable 
competition for the others. ÂPRÂ, although still perhaps the 
largest party, can not yet be assured that it could legally 
take over the government even if legally elected. In the mean­
time, the Apristas remain, either alone or in a coalition with
1Ô3
the Odri^stas, a revengeful opposition. Such strong opposition 
is conducive neither to political or economic development.
The president in Mexico is at the same time (die chief 
executive and the chief legislator. In Peru, the party strug­
gles are reflected in (die Congress and in legislative-executive 
relations. That is, the Peruvian president must expect more 
opposition from the Congress than would the president of Mexico 
from his legislative body.
In both countries (die president is (die chief adminis­
trator. The administrative organization in Mexico is, however, 
a more tightly woven system than that of Peru, and it is better 
shaped to handle the problems of economic development.
Finally, (diere is confidence in Mexico (diat "political
stability," a term almost interchangeable wi(di "political devel-
207opment," has been achieved. In Peru, on (die other hand, 
political stability is still l a c k i n g . T h e  society of the
2072dwin M. Martin, while Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs in the U. S. Department of State, said: "Mexi­
co has enjoyed political and economic stability since 1930."
U. S. Department of State, Bulletin. XLIX, No. 1278 (December 23, 
1963), p. 960.
In a study of another of the more highly developed systems 
in Latin America, Chile, the author concludes that its "highly 
specific structures" do not represent more than about one-fourth 
of the population. In Chile, the author concludes, a "sense of 
national community is yet to be achieved." Charles J. Parrish, 
"The Politics of Economic Development: Bolivia and Chile," (un­
published Ph.D. dissertation, Depar(m*ent of Political Science, 
University of Nor(di Carolina, 1964), pp. 420-21. Just the op­
posite appears to be the case in Mexico.
^^®There are many disunifying factors in Peru lAiich con­
stitute impediments to political development. On geography see 
Jose Pareja Paz Soldan, Geografla del Peru (Lima: Librerla
Intemacional del Peru, S. A., 1955); and Avencia Villarejo,
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latter country is in the process of transition from a tradition­
al to a more advanced state. The government reflects this, is 
weakened by it, and is not, therefore, in the position to lead 
as effectively as those who favor immediate modernization would 
desire.
La Selva % el Hombre (Lima: Editorial Ausonia, 1959). Excel­
lent accounts of social and cultural diversities are Roberto 
Mac-Lean y Estensos, Sociologia del Peru (Mexico, D. F.: In­
stitute de Investigaciônes Sociales Universidad Nacional Aut6- 
noma de Mexico, 1959); Jose Varallanos, El Cholo ^ £i Peru 
(Buenos Aires: Imprenta Lopez, 1962); Louis E. Valcarcel, Ruta
Cultural del Peru (Mexico, D. F«: Fondo Cultural Econômica,
1945); Alan R. Holmberg, "Changing Community Attitudes and 
Values in Peru: A Case Study in Guided Change," in Richard N.
Adams, e£ gl., Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, 1961); and 
Richard N. Adams, 4 Community in the Andes: Problems and Prog­
ress in Muauivauvo (Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1959); and William W. Stein, Hualcan: Life ia Highlands o£
Peru (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1 9 6 1 ) . For
extensive treatment of national ideology in Peru see Harry 
Kantor, Xdeologv âSà Program Qg £AS£Y (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1953). Mac-Lean y
Estensos adequately summarized Peru vdien he said "la unidad 
nacional es inexistente, no existe una unidad en nuestra Patrla," 
SC* Sic*» P* 550,
CHAPTER V 
POPULATION
Most studies in economic development* including the 
major textbooks, deal extensively With the influence of popu­
lation on economic development. So much so, in fact, that 
Kindleberger refers to the discussion of population as a "well- 
worn topic," and indicates that he will attempt only to "re­
capitulate the familiar.
Students of political development have so far done 
little with the topic.^ For that reason, the emphasis in this 
chapter will be focused on the economic questions arising from 
the high population increases, and governmental actions in 
coping with the problem.
Concern with the effects of population increase and 
level of living may be traced at least back to Malthus. In his 
essay, "Principle of Population," he concluded that "population, 
when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence
^Kindleberger, op. cit.. p. 205.
^In a recent study by Robert T. Holt and John £• Turner, 
The Political Basis of Economic Development (Princeton: D. Van




only Increases in an arithmetical ratio." The power of popula­
tion, he continued, "is infinitely greater than the power in
3the earth to produce subsistence for man." While certain 
checks such as war, pestilence, famine, and premature mortality 
had curbed population in the past, he offered only one major 
solution to the increasing population problem: delayed mar­
riages.*
Marxists,^ and other scholars inside and outside the 
socialist tradition, have accused Malthus of oversimplifying 
the population arguments. Most of them do, however, agree that 
a population increase under certain conditions may constitute 
an impediment to economic and social development. At the same 
time, it is generally recognized that an increase in population 
may, under certain conditions, be advantageous to a particular 
country.6
Hans Singer has described the differences between static 
overpopulation, and an increasing population, as they affect 
development. In the former case, it "lowers the national income 
per capita and is thus . . .  an antidevelopmenta1 factor." The 
lower the per capita income,"the more difficult it is for a
% .  R. Malthus, Principle og Population (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1921), p. 7.
*lbid.. p. 98.
^Ronald S. Meek, Marx and Engels on Malthus (New York: 
International Publishers, 1954), pp. 53-57.
^United Nations, Proceedings og thfe Wojçljâ 
Conference (New York: United Nations, 1954), Vol. V, pp. 1095-
1113.
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country to achieve the rate of domestic savings idiich will en­
able it to pull itself up by its own bootstraps."^ With respect 
to the latter, "you have to run in order to keep in the same 
place," The investment required to equip the increasing popu­
lation with the same level as the rest "must be considered as 
unproductive investment." This latter investment does not help 
develop a country, but only helps it maintain the status quo.
Therefore, the greater the population increase, the greater the
8amount of unproductive investment of this kind.
A reduction in the rate of population increase will not 
necessarily, however, promote economic development. A reduc­
tion in fertility may be of assistance. But if the decline in 
population is due to an increase in mortality among the adult 
population, that is, the active workers, the effects may be 
harmful. If the mortality rate is high among the youth ̂ o  are 
just preceding the productive ages, the decrease may be harmful. 
Therefore,
it is thus conceivable, although perhaps not likely, that 
an acceleration of population increase is beneficial for 
economic development. But this will normally require both 
falling birth rates and falling death rates, with the lat­
ter fall concentrated among the adult group,^
A combination of high birth rates and high death rates,
so characteristic of the less developed areas, is economically
wasteful. Resources are used to care for the large number of
^Singer, Q2» P* 73. Singer was a participant at
the World Population Conference at Rome in 1954.
Slbid.. p. 74. 9%bid.
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children, yet they may not live long enough to repay for the 
investment made in their food, clothing, shelter, education 
and other services. The low birth rate combined with a low 
death rate "leads to conditions favorable to high levels of con­
sumption and capital formation and thus of economic develop­
ment
World-Wide figures show that there are about one-sixth 
less persons of productive age in the less developed countries 
than in say the United Kingdom. The figure for Latin America 
is even higher. Even if differences such as capital equipment, 
levels of education, climate, natural resources, etc. were ig­
nored, the demographic factor alone would be responsible for 
output in the less developed countries being one-sixth lower 
than it is in the United Kingdom.
In summing up the relationship between population and 
economic development in the less developed countries, there 
are at least three ways in \diich the former may affect the lat­
ter. First, high birth rates may create a heavy economic load 
per adult. This not only makes it difficult to save for invest­
ment purposes, but it may also result in the denial of education 
and other long term development essentials to the children. 
Secondly, lower death rates and higher birth rates increase the 
population, thereby creating the need for larger and larger in­
vestment just to keep the Individual worker equipped in the way 
to which he has become accustomed. Investment for the purpose
10'Ibid.. p. 81. lllbid.. pp. 81-82.
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of improving the overall level would tend to be scarce. Third­
ly, many of the less developed countries have a high agricul-
12tural population in relation to the land under cultivation*
Demographic Pattern in Latin America
The 1965 population of Latin America was estimated to
be in excess of 225 million; the annual Increase of about 5
million— about 2.5 percent--was among the highest in the world.
From about 33 million and 3 percent of the world total in 1850,
the 20 republics now have about 7 percent. According to United
Nations estimates, the population of Latin America may be near
300 million by 1975 and possibly 600 million by the end of the 
13century.
Increases vary from country to country. During the 
period 1935-1955 the countries with the lowest average annual 
rates of increase included Uruguay, Haiti, Bolivia, El Salvador, 
Peru, Chile, and Cuba in that order. Those at the top and in 
descending order included Venezuela, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Mexico. The projec­
tions for the period 1955-1975 indicate that all but four coun­
tries will have higher annual growth averages, with two of the
IZunited Nations, Proceedings si £hg World Population 
Conference, o^. p. 1 1 0 3 . Similar views are expressed by
Joseph J. Spengler in "The Population Obstacle to Economic 
Development," American Economic BfiXâSH»,2fiEfiC£̂ as4 o£ îhg Sixty-third Annual Meeting. XLI (May, 1951), pp. 343-54.
^^United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Af­
fairs, ECLA, "The Demographic Situation in Latin America," Eco­
nomic Bulletin fog Latin America. VI (October, 1961), p. 13.
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latter remaining the same.^^ The average annual rate of increase 
for all countries during the 1935-55 period was 2.2 percent 
while it rises to 2.6 percent for the projected estimates in 
the 1955-75 period.
Population growth in Latin America is influenced by 
several factors. Among them are birtii rates, death rates, and 
in certain cases, immigration. The latter has had at most only 
moderate effects, and has been limited mostly to Argentina, 
Brazil, and possibly Venezuela. Birth rates have changed very 
little from what they were in the early part of this century.
They have always been high, probably around 45 per 1,000 popu­
lation* Exceptions to this general pattern would be those of
Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Cuba and southern Brazil.
The predominant factor accounting for the rapid increase 
in population in Latin America is the sharp reduction in mor­
tality. While specific data of a reliable nature has been ex­
tremely difficult to obtain in the past, it has been estimated 
that during the early years of this century the death rate in 
Latin America as a general rule amounted to about 30 per 1,000. 
The birth rate, as indicated above, was in the general area of 
45 per 1,000.^^ As shown in Table 7, the death rate had de-
^^See Table 6, page 191. l^Ibid.
^^United Nations, "The Demographic Situation, . . . "
OP. cit.. pp. 14-15; Carr B. Lave11, Population Growth and the 
Development of South America (Department of Sociology and 
Anthropology, George Washington University; Washington, D. C.: 
1959), p. 6; see also Table 7, page
^^Lavell, o£. cit.. p. 7.
191
TABLE 6
POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR THE TWENTY LATIN AMERICAN 






rate of Increase 
(percentages)
1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1935-55 1955-75
Brazil.... 37150 46215 58456 74572 95788 2.3 2.5Mexico.... 18089 22576 29679 40635 53561 2.6 2.9Argentina.. 1^044 15^90 i)l59 h m t nColombia... 8199 10152 12836 16985 22702 2.3 2.9Peru....... 6483 7727 9396 12420 16382 1.9 2.8Chile..... m b 5541 6)61 8$81 1Ô8ÔÔ TÎ9 J aCuba....... 4221 4932 6131 7553 9183 1.9 2.0
Venezuela.. 3300 4267 5882 8081 10779 3.0 3.0
Haiti...... 2581 2928 3388 4133 5209 1.4 2.2
Bolivia.... 2540 2850 3334 4152 5299 1.4 2.4
Ecuador.... 2296 2781 3691 4912 6446 2.5 2.8Uruguay.... 2030 2256 2615 2896 3143 1.3 0.9
Guatemala.• 1996 2438 3258 4320 5902 2.6 3.1
El Salvador 1531 1742 2109 2730 3571 1.7 2.7
Dorn. Rep... 1484 1889 2454 3319 4605 2.6 3.2
Honduras... 1042 1261 1660 2179 2819 2.5 2.7
Paraguay... 988 1247 1498 1779 2214 2.0 2.0
Nicaragua.. 728 923 1245 1692 2269 2.8 3.0
Panama..... 546 703 914 1206 1587 2.6 2.8
Costa Rica. 551 695 951 1335 1827 2.9 3.3
Total
Twenty Reps. 113499 138513 175380 226459 ;291206 2.2 2.6
*United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Af­
fairs, ECLA. Economic Bulletin for Latin America. VI (October, 1961), p. 14.
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TABLE 7
BIRTH RATE, DEATH RATE, AND NATURAL INCREMENT, 1953-57&
(Per 1,000 inhabitants)
Country Birth rate Death rate Natural increment
A B A B A B
Argentina.... 24.1 2 4-25 3.5 8-9 1 5 .6 15-16Bolivia...... 31.0^ 41 -45 11.0 1 8 -25 20.0 18-25Brazil....... 43.ol 42-45 20.6 16-19 21.4 24-28Colombia..... 40.4 44-45 1 3 .0 1 5-17 2 7 .4 28-29Chile........ 34.4 35-37 12.6 1 3 -1 4 21.8 2 2 -2 4Ecuador....... 46.0 44—43 1 5 .3 1 5 -1 7 30.7 28-32Paraguay..... 46.62 4 5 -5 0 10.6 12-18 3 6 .0 30-35Peru.......... 36.9 42-43 1 3 .0 1 5 -22 23.1 2 2 -30Uruguay...... 19.03 18-20 7.4 7-3 11.6 10-13Venezuela,.... 46.5 44-47 10.1 1 2 -15 3 6 .4 25-32
Total 33.3 39-41 1 5 .7 1 4 -1 7 22.6 23-26
Costa Rica.... 43,0 44—43 1 0 .5 10 -15 37.5 30-36
Cuba......... 25.14 30-32 5.3 10-11 20-21
El Salvador... 43.0 44—43 1 4 .1 14-13 33.9 28-32Guatemala.... 49.9 4 6 -5 2 20.5 18-25 2 9 .4 25-30
45-55 25-35 15-25Honduras..... 42.2 44—43 11.0 1 5 -20 3 1 .2 25-32Mexico....... 46,4 43-4_7 1 3 .6 14-17 32_.8 29-32
Nicaragua.... 42.6 4 5 -5 0 9.2 1 4 -1 8 33.4 28-35Panama. . . . . . . . 39.2 3 3 -4 2 9.3 9-12 2 9 .9 28-32Dominican Rep. 41.1 45 -50 8,8 15-20 32,3 25-32
Total 43.45 43-46 12.5 1 5 -1 8 3 0 .9 2 6 ,3 0
Grand Total 3 9 .7 6 40-43 1 4 .3 1 5 -1 7 2 4 .9 25-26
^•United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, ECLA, Economic Bulletin for Latin Merica. 
"Statistical Supplements for 1960,^ V, Table 3#









dined by the mid-1950's to half that of 1910,
The death rate is still high in some of the Latin Ameri­
can countries, particularly those which are partly located in 
the Tropical Zone such as Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia and parts 
of Peru. With continued use of the inexpensive DDT in combat­
ting malaria, however, the death rate is expected to continue
18to fall in these areas.
No important change in the average rate of growth of 
the Latin American countries has been predicted, even though 
the rates of growth in some of the countries are among the 
highest in the world. Some writers have speculated on the pos­
sibility of a mild decline in the fertility rate as urbaniza­
tion grows, a trend which did apparently influence birth rates 
in the developed nations of the West. And in Latin America, 
the comparatively low rates of Argentina and Uruguay are some­
times attributed in part to attitudes which are commonly asso­
ciated with the technologically advanced states. Even now,
"in every Latin American country birth rates are markedly lower 
in urban than in rural areas, evidently because of the differ­
ences in living conditions between the two types of environ­
ment . "
The proportion of the population that lives in the urban 
areas of Latin America is increasing rapidly, and will have




some influence in decreasing the average birth rate. Such de­
creases, however, will be mild and slow, and "so long as there 
is room for a sizable reduction in the death rate, the possible 
small reduction in the birth rate will be far from sufficient 
to offset the tendency towards accelerated population growth."
No significant changes will take place in the rate of popula­
tion growth "without profound changes in social and individual 
attitudes, such as those which have occurred in Argentina and 
Uruguay.
The only hope for successful development under condi­
tions such as those which exist in parts of Latin America, and 
the underdeveloped world as a whole, is, according to Staley,
"for them to balance deliberate modernization in the spheres 
of economics and health with equally deliberate and organized
efforts to lower the birth rate nearly as fast as the death
21rate." He adds, however, that "no one knows whether or not
such a policy can be adopted and effectively implemented. . . .
Technical advances in birth control and in the social technolo­
gogy of spreading new ideas may help." Other international
Z^Staley, og. cit.. p. 282. At the recently held eighth 
international conference of the World Planned Parenthood Assem­
bly, Santiago, Chile, Sir Colville Deverell of Britain, Secre­
tary General of the International Planned Parenthood Federation, 
told the delegates from 87 countries that the population explo­
sion could be curbed "only if governments and volunteer agencies 
greatly increase present efforts to make contraception and mater­
nal services available to the public in the developing countries. 
. . ." New York Times. April 16, 1967. p. 1.
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observers have expressed even greater concern for the overall 
problems of population Increase. Julian Huxley, for example, 
has put it this way;
The world population problem is to toy mind the most im­
portant and the most serious of all the problems now beset­
ting the human species. The problem of avoiding nuclear 
war is more immediate, but that of overpopulation is, in 
the long run, more serious and more difficult to deal with 
because it is rooted in our own nature.
It is now a world problem in general public estimation, 
but it has only recently achieved that position.23
India may have become something of a model for the less 
developed countries which want to take specific measures to en- 
cotirage birth control. Through that government's Planning 
Commission, the Family Planning Association of India, and the 
International Planned Parenthood Association, which organized 
at a Bombay meeting in November, 1952, an attempt was made to 
disseminate birth control information to 80 percent of the 
Indian w o m e n . I n d i a ,  howeverf enjoys one advantage in this 
sphere of activity which would not be prevalent in most of the 
Latin American countries; that is, the Hindu or Moslem religions 
do not constitute serious bars to the distribution of birth 
control information.
In matters dealing with birth control in Latin America, 
it may be assumed that pronouncements by officials of the Catho­
lic Church would have considerable influence on any actions 
taken at the governmental level, and possibly those of a private
^^pie Human Crisis (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1963), p. 43.
^^ e w  York Times. November 28, and November 30, 1962.
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n a t u r e . On the basis of this assumption, a brief resume of 
such pronouncements will be included here.
The Church's strongest pronouncements have been made 
in connection with abortion, a method of birth control which 
has never been very acceptable anywhere. Pope Pius XI, not­
ing in a papal encyclical in 1930 that some people think it is 
an appropriate means for lowering the birth rate, condemned it 
even if the mother's life is at stake. “However we may pity 
the mother whose health and even life is gravely in^riled in 
the performance of the duty allotted to her by nature," he 
said, "what could ever be a sufficient reason for exercising 
in any way the direct murder of the innocent?"^*
The 1930 papal encyclical also condemned contraception. 
Called "shameful," "vicious," and "a grave sin," such prac­
tices were labeled offenses "against the law of God and of na­
ture ." In 1961, Pope John XXlIl made similar statements in 
"Mater et Magistra." Anti-conception devices, he indicated, 
are expedients that "offend against the moral order established 
by God."27
In one recent publication in \diich an attempt is made 
to justify the Catholic viewpoint on birth control, the Catholic
^^A similar assumption is implied in Robert S. Smith, 
"Population and Economic Growth in Central America," Economic 
Development &nd Cultural Chan&e. X, No. 2, I (January, 1962), 
pp. 134-149, especially pp. 143-145.
26"Casti Connubii," The Ecclesiastical Review. IXXXIV 
(March, 1931), pp. 242-43.
^^New York Times. July 15, 1961, pp. 7 and 8.
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author deals specifically with the fertility rate in the under­
g odeveloped countries. "In my judgment," the author says, "the 
strongest appeal for birth prevention is based on the theory 
that it will help the newly developing countries to accumulate 
the capital for the modernization program." He then attempts 
to show, however, that population growth is not necessarily a 
"luxury which absorbs capital that might otherwise be diverted 
into the productive econony," but a force that "powers the 
economy into seIf-sustained growth." The real problem of solv­
ing overpopulation in developing countries, he concludes, "re­
solves itself into the work of increasing per capita produc­
tion."^^
The much talked about "rhythm method" of birth control 
is sometimes referred to as a method which may find extended 
use in the heavily populated areas. According to Zimmerman, 
"the Church does not oppose guidance in child spacing which is 
directed toward preservation of family welfare and perfoxmoed 
within the framework of the natural law." Such guidance is of­
ten given by physicians in developed countries vdien, he notes, 
it is requested by the parents. Therefore, "there is no reason 
to believe that a different policy would be applied to newly 
developing countries." But private advice and public campaigns 
aimed at birth control are totally different things. When
^^Anthony Zimmerman, S.V.D., S.T.D., Catholic View- 
on Overpopulation (Garden City, New York: Hanover House,
29lbid.. pp. 181-86.
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"approving Rhvthm for solving family problems. the Church does 
not necessarily endorse undignified public Rhvthm campaigns 
aimed at balancing a national budget."30
Zimmerman sees only one set of circumstances in which 
the Church might justifiably change its teachings on birth con­
trol: absolute overpopulation « At the present time, he thinks,
such conditions do not exist, even in India and China. But 
should it occur, "reason would demand the employment of a 
legitimate form of population control, and the Catholic Church
would presumably interpret the natural law in accordance with
31this circumstance."
In spite of the conclusions such as those described 
above, some actions have been taken in Latin.America which indi­
cate there is an immediate concern with the problem of a bur­
geoning population. One such example was that involving the 
four-day meeting of the Pan American Assembly on Population, 
held at the Medical College of Universidad del Valle, Cali, 
Colombia, in August of 1965. Sponsors of the First Pan American 
Assembly on Population were the Colombian Association of Medical 
Schools, the Population Council of New York, the American Assem­
bly of Columbia University of New York, and the Universidad del
3Qlbid.. pp. 180-81.
3̂ -lbid.. p. 211; similar views, with a slightly differ­
ent emphasis, are those of Dr. Donald N, Barrett, a member of 
the Papal Commission on Population and Birth Control, in U. S. 
Congress, Senate, Population Crisis. Hearings before the Sub­
committee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Committee on 
Government Operations, S9th Cong., 2nd Sess., II (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 384-420.
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32Valle at Cali. ^
The more than 150 delegates, representing "almost every 
hemisphere nation," were told by Dr. Frank W. Notestein, presi­
dent of the Population Council, New York, that "the nation that 
chooses to be poth prosperous and large in the long run can 
speed the day by reducing its birth rate drastically and at 
once." While pointing out that high birth rates do not have 
the same effects on all countries. Dr. Notestein continued by 
saying that "for undeveloped countries with high birth rates 
economic advances are out of the question because all available 
energy and capital are consumed in maintaining existing econom­
ic levels.
The loudest sounds coming from the conference, accord­
ing to H. J. Maidenberg, New York Times observer, was the si­
lence of the Roman Catholic Church. Many of the delegate- 
priests, he said, "not only sat through speeches sharply attack­
ing previous positions of the Church on birth control, but they 
also submitted some of the best and boldest papers on the sub­
ject." Some of the clergymen, he noted, were "more frank about 
their support of family planning--a term they prefer to birth 
control--than the more cautious lay delegates." A summary of 
the clerics' attitudes is as follows:
The best attitude our superiors could assume on these 
vital is8ues--until the Vatican clarifies the position of 
the Church--was to be silent. This does not mean the
^^New York Times. August 15, and 22, 1965, p. E 3.
200
hierarchy is in agreement with us or with the advocates of 
birth control programs. It does mean that the Church now 
realizes the dangers of alicmating millions of devout Roman 
Catholics by supporting certain social attitudes. The 
Church knows, for example, that for every two births in 
Latin America there is one abortion and that almost half 
the female members of the Church now use some contracep­
tive device. Those not using such devices are usually the 
poorest classes, \diose high birth rate creates social con­
ditions that lead them to live outside the Church.34
The success of the Assembly was expected to give en­
couragement to officials in the Latin American governments idio 
would like to take positive action, such as the establishment 
of family planning clinics. Some delegates indicated, however, 
that the distrust of government the lower classes might re­
quire that such aid be handled through non-governmental or at 
most semi-governmental agencies. Education as an answer to the 
problem was mentioned by some in attendance at the Assembly. 
According to one of the delegate-priests. Padre Gustavo Perez 
Ramires of Bogota, the main obstacles to family planning now
are "lack of education and organization among the vast inarticu­
lélate Latin masses and not the Church.”
The Demographic Situation jün Mexico
The population of Mexico is Increasing rapidly. The 
official censuses have indicated the following growth since 
1895;3*
^^Gilberto Loyo, La ooblaciSn de Mexico; estado actual 




1 Oct. 20, 1895 12,632,427
2 Oct. 27, 1900 13,607,259
3 Oct. 25, 1910 15,160,369
4 Nov. 30, 1921 14,334,780
5 May 15, 1930 16,552,722
6 March 6, 1940 19,653,552
7 June 6, 1950 25,791,017
8 June 8, 1960 34,625,903
The increase, especially since 1940, has been relatively high. 
The figure for 1960 was approximately 8.8 million over that of 
1950, and 15 million above that of 1940. On a percentage basis, 
the growth rate between 1940 and 1960 averaged about 2.9, mov­
ing closer to 3 percent during the 1950*s. Since 1930, the 
population has more than doubled.
Host of Mexico's increase is due to high birth rates 
and falling death rates. There has been some imnigration, such 
as the Spanish refugees \dio went to Mexico in the 1930's, but 
nothing on a large scale. It may be assumed that this increase 
will continue, even though little immigration is expected, pri­
marily because of the better living conditions, a continued
37reduction in mortality rates, and a high birth rate.
As Mexico's population grows, there has been a heavy 
migration to urban centers. Using the Mexican census definition 
of urban as communities of 2,500 or more, the urban population 
as a percentage of the total population for various years is as
follows
^^Brandenburg, The Making of Modem Mexico. 0£, cit.. 
pp. 234-35.








As the following table indicates, the already heavily 
populated areas, such as the Valley of Mexico, have since 1930 
attracted most of the migrants from the rural areas.
TABLE 8
POPULATION INHABITING FEDERAL ENTITIES OF MEXICO WITH 
SPECIFIED POPULATION DENSITIES, 1930, 1940, 1950 and 1960&
(Millions)
Density 1930 1940 1950 1960
Total (all densities) . . .  16.6 19.7 25.8 34.6
Under 5   2.2 2.3 2.5 1.1
5-25 9.0 10.8 10,8 13.7
25 and over   5.4 6.6 12.5 19.8
^United Nations, “The Demographic Situation, . . . "
2£* cit., p. 22.
The Federal District of Mexico has nearly quadrupled in 
population during the period 1930-1960. By 1964, estimates of 
its population were in the neighborhood of 6 million inhabitants. 
It has been predicted that by 1980 the District will have 15 mil­
lion. Mexico City alone counted 2.3 million people in the fed­
eral census of 1960.
Other areas of Mexico have been growing also. In fact 
during the 1950's, there was a higher rate of growth in the
p. 236.
OQ''^Brandenburg, The Making of Modem Mexico, op. cit.«
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northern border states than there was in southern states, idhere 
there Is a large concentration of indigenous Indians. The rate 
in Sonora, for example, was 4.2 percent; it was 3.8 percent in 
Chihuahua, and 3.5 in Tamaulipas. In the South, Hidalgo had a 
growth rate of only 1.5 percent; Oaxaca was 1.6; Yucatan had 
1.7; and the percentage was 1.8 for Durango and Zacatecas.
Much of this growth in the outlying areas was, however, in urban 
centers such as Monterrey, Puebla, Ciudad Juarez and Leon.
The transition from a rural to an urban society may be 
a trend which favors economic development. Where there are 
large concentrations of people, transportation problems become 
less serious obstacles. A large and capable labor force may be 
assembled more easily, and markets can be organized on a more 
satisfactory scale. Education may become more accessable to a 
larger number of the inhabitants, and public health programs 
will be able to reach a larger percentage of the population.
In most of the Latin American countries, more women than 
men leave the country to live in the cities. Consequently, 
more women than men make up the urban population, while in the 
rural areas it is just the opposite. In Mexico, in 1950, there 
were only 90 males per 100 females living in urban areas. In
42the rural areas, however, there were 103 males per 100 females. 
40ibid.
^^United Nations, "The Demographic Situation, . . . "
£i£., p. 22.
^^Urban is defined here as localities with 20,000 or 
more inhabitants; rural means the rest of the country.
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This phenomena, characteristic also of population shifts in the 
United States,appears to be associated with the European cul­
tural pattern. The opposite appears to be the tendency in some 
non-European cultures such as those of India, Turkey, and the 
Union of South Africa.^4
As indicated earlier in this chapter, economists gener­
ally consider populations with high proportions of population 
in the 15 to 64 age brackets to be more efficient; that is, the 
ideal situation exists where there are about 2 potential workers 
for each non-working dependent. In 1960, 53.5 percent of 
Mexico's population was in this category. Projections for 1975 
indicate that the figure will rise slightly, to 54.3 percent.
A further breakdown of the 15 to 64 age population is 
sometimes made. This involves the percentage of that age which 
is below 40 years. It is assumed that the 15 to 40 age group 
may more readily adapt themselves to new tasks. For every 100 
persons in the 15 to 64 category, Nicaragua has 73 who are be­
tween 15 and 40. From that high downward, Uruguay has 57.
Mexico has 71. This may not be as great an advantage as might 
appear, however, because the effectiveness of that 71 will de­
pend to a great extent on their education and training. In the 
countries with high birth rates, it will create heavy demands
43por each 100 females in the United States in 1950 
there were 93 urban males and 108 rural males.




46on the educational system*
The percentage of the economically active population 
of Mexico in the late 1950's was 32.4 percent. For males, the 
figure was 53.4 percent of the total male population; for all 
females, 11.6 percent were economically a c t i v e . T h i s  rela­
tively low percentage of economically active population is due 
mainly to the fact that about 43 percent of the population is 
less than 15 years of age as compared with about 31 percent in 
the United States. This again reflects the high birth rate 
among the Mexican people.
As indicated above, a main factor that accounts for the 
low percentage of economically active population is the fact 
that so few women are employed. The number has, however, been 
increasing. Women, as a percent of the total labor force, in­
creased from 8 to 13 percent between 1940 and 1950. By 1960, 
the figure was close to 17 percent. This encouraged a percen­
tage increase in the labor force as a part of the total adult 
population from 53 percent in 1940 to 59 percent in 1950 and to 
about 62 percent in 1960.^8 in other words, the number of jobs 
in Mexico rose in relation to the number of people. Much of 
the expansion in jobs for women was in business and government 
offices.
46lbid.. p. 37.
4?United Nations, Demographic Yearbook. 1964 (New York, 
1965), p. 203.
^^Vlctor L. Urquidi, "Problemas fundamentales de la 
economic mexicana." Cuademos Americanos. XX (January, 1961), p.
99.
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Despite the rapid increase in population, the living 
standard in Mexico has progressively improved. According to 
Vernon:
Of course, giant discrepancies in income persisted in 
Mexico, not only among the different income classes of the 
nation but also from one geographical area to the next.
But no solid support exists for the suspicion that Mexico's 
growth was largely a case of the rich growing richer while 
the real income of the poor declined. The rise of foodstuff 
consumption and decline of the infant death rate since 1940 
suggest the opposite conclusion. So does the visible expan­
sion in free public facilities for supplying education, 
medical help, and various other services.49
The main reasons why Mexico has been able to stay ahead 
of her population growth have been discussed in preceding chap­
ters of this study. In short, the Revolutionary ideology which 
encourages the government to act, and the fact that the govern­
ment has acted, appear to be the two broad general reasons for 
success. Between 1940 and the present time, the government has 
acted, even if not always with the same degree of enthusiasm 
and success, in many ways to encourage economic growth. It was 
in the early 1940's that the government, through such institu­
tions as Nacional Financiera, made its first tentative invest­
ments in manufacturing enterprises, a practice which was to be­
come quite common in later years. Road improvement followed, 
with emphasis on the zrural areas. Government financed irriga­
tion systems were developed. Monetary and fiscal policies, 
carried out by the Banco de Mexico, kept inflation under control. 
The peso was devalued. Tariffs were adjusted to fit particular
49Vernon, op. cit.. p. 94.
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needs* Large investments were made in dams, railroads, Femex, 
and electricity. Money was borrowed from abroad, tourism was 
encouraged, and foreign investors were made subject to new con­
trols.^®
By 1958, about the time of the election of Lopez Mateos, 
the threat of stagnation became a pronounced possibility. Ac­
cording to Vernon,
the astonishing increases in Mexican population . . .  were 
beginning to make their inexorable demands on government 
revenues in the form of "nonproductive" expenditures— ex­
penditures on schools, health facilities, even housing
At the same time, the government was becoming less willing to 
resort to deficit financing in order to obtain funds for the 
public sector. For a period of some two or three years, there 
was a pronounced decline in private investment. By 1961, how­
ever, with L&pez Mateos' assurance to the business community 
that their role was vital and that the government was behind 
them, an upward turn took place.
While the Mexican government has been attacking the
population problem by encouraging more investment and a higher
rate of per capita production, little appears to have been done
by way of discouraging the high birth rate. In fact, the few
statements by Mexicans who have commented on the problem^ have .
indicated very little sympathy with birth control programs.
Gilberto Loyo, the Mexican demographic expert, has stated that
demographic pressures create social and political forces 
which tend to accelerate progress. . . .  Without these
50'ibid.. pp. 94-122. 51%bid.. p. 116.
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demographic pressures I consider that the progressive 
evolution of this world would be slower and I doubt that 
it would be less burdensome.
A Mexican economist, Rubio L. Garcia, has drawn these 
conclusions:
With a very rapid demographic increase, year by year 
the standard of living rises--slowly, it must be admitted. 
This is because little exploited natural resources are 
important, and because the incxrease in density works in favor of economic progress.53
Another economist, Victor L. Urquidi, brushes the prob­
lem aside and out of the hands of the economists by stating:
Fundamenta1ly, population control is a cultural prob­
lem. . . .  I don't believe it is a problem for an econo­
mist. A demographic growth rate of 3 percent is a fact.
I accept it. This means we simply have to plan the econo­my taking this fact into account.54
A Mexican gynecologist. Dr. Alfonso Alvarez Bravo,
writing for the newspaper Excelsior, recently stated that no
contraceptive method is harmless. On the contrary he said,
the use of these methods will aggravate existing pathologi­
cal conditions. In not a few cases, such methods provoke 
individual intolerances, predispose to the appearance and 
development of cancer, cause changes in the endocrine 
glands, the hypophysis, and in the female reproductive or­
gans, and can likewise diminish fertility forever. . . .
The psychic disturbances produced by the contraceptives 
form a sober gamut of frustrations and disturbing inhibi-
52problemas Demogrâficas de Mexico, cited in L. N. 
Stevens, "Problems of Population Growth,"Public and Interna­
tional Affairs. XI (Fall, 1963), p. 121.
SSiigĵ  Desarrollo Demogrâfico de Mexico y sus Exigencies 
Economico-Sociales," Revista International de Sociologie. XIX 
(March, 1961), pp. 561-62.
^^Cited by Arthur Corwin, Contemporary Mexican Attitudes 
Toward Population. Poverty and Public Opinion (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1963), p. 6.
209
55tiens, guilt complexes, especially in religious people.
On two occasions within recent years, representatives 
of the Latin American governments have had an opportunity to 
express their opinions on birth control programs. The first 
was a proposal at the World Health Organization (WHO) that 
would grant assistance for family planning to countries that 
wanted it. The issue, firmly opposed by a coalition of Commu­
nist and Catholic countries, is reported to have almost t o m  the 
WHO organization apart. Apparently all of the Latin American 
delegates were against it.^6
A second opportunity to take positions on measures de­
signed to encourage family planning came about in the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1962. A measure, sponsored by 12 
Asian, African and European nations, proposed that the United 
Nations give assistance, vdien requested to do so, to countries 
engaged in establishing projects and programs dealing with 
problems of population. A watered down resolution was finally 
passed, after the "assistance" provision was deleted. Voting 
for the measure as it was originally introduced were only 2 
Latin American countries, Chile and Costa Rica. The rest either 
abstained or voted negatively. Mexico abstained.
^%xcelsior (Mexico City), May 14, 1964.
56j. Mayone Stycos, "Opinions of Latin-American Intel­
lectuals on Population Problems and Birth Control," The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. CCCLX 
Tjuly 1965), p. 20.
5?Ibid.. p. 21. The Resolution as finally passed is 
found in American Foreign Policy. CyCESnt Jlââlf 22-
cit.. pp. 176-78.
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The Demographic Situation in Peru
The population of Peru is growing rapidly. Various










United Nations estimates have arrived at a growth rate of 1.9 
percent for the period 1935-1955, Estimates for the period 
1955-75 indicate a sharp upward turn to something near 2,8 per­
cent, only slightly less than that in Mexico, Such a growth 
rate would give Peru a population in excess of 16 million by
1975,59
The increase in population is due, as in Mexico, main­
ly to the high birth rate. Some immigration has taken place, 
but it is an insignificant number relative to the total popu­
lation, The Oriental and Negro races together account for 
about one percent of the total population. According to ECLA 
estimates, the birth rate for both Mexico and Peru are higher 
than the average for the 20 Latin American republics. But the
5®Figures for 1935 through 1963 are from United Nations 




death rate in Peru is considerably higher, a fact which probab­
ly accounts for a lower rate of natural increment in Peru than 
Mexico.
Although confiete data are lacking, there appears to
have been some shifts in the Peruvian population. This has
come mainly in the form of Indian migration from the sierra,
and a few from the selva, to the coastal area. Actually, the
migration has not been to the coastal area in general, but
primarily to the Lima metropolitan area which includes the city
of Callao. Between 1950 and 1964, the population of Lima just
about tripled in size; so did that of Callao. Arequipa, Peru's
second city located inland from the southern coast, grew from
130,000 in 1950 to only 150,000 in 1964, The population of
Cuzco, which is located in the southern sierra, just about
61doubled in population during the same period of time.
Recent ECLA estimates have set the 1950 urban popula­
tion of Peru at 35 percent in 1950 and 41 percent in 1960, 
"Urban," however, is rather loosely defined, applying to "admin­
istrative centers of departments, provinces and districts, and
finother localities having urban characteristics." Further esti­
mates indicate that Peru's urban population will be 51 percent 
by 1975.63
GOsee Table 7. ^^Ford, og. ci£-f P- 16.
6%United Nations, "The Demographic Situation, . . ."
22- cit., p. 26.
63Ibid.. p. 30,
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With respect to the sex ratios in the urban and rural 
areas, Peru is the only country in Latin America vdiere there are 
more males in the urban population than females, and less males 
than females in the rural a r e a s . T h e  only satisfactory ex­
planation for this reversal of trends is that it is probably 
due to internal migration, primarily by young males who have 
left the sierra or selva and settled on the coast.
The age composition in Peru is very similar to that in 
Mexico. In 1960, 52.9 percent of the population was between 
the ages of 15 and 64. Projections to 1975 indicate that it 
will drop only slightly, to around 52.4 percent. Further, the 
number of persons aged 15-39 years per 100 persons aged 15-64, 
was the same in Peru (71) that it was in Mexico in 1960.
The percentage of the population which is economically 
active in Peru is 31.5, a figure slightly less than that of 
Mexico. For the total male population, the figure stands at 
49.6 percent, low relative to Mexico's 53.4. For all females, 
the percentage who are economically active is 13.6, somewhat 
higher than Mexico's 11.6. The population below fifteen years 
of age amounts to about 43.3 percent of the total population, 
or roughly the same as Mexico.
64rhe 1940 census indicated there were 102 males per 
one hundred females in the urban localities, and 97 males per
one hundred females in the rural areas. Ibid., p. 38.
GSjbid.; Ford, og. cit.. pp. 17-18.
GGunited Nations, "The Demographic Situation, . . . "
2E* clt:.. pp. 36-37.
6?United Nations, Demographic Yearbook. 1964. 0£. cit..
p. 209.
213
There has been some improvement in the living standard 
in Peru in recent years, but it has not been as widespread as 
that of Mexico. The economic growth since World War II has been 
real, but lopsided. On the coast, particularly in the Lima 
area, the average annual income is currently in the neighborhood 
of $600. In the highlands, however, it is closer to $100. Ac­
cording to one report, urban wage earners on the coast have 
increased their share of national income between 1950 and 1963 
from 39 to 48 percent. The highland farmers, on the other hand, 
have seen their share of national income during the same period 
drop from 22 to 12 percent.
In Mexico and Peru, the birth rate has been relatively 
high, but it has constituted less of an impediment to develop­
ment in Mexico than in Peru. This is due primarily to the fact 
that the government of Mexico has been better equipped to meet 
the problem through the use of its monetary and fiscal policies. 
These policies have been made and carried out under stable con­
ditions, supported by Revolutionary ideals. In Peru, where 
political development is not as highly advanced, an ever in­
creasing population constitutes more of an immediate challenge 
to that country's leaders.
Belaunde has indicated that he is opposed to family 
planning schemes. In 1962, he pointed out that "the greatest 
capital is the inventive genius of man," and, "can we know the 
mystery of unborn men, who might have brought a new message
York Times. March 27, 1966, p. 5.
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69for humanity.” Peru's vote in the 1962 General Assembly, at 
the meeting in which the resolution tQ offer assistance in the 
area of population problems was introduced, was negative. Never­
theless, a presidential decree on December 4, 1964, set up a 
Center for Studies of Population and Development, one of its 
functions to be to
promote . . .  analysis and use of the results of the popu­
lation census . . .  in order to prepare programs of action 
with lAich to comfort the problems of population and of 
economic and social development as integral parts of the 
National Development Program.'®
The sale or manufacture of contraceptives is prohibited 
by the Peruvian Government. Nevertheless, observers have indi­
cated that the law is not strictly enforced. Furthermore, 
several national conferences in Peru, sponsored by non-government 
agencies, have taken up the "planning" topic in recent meetings, 
and considerable support for more direct action in birth con­
trol programs has been forthcoming. At least one protestant 
church connected organization, the Comisi&n de Avuda Social, 
has been quite active throughout the country in promoting the 
distribution of birth control literature and information. Dur­
ing the year of 1964, some 45 medical doctors in 14 Peruvian 
cities agreed to collaborate with the Comisi&n in promoting the 
use of intrauterine (lUD) contraception. The response from the 
Peruvian people is reported to have been enthusiastic. The
6®From the "Report of the United Nations Population 
Commission," December 18, 1962 (Mimeographed), and cited in 
Stycos, OR* cit.. p. 13.
70Ibid.. p. 22.
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governmentÿ in the meantime, has apparently made no effort to 
stifle the work of the organization.^^
United States* Views on Population Growth 
and Economic Development
While the United Nations General Assembly was, in Decem­
ber, 1962, debating the position which that body should take on 
the world population crisis, the United States representative, 
Richard N, Gardner, expressed the views of his government on 
the relationship between population growth and economic develop­
ment.^^ After reviewing the general problem of high population 
growth rates, which he indicated were of particular concern to 
countries in an early stage of economic development, he summa­
rized the policies of the government of the United States.
First, according to Gardner, the United States is con­
cerned about the social consequences of its own population 
trends. Second, the United States want to know more, and wants 
other governments to know more, about trends in the developing 
countries "where present levels of population growth may consti­
tute a major obstacle to the realization of goals of human eco­
nomic and social betterment." Third, it is the policy of the 
United States to oppose any effort to dictate to any country 
how it should meet its population problem. Fourth, the United
^^Bruce D. Carlson, "Comision de Ayuda Social: Respon­
sible Parenthood," in Population Crisis. I, og. cit., pp. 253- 
56,
s. Department of State, Bulletin. XLVIll, No. 1228 
(January 7, 1963), pp. 14-17.
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States does not believe that obstacles should be placed in the 
way of states which desire to do something about their respec­
tive population problems. •’While we will not advocate any 
specific policy regarding population growth to another country," 
the American spokesman told the other delegates, "we can help 
other countries, upon request." Fifth, the United States be­
lieves that there is need for more information about the "impact 
of economic and social development on population trends and of 
population trends on economic and social development." Sixth, 
the United States believes that the United Nations and other 
international agencies can play a significant role in the area 
of population developments, and that member countries should be 
able to obtain from the United Nations and related agencies 
"such assistance as they may need and request in connection with 
their efforts to deal with their population problems.
In summary, the United States delegate informed his 
colleagues that it was the position of his government to support 
United Nations efforts to obtain adequate information, train 
nationals for demographic work, and promote full and adequate 
discussion of the problem. The resolution before the General 
Assembly, Gardner noted, was consistent with the views expressed; 
therefore, he cast an affirmative vote.?*
73Ibid.. pp. 17-18.
74ibid.. pp. 18-19. The Itoited States did abstain, how­
ever, on Article 6 of the resolution which contained the "assis­
tance" clause. The abstention was explained on the grounds that 
the United Nations already had power to take such action; there­
fore, the provisions of Article 6 were superfluous. Ibid.. p.
19.
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On several occasions in recent years President Johnson 
has made public statements which indicate a growing synç>athy, 
on the part of tdie United States, for efforts leading to solu­
tions to the population problem in the developing countries. 
Perhaps typical of these statements is his reference to the 
population trends mentioned in a letter to Secretary General 
U Thant at the beginning of the Second United Nations World 
Population Conference, held at Belgrade, August 30, 1963.
"Second only to the search for peace," the President wrote, the
75population problem "is humanity's greatest challenge." In
the State of the Union Address before Congress, January 12,
1966, the President asked
. . .  that you give a new and daring direction to our 
foreign aid program designed to make a maximum attack on 
hunger and disease and ignorance in those countries that 
are determined to help themselves, and to help those na­
tions that are trying to control population growth.'»
In his Foreign Aid Message of February 1, 1966, President 
Johnson made further reference to the United States position 
relative to foreign assistance and population control. Placing 
much of the responsibility for economic development on the 
shoulders of the developing countries, the President said that 
only the people living in those areas and their leaders could 
"face the population problem squarely and realistically." But, 
he added, "we stand ready to help developing countries deal with
^^Excerpts of the letter and other statements are 




Perhaps the most direct action yet taken by a United 
States agency to link more closely foreign assistance and popu­
lation control was that undertaken by the Agency for Interna­
tional Development in February, 1966. At that time, AID head­
quarters advised all of its missions abroad to designate one 
of their officers as a population information specialist in 
each country. In the meantime, the Agency indicated that it 
would welcome requests for items needed in establishing organi­
zations which were concerned primarily with the population
problem. The Agency did not, however, institute programs pro-
78viding for contraceptives nor devices for their manufacture.
Summary
The rate of population may be an important influence 
on economic development. Where there are relatively high birth 
rates and death rates, there tends to be less persons of pro­
ductive age and is, therefore, an impediment to development. 
Conversely, low birth rates and falling death rates are quite 
likely to be an asset to development. The former situation 
exists in much of Latin America and most of the less developed 
world•
The current average annual increase in 20 Latin American 
countries is approximately 2.6 percent. It is closer to 3.0




percent in Mexico and Peru. In addition, both of these coun­
tries have relatively high death rates. To raise the standard 
of living under such conditions requires a high rate of invest­
ment. Due to its more economically and politically advanced
system, Mexico has been in better shape than Peru to promote
79this requirement.
Another method of coping with the population "problem" 
of the developing countries is to promote birth control meas­
ures. A number of governments in the Middle East, Far East and 
Asia have undertaken such programs. In those areas, however,
80there are few religious obstacles to such official activities. 
The opposite is true in Latin America. None of the governments 
in the latter region have officially espoused a positive birth 
control program at the governmental level.
In Mexico and Peru, leading spokesmen have indicated 
disdain for government action in sponsoring birth control pro­
grams. But in both countries, as is true for most of Latin 
America, private groups are promoting such activities, and the
^^This is not to say that either Mexico or Peru is 
presently overpopulated in relation to resources, but rather 
to take notice of Mexico's present position of being better 
able than Peru to balance these factors.
®®This does not mean, however, that other obstacles do 
not exist. In a study of the demographic situation in Egypt, 
for example, the author concluded that population control in 
"overpopulated" Egypt is difficult because many villagers feel 
that the number of children, like everything else, "is divinely 
ordained." Peter B. Heller, "Demographic Aspects of Develop­
ment in Contemporary Egypt; An Integrated Study," (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Political Science, New York 
University, 1963), pp. 367-68.
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governments have taken no action to suppress these programs.
United States aid is now available for indirectly aid­
ing birth control programs in developing countries. Only 
recently has this position become more definite. There is no 
evidence that any of the Latin American countries have as yet 
sought this aid, and it must be assumed that most of them will 
be reluctant to do so as long as the Catholic Church maintains 
an unsympathetic attitude toward it. And even though members 
of the Alliance for Progress are fully committed to promoting 
economic and social development, population control is not 




In one recent review of the literature on education 
and development, the author said that "it is difficult to 
find a subject in the field of economic growth and national 
development which has stimulated more new and imaginative 
thinking, publications, and conferences than the field of 
education,Conferences on educational planning and develop­
ment, he continued, "bringing together government officials, 
experts of international agencies, and university scholars, 
are the order of the day."2 The result is a truly im­
pressive volume of papers, reports and books on the topic.
The same observer accounts for current contributions 
and controversies due to a "rediscovery" of education by 
economists. At times, he notes, "one gets the impression that 
education has been taken over by those who are not pro­
fessional educators, by the economist, the sociologist, the 
political scientist, and the development p l a n n e r , " 3
%ans C, Blaise, "Education and Development: A Literature Survey and Comment," International Development 





Most studies of development make at least a passing 
reference to the influence, control or direction given to 
education by the government.^ In one recent article, two 
authors delve into considerable detail to explain the rela­
tionship.  ̂ "Education and politics," they say, "are inex­
tricably linked." Such is true, they think, because "a 
government's education policy reflects, and sometimes be­
trays, its view of society or political creed." The formu­
lation of policy is accomplished through the political pro­
cess, and "the implementation of education policy has politi­
cal consequences by affecting, among other things, types and 
levels of employment, social mobility, and the ideas and 
attitudes of the population."& Responsible planners and 
advisors should, therefore, "acquaint themselves with the 
political ends the government intends the educational system 
to serve, and to point out the effects, for good or ill, 
which may be expected to follow from alternative courses of 
action."?
Most of the qualified advisors to the governments of 
the developing countries have strongly urged improvement and
^See, for example, W.W. Rostow, The Stages of 
Economic Growth, op. cit.« p. 30.
^David Abernethy, and Trevor Coombe, "Education 
and Politics in Developing Countries," Harvard Educational 




expansion of the publie education system. The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development missions that visited 
Turkey and Iraq about mid-century, for the purpose of advising 
them how to proceed toward greater development, placed strong 
emphasis on education. "Probably no other type of invest­
ment, public or private," the mission’s report stated, "will 
produce a greater return per unit of outlay," as that of edu­
cation, The mission to Iraq said that as long as 90 percent 
of the people lacked fundamental education, "the benefits of 
economic development are unlikely to be diffused widely 
enough to produce stable social and political conditions,
Several economists have attempted to put the argu­
ment for more educational emphasis on a dollar-and-cents 
basis, Mary Jean Bowman, for example, has found that "as of 
the 1 9 5 0’s, no country with less than a 4-0̂  adult literacy 
rate had a measured per capita income in excess of $200 with 
one exception, in which oil dominated the picture."9 Below 
the 40 percent literacy rate, " there was almost no educa- 
tion-income correlation. This suggests a minimum threshold 
educational diffusion level at about as a precondition
of development. "^0
Studies have indicated that a 4o percent male liter-
®Quoted by Staley, o£, cit., p, 32,
^Mary Jean Bowman, "Perspectives on Education and 
Development," International Development Review, VI 
(September, 1964), pp, 3-7.
lOlbid.. p, 3.
224
acy rate preceded the beginning stages of the factory system 
in France and England. Even in Russia, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, urban literacy exceeded this amount.
Even though the 40 percent literacy rate may be a 
precondition for development, it is not sufficient in itself 
to assure development, A number of countries have literacy 
rates in excess of that figure, yet their per capita in­
come is low. 12
In a study similar to that of Bowman, Frederick 
Harbison found a strong correlation between a country’s 
educational development and its economic productivity. His 
conclusion, in part, is as follows;
Using an indicator of educational development that 
is based on the enrollment in secondary schools and 
universities, we found that in the 75 countries the 
coefficient of correlation between educational level 
and the gross national product per capita is .888. The 
best single indicator of a country’s wealth in human 
resources is the proportion of its young people en­
rolled in secondary schools.13
Harbison also adds, as most students of development 
do, that education alone isn’t enough. The educational 
level in Japan, for example, ranks among the world’s top 
10 countries. Yet, its per capita gross national product 
is far below that for most of the advanced nations. Other 
countries ranking high in education but low in per capita
lljbid.
l^Ibid.. p. 4.
l^Frederick Harbison, "Education for Development," 
Scientific American. CCIX (September, I9 6 3), pp. 140-14?.
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gross national product include Egypt, India, and Thailand.
The situation is just the reverse in some countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, Liberia and Venezuela, Because success of the 
educational expenditure will depend on so many other factors, 
"we cannot say that an investment of x dollars in education 
will produce a y result in economic growth." Nevertheless, 
it can be predicted "that a well-educated and motivated 
people will do extraordinarily well, as the little country 
of Israel, with its very limited natural resources, is 
demonstrating,
Balance in the educational system is important. The 
educational program must, in order to be successful, be 
tailored to the needs of a particular country. Such bal­
ancing will be concerned with compromise among:
(1 ) quality and quantity, (2 ) science and the humanities, 
(3) vocational training in school and on the job, (4) 
regulation of salary incentives by the state and by the 
market and (5J the needs of the individual and the needs 
of the state.
Most authorities agree there must be an educational 
base from which to start. This base is elementary or primary 
education where the "3 R's" are emphasized. As one observer 
has put it,
the "crust of custom" in traditional societies is not 
broken until a significant segment of a culture has been
l^ibid.. p. 147.
^^Ibid.; the way in which the Conference of African 
Ministers of Education chose to balance their educational 
programs, in a long range 25 year plan, is described in 
United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa, UNESCO,
Final Report. Conference of African States on the Development 
of Education in Africa ('Addis Ababa: 1961).
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introduced to a more systematic means of obtaining and 
disseminating information about the production and dis­
tribution of goods.
By breaking traditional, inefficient word-of-mouth 
communication patterns, primary education on a large 
scale brings a new, more systematic informed set of 
actors onto the economic stage.
Once a "floor" of citizenry educated at the primary 
level has been established, then "that society will have a 
base upon which to build an increasingly more complex and 
efficient production and distribution s y s t e m . S u c h  an 
educational base "is an absolute precondition for the fruit­
ful application of research and development to the process 
of p r o d u c t i o n . I t  is only when "the working force at all 
levels is sufficiently literate, educated, trained, and mo­
bile to take advantage of new advances in techniques and 
organization of production that the creation of a built-in 
industry of progress becomes possible,
In looking at historical records, it may be shown 
that 39 countries in 1948 had more than 10% of their popula­
tion enrolled in primary schools. These 39 countries "pro­
vided the first 34 countries in 1958 in per capita output.” 
Four of the remaining 5 countries (Ceylon, China-Taiwan, 
Mexico, and the Philippines) "led their neighbors and-- with
^^Alexander L. Peaslee, "Elementary Education as a 
Prerequisite For Economic Growth," International Development 
Review. VII (September, 1965)» PP. 19-21.
l^IBid.. p. 2 0.
^®Singer, o£. cit.. p. 70. 
l^Ibid.
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the exception of Ceylon— appeared on the road to continuing 
economic progress. "20
The primary school may be an instrument for nation 
building, A national language, for example, may be stressed. 
Through emphasis upon the country's history, "an important 
measure of popular (and sometimes "jingoism," too, unfor­
tunately) can be created.Furthermore, a public educa­
tion system assists in strengthening "the kinds of loyalties 
and values that are necessary for a specialized and im­
personal economy to operate. "^2
Some of the elementary school graduates should go on 
to secondary schools. Once there, they should probably con­
centrate on vocational and technical courses set up to meet 
the needs of the particular government. A small fraction of 
those who enter secondary schools should pursue general educa­
tion which will prepare them for work at the college level.
Some countries have tended to stress secondary and 
higher education at the expense of primary enrollment.
Peaslee identifies 3 of these countries as being India, 
Pakistan and Egypt. He singles out 4 others, Brazil, Mexico, 
Spain, and China-Taiwan, which have put greater emphasis on 
primary education. The former group, he thinks, has over-
ZOpeaslee, 0£. cit., p. 2 0.




invested in secondary and higher education, "while failing 
to put enough emphasis on elementary programs," He con­
tinues ;
If the Indians in 1958 had had the same ratio of 
enrollment that Mexico had in secondary schools in 19^5 
(roughly five years after Mexico began to show sustained 
growth, which India has not), India would have had
2.464.000 students in secondary schools instead of 
14,426,000. Using the same ratios for higher education, 
India would have had in universities in 1958 only about
576.000 students instead of 913t000, The expenditures 
on the excess secondary and higher education students 
(since the cost per student at those levels is much 
greater than in elementary schools), if allocated in­
stead to primary schools, would have permitted ex­
pansion of Indian elementary enrollment to well beyond 
10^, thereby providing a real opportunity to break the 
'crust of custom,'24
The question is sometimes raised, is education a 
cause or an effect of development? According to Peaslee, the 
enrollment and growth data of those countries for which they 
are available indicate that "sustained growth in no case 
began before the nations had attained primary enrollments of 
at least 6% of total population,"25
Education in Latin America
In listing what the economists think are the social 
requirements for economic development, Urquidi puts "improve­
ment in the quality and extent of education" at the top of 
the l i s t , A n  educational system must be oriented, he be­
lieves, "so that it will be instrumental in the rapid attain-
oU,'^^Peaslee, 0£, cit,. p, 2 0,
Z^ibid,
26The Challenge of Development in Latin America, op, 
oit.» p. 79.
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ment of economic goals, which in turn, will bring cultural 
and educational opportunities within reach of an increas­
ing proportion of the population." Such a concept, he con­
cedes, "makes it clear that education is an economic problem, 
although it is usually presented as a social one." This 
being the case, "economic development and education must be 
dealt with jointly."^7
According to UNESCO figures for 1950» some 40 to 42 
million of the 97 million persons in Latin America above 15 
years of age were illiterate. The study conjectured that 
the absolute number of illiterates was still growing at that 
time. Such an illiteracy rate, of some 42 to 43 percent, 
may be compared with the Asian rate of about 6l to 65 per­
cent, and the European rate of 7 to 9 percent.28
All of the Latin American constitutions specify that 
elementary education shall be universal and free. But for 
most of these countries, such provisions constitute goals 
which currently are far removed from the social realities of 
the situation. Yet there is evidence that the situation is 
improving. From 1950 to i9 6 0, primary school enrollment for 
the 19 signatories of the Alliance for Progress increased 
from 1 4 .3 million to 24.8 million. For each 100 persons in 
the 5 to 14 year age group, 64 were enrolled in primary edu-
2?Ibid.. p. 79.
^®United Nations, Economic and Social Council,
World Survey of Education, II: Primary Education (Paris;
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cation in 1955. By i96 0, the figure had risen to ?8 per­
cent, Even as impressive as these figures are, they are 
tempered somewhat by the fact that the drop out rate is 
high; 50 percent leave school while still in the first three 
grades, and only 20 percent, in the area as a whole, act­
ually complete the first 6 years of primary education.^9
Primary education in the rural regions is especially 
a problem. There, the primary school lasts for only 2 to 4 
years. Attendance is low, transportation is difficult, and 
the basic health of the children is inferior to that of the 
children in the urban areas. Furthermore, trained teachers 
are scarce,30
Galo Plaza, former president of Ecuador, has recently 
pointed out that the basic needs from the standpoint of 
primary education in Latin America is for more schools, 
rather than just better schools. The latter, he thinks, can 
come later. The primary school, he believes, "is becoming 
more and more a part of the community. But if we are to 
lower substantially the menacing statistical figures for 
illiteracy, we will have to treat the problem on an emergency 
basis,
Another Latin American statesman, Luis B, Prieto,
29oabriel Betancur-Mejia, "Education: Backbone of the 
Alliance for Progress," Americas, XV {September, I963), pp, 
2-9. _
^^Ibid,; See Table 8,
31"Problems of Education in Latin America," in 
Mildred Adams (ed,), o£, cit,, pp, 159-69.
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president of the Venezuelan Senate at the time of his writ­
ing, has asserted that "education is also an effective in­
strument for promoting p r o g r e s s . "32 primary education, he 
notes, "has specific tasks to fill." They include the 
attaining of
security and freedom, and to foster habits of cooperation 
in a free world. It /education/ must be compulsory and 
free, designed to give man an understanding of his en­
vironment and to train him for productive work. It 
should awaken community spirit, through which the pupil 
learns by cooperation with others that he is a member of 
a larger nucleus from which he receives benefits and to 
which he has obligations. It must also foster respect 
for the principles of coexistence, which is the law ofthe community.33
Prieto believes that one of the most challenging 
tasks for the Latin American educational system is to "de- 
ruralize" the country schools. The "two" educational systems 
which now exist in so many countries puts the rurally trained 
individual at a disadvantage when he goes to the city to 
work.3^
In Latin American secondary education there was an 
average increase in enrollment of 14.84 percent during the 
1955 to i960 period. The increase in numbers was from
2 ,194 ,000  in 1955 to 3,837*000 in i96 0. This is not, however, 
as impressive as it may appear because of two factors. First, 
there were large numbers of drop-outs. About 78 percent of 
the initial enrolles failed to complete the course period of
32"Education for Latin America," in Mildred Adams 
(ed.), 0£. cit.. pp. 169-7 7.




TEACHERS IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES; 1960-62/63^ {Trained and untrained)
Country With a degree
Without a degree
Number ^ of Total
Argentina 140,311 629 0 .5
Bolivia 3,028 7,824 6 0 .9
Brazil 1 2 2 ,7 4 3 1 0 2 ,8 2 6 4 5 .6
Colombia 15 .3 0 8 33,221 6 8 .5
Costa Rica 6,620 2,142 24.4
Chile 18,681 1 3 ,4 1 9 42.0
Ecuador 5,789 9 ,9 6 3 6 3 .3
Mexico 48.277 66.232
Panama 5 .56 0 454 7.5
Peru^ 16,348 4 9 .0
Paraguay 4 ,8 6 2 6 ,3 5 6 5 6 .7
Uruguay 8 ,4 9 7 1,241 12.8
Venezuela 18,500 17,789 4 9 .0
^Institute Interamericano de Estadistica, America 
en Gifras 1963. V: Sltuaclën Cultural (Washington, B.C.: 
Uni'ôn Panamericana, 1964), Tables 501-3^; cited in Uni6n 
Panamericana, Estudio Social, . . . op. cit., p. 141.
^Data from UNESCO, Situaci6n Educativa en 
Amfrica Latina, pp. 240 and 246, as cited in Edelmann, 
op. cit., p. 122,
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approximately 6 years. Secondly, the courses of study being 
pursued did not correspond to the economic needs of under­
developed systems. In i9 6 0, for example, 9 percent were 
enrolled in industrial studies; I5 percent was in commercial; 
a scant 1 percent was in agriculture and animal husbandry; 2 
percent was in home economics; 10 percent was in normal 
school; and a whopping 63 percent was in general secondary 
education courses,
There is also a shortage of qualified teachers at 
the secondary level in some of the Latin American countries. 
Only about 30 percent of the teachers have taken courses in 
teacher training, "and it is precisely in the subjects that 
today require the best teachers— mathematics and the sciences 
--that the inadequacy is most evident.
According to Galo Plaza, "secondary education is by 
far the weakest link in our school system." This is due, he 
thinks, to the French influence on the Latin American educa­
tional systems. The traditional aim of instruction at this 
level has been
to develop an intellectual elite, capable of appreciating 
the arts, letters, and sciences. Its task was to select 
and train the best minds for positions of leadership in 
social, economic, and public life. It imparted general 
education, with a heavy emphasis on classical subjects 
and little attention to applied sciences and vocational 
subjects. Its goal was to prepare for the universities.3'
^^Betancur-Mejia, op.cit.« pp. 3 and 4.
36lbid.. p. 4.
3?Plaza, 0£. cit.. pp. 162-63.
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Prieto has expressed similar views to those of Plaza. 
"We have remained," he says, "captives of a literary human­
ism. When the continent needed expert labor and technicians, 
we were turning out lawyers to settle suits among landowners, 
clergymen, and poets." Furthermore, the secondary school 
"has suffered from an excessive intellectualism inherited 
from French and English schools, a survival which is dangerous 
to our economic and social development,
In the area of higher education, there was an annual 
growth of 5*3 percent during the period 1955 to i96 0. In 
the latter year, the 519*000 students enrolled in colleges 
and universities amounted to 3*1 percent of those in the 
20 to 24 age group. By way of comparison, some 34.9 percent 
of that age group in the United States was enrolled in insti­
tutions of higher education in 1960.^9
Course enrollment in colleges and universities is 
very similar to that in the secondary school. It does not 
match the needs of a developing country. In I96O the per­
centage of students in agriculture was 2 percent; fine arts,
3 percent; exact and natural sciences', 4 percent; education,
4 percent; humanities, 11 percent; social sciences, I7 per­
cent; law, 20 percent; and medical sciences, 21 percent,
At the Punta del Este Conference, I96I, resolutions
38prieto, o£. cit,, pp, 172-74, 
^^Betancur-Mejia, o£, cit,« p. 4,
40lbid,
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were passed which empowered the Secretary General of the 
Organization of American States to appoint task forces to 
carry out work in various fields covered by the Charter.
One of these fields is education. In November, I9 6 2, 
Secretary General José A. Mora named members to the Special 
Commission for the Programming and Development of Education, 
Science and Culture in Latin America, which became the 
Education Task Force for that field. The Task Force has 
since published criticisms of education in Latin America 
and at the same time has suggested a number of ways in which 
it could be improved,
With respect to primary education, the Education 
Task Force has emphasized the problem of the drop-out rate. 
In the area of secondary education, the Task Force has noted 
that :
It is obvious that secondary education in Latin 
America needs considerable diversification in order to 
cope with cultural, social, and economic characteristics 
of the various regions of the same country and also with 
the Individual differences of the heterogeneous popula­
tion found in its classrooms,^2
In the field of higher education, the Task Force noted:
At present it may be said that the university has 
failed to keep pace with the social and economic evo­
lution of the Latin American countries, and has made 
little effort to promote the 'new' professions needed 
for accelerating development. Although there is a 
critical shortage of trained high-level manpower, Latin 




ditional professions, many of which are neutral towards 
development and have failed to train enough persons 
capable of leadership or to contribute to the mobility 
of societies, . . .^3
Included among the recommendations of the Task Force 
was the suggestion that a greater percentage of a country's 
GNP be allocated to the educational function. In i960 only 
one country was spending 4 percent of its GNP for education. 
Three countries were spending between 3 and 4 percent; 8 
were spending between 2 and 3 percent; and 8 were spending 
less than 2 percent. At the Conference on Education and 
Economic and Social Development held in Santiago, Chile, in 
March, 196 2, a declaration was passed which recommended that 
not less than 4 percent be alloted to education by I963. By 
1 9 7 0, it was suggested that the figure be 4.53 percent of 
GNP, and by 1975, the figure suggested was 5.72 percent. 
These higher figures would compare favorably with the per­
centages being alloted for education in the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and the OECD countries, where they are 
5 .2 9, 5 .9 » and 4.8 respectively.^^
By 1 9 6 4, only 3 countries were spending more than 4 
percent of GNP for education. Four were spending between 3 
and 4 percent; 4 between 2 and 3 percent; and the rest, for 
which data is available, less than 2 percent. Several 




Panama, and Mexico, had made impressive improvements.
Several others, including Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Paraguay were spending less percentage-wise of their 
GNP on education than they had in 196 0.^^
Five Latin American countries were spending between 
20 and 30 percent of their national expenditures for edu­
cation in 196 4. There were 12 spending between 10 and 20 
p e r c e n t , I n  the same year in the United States, the 
composite expenditure for education by state governments in­
cluded approximately 4o percent of total expenditures.^?
The Task Force on Education set up specific goals 
with respect to school enrollment at all levels. Before 
doing so, they separated the countries into 3 groups. The 
actual enrollment and goals were as follows:
Enrollment as a percentage 
of this age population
(Actual)
i960 1965 1970 1975
Group I
(Argentina, Chile,
Uruguay, Venezuela) 88 100 100 100
Group II
(Mexico, Peru, and
10 other republics) 78 81 100 100
Group III
(Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras) 4-3 56 70 89
The Task Force further emphasized the need to see that a
^^See Table 9.
^^See Table 10.
^?United States, Department of Commerce, State Govern- 
ment Finances in 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1 ^ ) .  P. 7.
238 
TABLE 9








Costa Rica 3 .9 3.6
Argentina 2.9 3.6
Colombia 1 .6 2.7
Mexico W
Ecuador 1 .6 2.6
El Salvador 2 .5 2.4
Nicaragua 1 .6 1.8
Honduras 1.7 1.7
Bolivia 1 .5 1.6
Paraguay 1.6 1 .5
Guatemala 2.8 1.4
Haiti 2.6 — — —
Dominican Republic 1.5
®'"Dates y Cifras de las 




EXPENDITURES FOR EDUCATION IN LATIN AMERICA: 1964&



















&"Dat08 y Clfras de las Americas," Americas.XVIII 
(March, I9 6 6), pp, 4-6 and 4-7; data for Mexico is from New 
York Times. August 22, I9 6 5, p. 3 6, and December 26, I9 6 5.
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larger percentage of primary students complete the primary 
grades. It was suggested that in Group I, the percentage 
who complete their work rise from 30 percent in i960 to 70 
percent by 1975; iu Group II, from 6 percent to 60 percent; 
and for Group III, from 7 percent to $0 percent.
In the area of secondary education, the Task Force 
made overall recommendations that the number enrolled in 
school be increased from 24,396 in i960 to 36,946 in 1975. 
Percentage wise, this would amount to a jump from 15.7 per­
cent of those eligible to 35 percent of those in the second­
ary age category. With respect to the areas of study, the 
following emphasis and changes were recommended:^?
Area of Study Percentage of Total Enrollment
i960 1965 1970 1975
Agriculture 1 3 7 12Industrial 11 15 20 28Teacher-training 10 12 14 16
Commercial 15 15 14 14General Secondary 63 55 45 30
In the area of higher education, the Task Force re-
commended that enrollments increase from 16,466 in i960 to 
21 ,6 96 in 1 9 7 0, and to 24,577 in 1975. On a percentage basis, 
this would amount to an increase from 3.1 percent to 5.2 per­
cent and on to 8.6 percent in 1975.^^
Education in Mexico 
A survey of the literature on the subject of social




and cultural forces affecting development reveals something 
like unanimous opinion on the specific influence of edu­
cation in Mexico. At least two major works attempt to show 
that the attention given to education is primarily respon­
sible for building a climate within which development could 
take place.
Before the triumph of Juarez in 186?, little had 
been accomplished by way of making education available to 
the Mexican masses. It was primarily in the hands of the 
Church, even though a statute was passed in 1829 giving some 
encouragement to secularized education. Also, the Consti­
tution of 1857 proclaimed that elementary schooling was to 
be free and compulsory. Social^ cultural, political and 
economic factors, however, prevented implementation of the 
compulsory provision.
The foundation for Mexico*s modern school system 
was laid during the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
Between 1880 and 1910, a group of lay personnel of the 
positivist school of philosophy (the "Scientists”) had con­
siderable influence in guiding the learning process. One of 
them, Enrique Eebsamen, wrote a Guide for the Teaching of 
Writing and Reading and Guide for the Teaching of History, 
both of which were used extensively by public school 
teachers. Another of the lay group, Joaquin Baranda, became
•̂ ^They are George C. Booth's, Mexico 's School-Made 
Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 19^1); and 
Goodwin Watson's Revolution by Education (New York: Council 
for Pan-American Democracy, T9^0).
242
Minister of Education and completed the reorganization of 
the primary urban schools in 1886, Still another of the 
scientists, Justo Sierra, whom Francisco Larroya says "was 
able to envision the ultimate consequences of education in 
a liberal society," took over the Ministry of Education in 
1905 and made several significant changes in the system.
A Superior Council of Federal Education, an agency set up 
to promote a smoothly functioning school system, was estab­
lished, A Secretariat of Public Instruction and Fine Arts 
was created in I9IO,
Two Congresses of Education were held, one in I889» 
another in I89I. Partly as a result of the work done at 
these meetings, the Statuatory Law of Obligatory Instruction 
was passed in 1892, By the end of I907, 557 primary schools 
had been established. By I9IO, the number had risen to 641, 
and in addition 6 kindergartens had been set up.^5
One of the first important tasks undertaken as a 
result of the revolutionary movement of I9IO was the creation 
of rural schools. In 19II, the Congress passed a law making 
the central government responsible for supporting education 
throughout the country. Since 1912, there has been an 
attempt to make instruction in the rural schools practical
52prancisoo Larroya, "Half a Century of Education in 
Mexico," Texas Quarterly. II (Spring, 1959)» PP« 113-25; see also his ^La Educaoibn," Mexico 2  iâ Cultura (Mexico 
City: Secretaria de Educaolbn I^blioa, 1946), pp. 583-626,
^^Ibid.
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and of a utilitarian character. The goal has been to fit 
the instruction to the needs of the rural people, while at 
the same time giving them something of a liberal education, 
but stressing most of all improvements in their reading 
ability.
From 1912 on, a group of young men at the University 
of Mexico had considerable influence on education. The 
group, organized officially as the Ateneo de la Juventud. 
wanted to take culture to the people.55 Among the members 
were Antonio Casa', Alfonso Reyes, Martin Louis Guzman and 
Alfonso Gaso. They established what they called the Popular 
University. Members of the Ateneo, working in the name of 
their University, visited workers' gatherings, employee 
centers, and similar places. They gave lectures, organized 
visits to museums and planned excursions to historic sites.
Because of internal conflicts taking place between 
1914 and 1 92 1, there was little the federal government could 
do to support education. The work was left mostly to the 
states. The Constitution of 1917» however, contained some 
revolutionary pronouncements which embodied the convention's 
ideas about the theory and practice of education in Mexico. 
Article 3 begins by stating that education imparted by the 
Federal State "shall be designed to develop harmoniously all
more complete aocouut of this organization is 
found in José Vasconcelos, Conferéncias del Ateneo de la 
Juventud (Mexico City: Imprenta Lacund, I910TI
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the faculties of the human being and shall foster in him 
at the same time a love of country and a consciousness of 
international solidarity, in independence and Justice,"
Such education "shall be maintained entirely apart from any 
religious doctrine and, based on the results of scientific 
progress, shall strive against ignorance and its effects, 
servitudes, fanaticism and prejudices,"
Education, Article 3 continues, "shall be democratic, 
not only as a legal structure and a political regimen, but 
as a system of life founded on a constant economic, social, 
and cultural betterment of the people," Education "shall be 
national . , , without hostility or exclusivism," It is to 
"contribute to better human relationships," promote esteem 
"for the dignity of the person," and produce an appreciation 
"of the general interest of society," It shall avoid "privi­
leges of race, creed, class, sex, or persons," Private edu­
cation was authorized under Article 3, but such Institutions 
were required to obtain, "in every case, the express auth­
orization of the public power," Furthermore", they would 
have to operate in harmony with official plans and programs," 
Authorizations to private institutions to operate "may be 
refused or revoked by decisions against which there can be 
no judicial proceedings or recourse," Religious corporations, 
ministers of religion, and others "devoted to propagation of 
any religious creed shall not in any way participate in in­
stitutions giving elementary, secondary and normal education
zî5
and education for laborers or field workers."
Article 3 further stipulated that elementary edu­
cation would be compulsory; and free. Finally, it empowered 
the Congress of the Union, to "issue the necessary laws for 
dividing the social function of education among the federa­
tion, the states and the municipalities, and for fixing the 
appropriate financial allocations for this public service."
The Ministry of Education under the Constitution of 
1917 was established in I92I. No such agency had existed 
after I9 1 4. José Vasoonoelos was named the first Minister. 
The philosopher-educator led a program to combat illiteracy, 
multiply elementary schools, create technical schools, estab­
lish agricultural schools', train teachers and other adults, 
and coordinate the work of federal-state-local governments 
in the educational system,
The work of Vasconcelos was carried on by successive 
Ministers, particularly Jose Manual Puig Casaurano (1923- 
1 9 2 8) and Narciso Bassols (I93I-I934), It was President 
Cardenas, however', who led a movement in 1933~3^ to get the 
educational article of the I917 Constitution changed. He 
succeeded, and the new provision adopted in 193^ statedi
Education which the state imparts will be socialistic 
and, besides excluding all religious doctrine, will com­
bat fanaticism and prejudices, to which end the school 
will organize its teachings and activities so as to
^ Larroya, o£. clt.. p. 118; Tucker, o£. cit.. pp. 
35^-5* George I. Sanchez, "Education," Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCVIII 
(March, I9 4 0 pp. 149-^2.
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create In youth a rational and exact concept of the 
universal and social life.
cârdenas was also instrumental in establishing the 
National Polytechnic Institute, promoting an anti-illiteracy 
campaign, and doubling the number of federal rural primary 
schools between 193^ and 1938. The Church led some opposi­
tion to Cèrdenas* programs, particularly about the question 
of "socialism” in education. Opposition also came from fana­
tical peasants and employees of the hacendados. who were said 
to have been responsible for the slaying of some 300 rural 
school teachers between 1935 and 1939
Administrations since 1940 have taken more of a 
middle-of-the-road position on education. Ivila Camacho was 
mainly responsible for a constitutional amendment in 1943 
which modified the tone of Article 3 concerning educational 
purposes. No longer was state education described as 
"socialistic," and designed primarily to combat "fanaticism." 
The new provision stressed the need to harmonize "all the 
faculties of the human being and foster in him, at the same 
time, the love of his country and the awareness of inter­
national solidarity in independence and justice."^9
The Camacho administration was also primarily respon­
sible for almost doubling the number of kindergartens, pri­
mary and secondary schools between 1940 and 1946. Other
Quoted by Larroya, 0£. cit.. p. II9 .
^®Tucker, o£. cit.. p. 356.
■^^Article 3.
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accomplishments during his period of office included the 
setting up of the Institute Federal de Capictaci'Sn to in­
struct teachers, and the reforming of the Institute of 
Anthropology and History, and the Polytechnic Institute.
He founded the Astrophysical Observatory of Tonantzintla 
and the Seminary of Mexican Culture in 1942. In the follow­
ing year he created the Committee for the Co-ordination of 
Scientific Information. Beginning in 1944, the campaign 
to obliterate illiteracy was started. Through a program 
whereby the literate would help the illiterate, some half 
million more Mexicans had learned to read by mid-1946.^® 
Mexico's educational system continued to expand 
throughout the decade 1950 to I960. It was after the election 
of President Lopez Mateos, however, that the whole system was 
singled out for special attention. The new President, him­
self a former educator, claimed that his administration 
would be stamped by the advancement made in free education.
One of his first acts was to appoint a commission to de­
termine how private enterprise and government could work to­
gether to promote the educational system. In his first bud­
get, the Ministry of Education got the largest appropriation 
of any agency. The amount allocated amounted to 18.31 percent 
of total expenditures, highest in Mexican history. Besides 
funds to build more classrooms and employ more teachers, new 
funds were to be used at the National University, the National
60Larroya, o£. cit., p. 124.
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Polyteohnloal Institute, and to help integrate the Indians 
into national life. The program of motorized cultural mis­
sions was to be expanded, and rural education was to be 
boosted by 20 demonstration teams which were to travel in 
sparsely populated areas teaching reading, writing, and 
agricultural fundamentals.
Three years after the election of Lbpez Mateos, his 
Minister of Education, Dr. Jaime Torres Bodet, a former 
president of ÜMESCO., reported that the number of schools in 
the centers of Indian population had increased from 2,524 
in 1958 to 3 ,9 0 0 in i960. Student population had increased 
from 269,464 to 318,000, and the number of teachers in these 
schools climbed from 4,856 to 7,074. Rural teachers without 
degrees were being taught through correspondence courses 
and radio broadcasts. Carried by some 100 stations, the 
broadcasts helped 3,000 rural teachers get degrees in I96I. 
Twice that number was enrolled in 1962.^2
In still another area, that of free texts, some I7 
million were distributed in I96O. In I96I the number was
increased to 20 million, and in 1962, to 22 million.
There was some opposition by Church leaders to text content.
But to the critics'. President Mateos replied: "it is a shame
for Mexico that those who try to hinder the progress of
knowledge do not show their faces but use children to say
^^New York Times. December 27, 1959* P» 22. 
63lbid.
^^Ibid.. January 14, 1962, p. 40,
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what they do not have the courage to express," To this he 
added; "These same Irresponsible people try to mislead the 
Mexican public. They talk about the single textbook as If 
Its contents deform the national conscience,
The seriousness with which Mexico continues to 
attack Its problem of education has recently been described 
by one observer;
For three hours today a corner of this capitales 
main park became a center for Intensive self-improvement. 
At 10 a.m, a truck marked "Secretarla de EducaclSn 
Publlca" drove up to what ordinarily serves as a music 
grove In Chapultepec Park, Benches, tables and black­
boards were unloaded and set up under the trees, , , , ^oon thereafteÿ^ 25 men listened and wrote Intently In 
notebooks as a "Eeacher explained an electrical circuit 
on a blackboard. Nearby, young girls watched a teacher 
knead dough and make pastry decorations. On an ad­
joining bench women were being taught to make arti­
ficial flowers and further on others were learning how 
to measure and cut a dress pattern, , , , In the midst 
of this relatively advanced activity, four youths sat 
laboriously copying the letters that a young teacher 
had written on a blackboard. Later they were joined 
by an old woman,°5
The Sunday morning scene described above was also 
taking place In other parks In Mexico City, The Instruction 
was free», and people were encouraged to come and bring a 
friend, especially someone who needed to leam to read and
write,
One of Mexlco*s biggest educational problems has been 
the establishment of additional primary schools to accommo-
^^Ghrlstlan Science Monitor, March 2, 1963*
^^New York Tlmes  ̂August 22^ 1965, P* 36*
G^Ibld,
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date the increasing population as well as to make more 
schooling available for those already in school. In 1955 
there were roughly 3*5 million students in primary schools.
By 1962, the figure had jumped to more than 5-5 million.^?
To accommodate this increase, the number of schools had in­
creased from 2 7 ,8 2 6 in 1955 to 35*165 iu 1962,^® The number 
of teachers increased from 83,444 in 1955 to 126, 705 in 
1962.69
Even though the increases in numbers are impressive, 
less than half of the population 5 to 14 years of age was 
in school in I96O, The i960 census indicated there were 
slightly over 9*5 million children in this age group. Of 
that total, only 4.6 million, or 48,4 percent were attending 
s c h o o l . 70 The percentage of those attending, however, had 
risen considerably from that in 1940 when it was about 40 
percent.
As shown in Table 8 , the percentage of primary teach­
ers without a degree in Mexico in I96I was 57-8. Of the 16 
countries for which figures are available, only 4 of them
6’̂Departamento de Asuntos Sociales de la Union Pan- 
amer icana* Estudio Social de Amërioa Latim» 1963-1964 
(Washington^ D.C. ; Uni6n Panamericana", 1964), p. 137«
68ibid.. p. 1 3 5. 69ibid., p. 140.
7Qlbid.,. p. 1 3 9.
^^Oscar Lewis, "Mexico Since Cardenas," in Richard 
N, Adamŝ , et al., o£, cit.'. pp. 285-345.
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had a higher percentage of primary teachers without degrees 
than M e x i c o , 72 Also high in Mexico, is the number of stu­
dents per teacher. In 1961» this figure stood at 4-6, a 
number higher than most of the other countries of Latin 
America.73
The percentage of primary school graduates who go on 
to secondary school is very small, even by Latin American 
standards. In I965» when there were in excess of five 
million students attending primary school, there were only
281,000 in the secondary grades.7^ The first priority in 
Mexico, literacy, has called for emphasis on primary in­
struction, In recent years, however, secondary education 
has been declared to be the second priority. At the present 
time, an expanded program of television instruction is being 
beamed to those in the rural areas. The same textbooks and 
examinations which are used in the day schools are being
used,75
Enrollment in higher education in Mexico amounted 
to about 2 per 1000 population in the late 1950's. The 
figure for Uruguay at that time was 4,8 per 1000 population;
72{phey are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Nicaragua,
73ln Argentina, where the lowest ratio prevailed, it 
was 1-21; Uni6n Panamerioana, Estudio Social, , , , 0£. cit.. 
p. 144.
74New York Times, December 26, 1965. P, 16,
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for Argentina it was 4,1; in Haiti it was 0,3» and in the 
United States it was 15,2,?^ Higher education in Mexico has 
had a priority subordinate to that of elementary and second­
ary systems in recent years. Enlarged appropriations, how­
ever, especially for the National University in Mexico City 
and the National Polytechnical Institute were introduced in 
L6pez Mateos? budget of 1959» While higher education in 
Mexico has, as in other Latin American countries, placed em­
phasis on non-technical studies, there was a growing ten­
dency discernible in the 1950*8 to encourage concentration 
in the newer fields. In 1948, for example, those getting 
degrees in medicine and law amounted to I5.I percent of total 
degrees given. By 1957» this percentage figure had dropped 
to 8 ,3 . During the same period of time, degrees in commerce 
and other fleias increased from 84,9 percent of the total to 
9 1 .6 percent of all degrees given,77 During the same period 
of time, the total number of degrees conferred more than
doubled.78
Mexico has not suffered the vicissitudes encountered 
by some other Latin American countries in implementing the 
goals of the University Reform Movement, The Mexican
7^Asher N. Christensen, "Latin America: The Land and 
People," Government and Politics in Latin ^erica. ed, Harold 
E, Davis (New York: The Ronald Press, 1958), pp. 56-57.
77MCommerce" degrees include auditors, private and 
public accountants, bookkeepers, etc, "Other fields" includes 
engineers, architects, agronomists, nurses, pharmacists, etc,
78Cline, Mexico, op. cit., p, 205.
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Constitution of I9 1 7, adopted a year before the University 
Beform Movement began in Argentina, expressed roughly the 
same goals for education in Mexico that the Movement ex­
pressed for all of Latin America: that higher education
should be more closely linked with the problems faced by 
a particular country or locality.
Education in Mexico, whether at the primary or 
university level, has had a close tie with the Revolution 
since 191?. This does not mean, however, that Mexico is 
without problems in the area of higher education. There are 
those, for example, who believe that students have too much 
control over policy-making in university affairs.GO Another 
problem involves the concentration of trained personnel in 
the Federal District. Students, who migrate to Mexico City 
from outlying areas, often stay there once their training 
has been completed. This deprives other parts of Mexico the 
services of badly needed specialists in many fields of
deve1opment.®^
One of Mexico's major successes has been its cam­
paign to eradicate illiteracy. This success may be shown 
by comparing the illiteracy rate for various years. The
f^Luis Alberto Sanchez, "The University in Latin 
America: Part III, The University Reform Movement," Americas. 
XIV (January, I9 6 2), pp. 13-I6 .
^^Edelmann, og, cit., pp. 137-143.
On L, Vincent Padgett, The Mexican Political System 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1§6ÏÏJ7 P- 225.
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rate for people 6 years old and over fell from 66,6 percent 
In 1930 to percent in 194-0, to 4-3.2 percent in 1950* and 
to 3 7 .8 percent in 1960.^2 By mid-1964. Education Minister 
Jaime Torres Bodet announced to the Mexican people that the 
illiteracy figure had further declined to a new low of 28.91 
percent. One observer did note, however, that his precise 
figure "was received with doubt."^3
Looking at the Mexican educational system from 
another angle, one can explain its growth and development, 
at least in part, by looking at the percentage of the 
national expenditures allocated to education. In 1921, 4-,9 
percent of total national expenditures were for education.
By 1930, the percentage figure had risen to 11.3; in 194-0 it 
was 11,9; by 1950 it was down slightly to 9.1; in i960 it 
had risen to 18.6; and by 1965 it had risen to approximately
26 percent.84
Education in Peru
Part III of the Peruvian Constitution of 1933 is de­
voted to education. Some of the more appropriate provisions 
will be quoted here. The technical direction of education 
is a function of the states (Denartamentos). "Primary edu-
82UNESCO, World Illiteracy at Mid-Century (Paris: 
195 7), p. 95; Uni6n Panamericano, Estudio Social. . , , 
op. cit.. p. 126.
®^New York Times. August 3 0» 1964, p. 3 6.
®4ciine, Mexico, op. cit.. p. 194; New York Times. 
December 26, I965, p. I6 .
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cation is obligatory and free" (Art, 72). There is to be 
at least one school in every locality where there are 30 
pupils (Art. 73). "Complete primary instruction shall be 
given in every provincial and district capital" (Art. 73). 
The State "promotes education in its secondary and superior 
grades, with a tendency to free education" (Art. 75). For 
each department "there shall be at least one school of an 
industrial scope" (Art. 76). "The State promotes the tech­
nical education of workers" (Art.77), and the law "shall 
indicate the minimum amount of the revenue destined for the 
maintenance and diffusion of education and the proportion 
in which it must annually be increased" (Art. 83).^^
The above provisions in Peru’s Constitution reflect 
the development of education in that country up to the time 
it was written. Throughout the nineteenth century, various 
decrees, laws, and constitutional provisions had indicated 
concern for a better educational program. None of them, 
however, seem to have ever been fully implemented. One of 
the first major steps taken in Peru, in this century, was 
the assumption by the national government, in President Jose 
Prado’s administration (1904-1908), of the educational sys­
tem. Responsibility for education was taken away from the 
municipal councils, free and compulsory education was estab­
lished, funds were appropriated, and national supervision
^^"Constitution of Peru, 1933," lu Amos J. Peaslee, 
Constitutions of Nations. Ill (Revised ed; The Hague, 
Netherlands': Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 135-59.
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was introduced.®^
Organic Laws were passed in I920 and 1941. The 
latter enactment constitutes what continues to be the basic 
law of Peru's educational system. While it strengthened the 
system from top to bottom implementation was delayed primar­
ily because of World War II. It was not until the late 
1940*8 under President General Odrfa's Minister of Education, 
General Juan Mendoza, that extensive progress was made. In 
the first two years of Mendoza*s ministry, "school enroll­
ments increased by 150,000 and the educational budget had 
an even greater proportional increase."®?
In 1 9 5 0* & ten-year Plan de Educaciôn Nacional del 
Peru was adopted. The Plan gave special attention to pro­
grams which would help integrate the Indians into the 
national society; to rural and urban school improvement pro­
grams ; to the development of vocational type schools; and to 
higher education in general, A thorough review of the entire
00system was made in 1 957»
The educational system in Peru has undoubtedly suf­
fered somewhat in recent years due to the general political 
climate. There were two teacher strikes, in i960 and in
®®Adela R. Freeburger and Charles C. Rauch, "Education 
in Peru," United States Office of Education Bulletin, No. 33 
(Washington, D.C.i U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, 1964), pp. 3-4.
G?Ibid.. p. 5 .
®®Ibid.. pp. 5-6.
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1961, before President Prado left office.^9 During the 
period of military rule, 1962 to 1963» there appears to 
have been the usual concern for education, but no more. 
Another strike took place in May, I9 6 3. After the Minister 
of Education declared it illegal, some of the teachers re­
turned to work. They were demanding, as they had done 
before, increases in their salaries which, at that time, 
amounted to about $60 a month in United States currency.9̂  
After Belaunde became president in I963 he indicated some 
concern for education, but his pronouncements were quite un­
like those made by Lôpez Mateos of Mexico in 1959»^^ In 
1964, after Education Minister Miro Quesda was censured by 
Congress, considerable shifting took place in Belaunde’s 
Cabinet. Sixteen charges were brought against Quesda, in­
cluding charges that he had been soft on communists and
atheists.92
In May, I9 6 3» the United States made grants of $1.1 
million, under the Alliance for Progress program, to the 
Peruvian school system. Administration was to be carried 
out by Columbia University Teachers' College in collaboration
234-5 3.
®9payne, Labor and Politics in Peru, on. cit.. pp. 
^°HAE, XVI (July, I9 6 3), p. 48?.
9^"Inaugural Speech," New York Times. July 2 9, I9 6 3» 
p. 7: New York Times. August 2, 1964, p. 22.
^^New York Times. October 4, 1964, p. 31*
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with the Ministry of Education in Peru. The funds were to 
he used to try and increase attendance at the primary 
schools, and to upgrade the industrial arts programs. About 
the same time, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations announced 
grants of some #450,000 to the Agrarian University in Lima 
for the purpose of studying and planning the agrarian reform 
program in Peru.^^
About a month after the private grants were made, 
the Agency for International Development announced an addi­
tional grant which would bring the total amount assigned to 
education in Peru to #2,322,829. The funds were to be spent 
over a three-year period, and in addition to the goals men­
tioned above, educational television was to be extended, 
scholarships in education were to be made available, more 
modern texts were to be printed, technical and vocational 
education were to be expanded, and specialized polytechnic 
institutions were to be established.9^
Plans were made for the opening of South America’s 
first graduate-level school of business, the Escuela en 
Administraoion de Négociés para Graduados, for the Fall,
1963. It was to be located in Lima, and was to be under the 
initial administration of Stanford University. Scheduled to
cost some #975,000 during its first 2 years of operation,
AID grants of #575,000 were to be matched by #400,000 of
9^SAE. XVI (July. 1963), p. 487.
9^1bid.. (August, 1963), p. 600.
259
Peruvian currency,95
The enormity of Peru's educational challenge has 
been captured by those who reported on the Cornell-Peru 
project at Vicos, When a leader of the project first arrived 
at Vicos in 19^9t he discovered that an elementary school 
was in existence. He was unable to find, however, even one 
child of primary school age who could read or write in any 
language. By 1951* out of more than 1600 children eligible 
to attend school, only five could read and write, and only 
36 were attending school. Some 1,566 had not gone to school 
at all. Those who had attended had done so under dis­
couraging conditions. The school building consisted of a 
crumbling adobe hut which contained no chairs or desks.
The teacher was poorly trained, and "it was unheard of to 
send a girl to school,"9^
Under the guidance of the project leadership at 
Vicos, more than 200 students were enrolled by 1957» and 7 
teachers were employed. Much of the labor used to build a 
new school plant came from the community, and the Minister 
of Education in Lima cooperated fully. About one-third of 
the students enrolled were girls, and the attitude towards 
education by members of the community had begun to change
9̂ Ibid,
9^Allan R, Holmberg, "Changing Community Attitudes 
and Values in Peru* A Case Study in Guided Change," in 
Richard N. Adams, et al,. Social Change in Latin America 
Today (New Yorl.: Council on Foreign Relations by Harper 
and Brothers, I96I), pp, 6W-6 9.
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from that of distrust and indifference to outright good­
will.
The Public Law of Education, 1941, requires chil­
dren between ages 7 and 16, or until completion of the sixth 
year, to attend school. Illiterates between 16 and 40 are 
also required to attend. Textbooks and supplies are free.^® 
There has been a steady increase in numbers, as well 
as in percentages, of children in the 5 to 14 age group who 
are attending primary school. In numbers, students attending 
increased from 1.1 million in 1955 to 1.5 million in 1962.^^ 
The percentage of the 5 to 14 year olds who were in school 
in i960 was in excess of 55 percent.^®®
The number of primary teachers increased from 29,753 
in 1955 to 4 5 ,0 1 1 in 1961.^°^ As late as 1958, however, 
roughly half of those teachers had no d e g r e e . ^02 The Student-
teacher ratio declined steadily between 19 5 5» when it was
10338-1, and I96I when it amounted to 33-1•
Under Peruvian law, any adolescent may attend free
9?Ibid.. p. 9 2.
^®Preeburger and Hauch, 0£. cit., pp. 10-11.
^^Union Panamericana, Estudio Social. . ., oji. cit..
p. 1 3 7.
^^^Ibid.. p. 139; similar data is found in Freeburger 
and Hauch, on. cit., p. 139»
lO^Ibid.. p. 140.
^^^See Table 8.
103^UniSn Panamer icana, Estudio Social. . ., oji. cit..p. 144.
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secondary education. But to be admitted, one must be be­
tween 12 and 16 years of age, must have completed the ele­
mentary school program, must be in good health and must 
have had a record of good b e h a v i o r ,
Throughout most of the post-war years, and parti­
cularly during the 1950's, the Peruvian secondary schools 
were going through a process of reorganization. By I960, 
there were 181 public secondary schools, and 306 private and 
evening ones. Total enrollment at the secondary level was 
approximately 158,000 students. Secondary school graduates 
amounted to 20,433 in 1961, Of that number, 13,183 graduated 
from public secondary schools while the remaining 7 ,2 5 0 com­
pleted their work at private institutions,^®^
In addition to the general secondary schools, there 
are the vocational schools. They are divided into 3 types, 
agricultural, commercial, and industrial. In 1962 they had 
a combined enrollment of 49,707» Less than 5»000 of the 
total were in agricultural schools, while more than half were 
in industrial schools. There were 2,098 graduates of the 
vocational schools in 1961,^^^
In the mid-1950's less than 2 students per 100 popu­
lation were attending institutions of higher learning in 
Peru, Total enrollment at the 8 major colleges and universi-




ties by I960 was slightly in excess of 35t000. Some 14,000 
of that total number were enrolled at the Universidad 
Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. Another 6,000 were enrolled 
at the Universidad Nacional de Trujillo. In the former 
University, some 5$000 students were taking courses leading 
to degrees in medicine (1,840), letters (1,751)i and law 
(1,532).^®"^ Another 3,000 were enrolled in economic and 
commercial science course studies; 1,308 were in sciences; 
and 1 ,2 3 8 were in education. Only 225 were pursuing work in 
chemistry, and 270 were in veterinary medicine.^0^
Some 16 additional universities were established 
between I960 and I96 3. Five of them are private. The ma­
jority of these new establishments specialize in technical 
fields.109
The influence of the University Beform Movement in 
Peru has not always been steady since first initiated there 
by Haya de la Torre in the early 1920's. The goals of the 
Movement in Peru, as in other Latin American countries, was 
the overall improvement of university education. According 
to Luis Alberto Sanchez, the beginning of the Movement in 
Peru was
a violent reaction against the archaic professors who 
repeated their lectures every time verbatim, who ad­
mitted no arguments or questions, and who disappeared
^°?Ibid.. p. 58.
^^^Ibid.. p. 3 1. 
^°9%bid.. pp. 32-3 7.
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from the classroom as soon as they had spoken the 
last word of a lecture,110
Eevolnt1onary goals of the Movement have been turned 
on and off In Peru almost every time the government has 
changed hands since the early 1920*s, The goals, for ex­
ample, were out of favor in the late 19 2 0's, in again in 
19 3 1» out in 1 9 3 2» on mildly after 1935» on in full force 
in 1 9 4 5, out again in 1948, mildly influential after 195&» 
in full effect in I960, only moderately influential in 
1963-1 9 6 3, and possibly more influential since 1 9 6 3,^^^
Writing about the university in Peru in the mid- 
1 9 5 0*8 , Jorge Basadre, a professor at the University of San 
Marcos, said "the old bureaucratic, stereotyped, rhetorical, 
formalist university must go," More people, he indicated, 
should be trained, but he hoped that the universities would 
not be "completely given over to practical applications,"Ü2
Higher education in Peru has, since 1945» become 
more democratic, and more stress has been placed on the 
study of technical and practical fields of learning,H3 But 
the main general criticism of university education in Latin 
America, that is, that higher education remains too far 
afield from the immediate needs of specific areas and local-
^^^Luis Alberto Sânohez, jO£. cit,. p. 15,
"LI 1 Ibid.. pp. 14-15; Jorge Basadre, "Some Problems 
of the University in Peru," ed, Angel del Rio, Responsible 
Freedom in the Americas (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955)» pp. 
126-33.
112Basadre, loo, cit.. p. 133•
l^^Ibid,. p. 129.
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itles, still applies strongly to Peru,^^^
Peru has waged campaigns since 1940 to reduce the 
illiteracy rate. Despite its efforts, the illiteracy rate 
of 58.6 percent in 1940 had declined to only 55 percent by 
1961.^^5 In the Sierra it is much higher— about 73 percent—  
than it is on the coast where it is as low as 29 percent.
In recent years governmental agencies have been using radio, 
evening classes, and mobile units to help erase the "dark­
ness.% In the areas where there are heavy concentrations of 
Indians, there has been an attempt to teach first Quechua, 
or other native languages, then Spanish.
Expenditures for education in Peru have been, in 
recent years, among the highest in Latin America, Further­
more, expenditures for education as a percentage of total 
expenditures has climbed steadily since 1955. In that year, 
educational expenditures constituted 13.87 percent of the 
total national budget. By I960, the figure had risen to 
1 7 .3 6 percent, and by 1964 to around 24,0 percent.
A report by the Peruvian Minister of Education, at 
the 1963 Conference of Education at Bogota, indicated that
^^^Luis Alberto Sanchez, "The University in Latin 
America: Part IV, As It Looks Today," Americas. XIV 
(February, 1963)1 PP. 14-17.
^^■^UNESCO, World Illiteracy, on. cit., p. 70.
^^^Freeburger and Hauch, 0£, cit.. pp. 37-40.
117Ibid.. p. 7; see Tables 9 and 10.
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education in Peru was suffering primarily "from the lack of 
a well-defined educational policy directed toward the eco­
nomic and social development of the N a t i o n . E d u c a t i o n a l  
problems were, the report noted,
further complicated by an underdeveloped economy, inade­
quate transportation and lack of communications facili­
ties; the high rate of illiteracy, and the lack of inte­
gration of the indigenous population into the national 
life; the shortage of teachers and their inadequate 
preparation; the excessive centralization of the adminis­
tration and direction of education; and the lack of 
financial resources to implement a program for the im­
provement and development of education.
There is a high dropout rate in Peru's primary 
schools, and instruction in the vocational schools is poor. 
Vocational schools do not have the prestige of the general 
secondary schools, and when instruction is so poorly admin­
istered that jobs cannot be secured upon graduation, the 
problem is compounded.
On the credit side, it should be pointed out that 
the government of Peru has, in recent years, become keenly 
aware of its educational inadequacies and has been working 
toward correcting them.
United States Aid Programs and Education
In proposing the Act for International Development 
of 1961, administration spokesmen made it clear that the
Ministerio de Educaci&n Publica, Informe Sobre 
el Desarrollo de la Educaoi&n en el Peru Durante el Ano 1962 
"(Lima; The Ministerio, I963), cited by Freeburger and Hauch, 
OP. cit.. pp. 41-42.
^^^Ibid.
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category of foreign assistance to be known as "development 
grants" would include a substantial share for education.
One of the basic needs in the less developed countries, it 
was pointed out, was a greater number of people possessing 
technical, vocational, and managerial capabilities. In 
addition, it was noted, there was lack of "effective 
organizational and institutional forms in the fields of 
government, finance, commerce, and e d u c a t i o n .
Development grants, as conceived in 196I-6 2, would 
involve funds for projects in which the recipent government 
would help share the costs, sometimes contributing the major 
share. The projects would be determined by joint consulta­
tion with certain stipulated criteria to determine the 
priorities of projects. Among the criteria, in fact at the 
top of the list was: "Whether the activity gives reasonable 
promise of contributing to the development of educational or 
other institutions and programs directed toward social pro­
gress, governmental improvement or economic growth.
In justifying this new emphasis on education. State 
Department personnel pointed out that progress in the develop­
ing states was being held back because of widespread illiter­
acy and "lack of adequate means for the dissemination and 
absorption of knowledge." Increased education and training 
"unquestionably raises present levels of living by opening
120U.S. Department of State, ^  Act for International 
Development, 1962. op. cit.. pp. 56-57»
IZ^Ibid.. p. 59.
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up new worlds of thought, social mobility, and enjoyment," 
the spokesmen continued. Nevertheless, it was noted, educa­
tion requires the longest ^lead time” of any of the resources 
needed for economic development. Dams, factories and roads 
can be built in a relatively short period of time; but for 
managers, administrators and other skilled personnel, it
may take 10 y e a r s . ^^2
Emphasis on education in the Charter of Punta del 
Este has been described above, and some of the accomplish­
ments since 1961 under the Alliance for Progress have al­
ready been mentioned.^^3 Not only have grants and loans
been made under the Alliance but through other United States*
12Aprograms and agencies as well.
In President Johnson's message to the Congress on 
February 1, 1966, he singled out education in the developing 
countries as an area in which more attention, through the 
foreign assistance program, should be given. To combat 
ignorance, the President pointed out, "I propose a 50-percent 
increase in AID educational activities to a total of more 
than $200 m i l l i o n . ”̂ ^5 jn the same address, the President
IZZlbid.. p. 64.
^^^Supra. pp. 60 and 257-258.
A detailed breakdown of aid to individual countries 
is found in U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, Resources Survey for Latin American 
Countries (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19^5).
^̂ •^Text of the address is reprinted in U.S.
Department of State, Bulletin. LIV, No. 1392 (February 28, 
1966), pp. 320-27.
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promised Congress that he would soon transmit to it a special 
message proposing an International Education Act.^26
In the special message on education and health, the 
President presented a new four-point program for the former. 
Part four dealt with educational assistance to developing 
nations. In it, the President called for expanded appro­
priations for education, the development of new techniques 
for teaching basic educational materials and fighting illi­
teracy, an expanded Summer Teaching Corps, and other pro­
grams .
On August 17» 1966, in a speech made at the Pan 
American Health Organization headquarters in Washington,
B.C., President Johnson reaffirmed the interest of the United 
States in educational progress in the developing states. 
"Education," he said, "must become the passion of us all." 
While progress had been made under the Alliance, he noted,
126It was in the same speech that President Johnson 
sounded a firm warning to aid recipients that the United 
States would continue to expect more and more from them.
"The United States can never do more than supplement the 
efforts of the developing countries themselves," he said.
If they do not carry their load, he continued, "nothing we 
can supply will substitute." Furthermore, the President 
warned, "action would be the standard of our assistance." 
Those countries not fulfilling their commitments to help 
themselves, "cannot expect help from us." Finally, the 
President made a firm guarantee to the American people that 
"no funds will be used in these and other countries without 
a clear case that such expenditures are in the interest of 
the United States," Ibid.. pp. 321-35•
^^^Text of the message is printed in Ibid.. pp. 
328-35» The latter part of the message deals with health.
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so far it had only scratched the surface of a world of
i l l i t e r a c y . 1 2 8
An International Education Act was passed in the 
closing hours of the Eighty-Ninth Congress, and signed into 
law by the President at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand, 
October 2 9, 1966, while on his 17-day tour of Asia. As 
passed, the bill was not exactly what the President had 
asked for, because it was concerned principally with inter­
national education within American colleges and universities 
and how it could be i m p r o v e d . 1^9 The provisions dealing 
with the expansion of assistance to education in the develop­
ing nations was not acted u p o n . 1^0 Senator Wayne Morse in­
dicated, however, that expansion of the program would be 
attempted in later sessions of the Congress; but at least 
one informed source speculated that such expansion might
have to await improvements in the Vietnam situation,
United States' development aid for education to
Mexico has been relatively small, while that to Peru has
been rather extensive. The different stages of development
of the two educational systems account for this fact. Long
time concern for and concentration on building an adequate
^^®U.S. Department of State, Bulletin. LV, No.
1419 (September 5» 1966), p. 332.
^^^The text of the Act is found in Education and 
World Affairs, International Education Act of 1966 
(New York: I966), pp. 7-1Ô.
^^°Ibld.. p. 5 9. 
l̂ Îbid.
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system of education in Mexico has been so successful that 
it may be expected to continue to develop without extensive 
outside assistance. In Peru, where emphasis on education 
is primarily a post-World War II phenomenon, the foreign 
aid in-put into its educational system can be a significant 
contribution to further growth.
Summary
The importance of education in development has been 
well established. From the standpoint of political develop­
ment, it can be a major element in the creation of national 
unity. With respect to economic development in a more direct 
sense, it is a means whereby the population may be equipped 
for carrying on the many specialized tasks in a developing 
system.
Students of development have suggested several guides 
for measuring the state of educational development in the 
less developed countries. All agree, for instance, that the 
first priority in any development scheme is a literate popu­
lation. Bowman has indicated that a literacy rate of approxi­
mately 40 percent is a precondition for take-off. Mexico's 
literacy rate is far above this figure, amounting to 70 or 
7 5  percent at the present time. As early as 1940, the 
literacy rate for Mexico was slightly above the 40 percent 
minimum.
Peru had, in 1940, about the same literacy percentage
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as Mexico, During the succeeding 20 years, however, it had 
increased only slightly to about 43 percent. Furthermore, 
Peru continues to have pronounced extremes in its overall 
literacy rate, ranging from a low of 27 percent in the high­
lands to a high of 71 percent on the coast.
Other students of development have suggested that it 
is necessary to have from 6 to 10 percent of the population 
enrolled in primary schools before growth can begin. Current­
ly both Mexico and Peru have about 12 percent of their total 
population enrolled in primary school. In both countries the 
rate is higher in the urban centers than in the rural areas; 
but here again, the differences in Peru are considerably 
greater. The drop-out rate is high in both countries, with 
only a small percentage of the primary enrolles going on to 
secondary institutions. In the latter case, Mexico enjoys 
a slight edge over Peru,
It has been suggested by the OAS Educational Task
Force that no less than 4 percent of the GNP be allocated
to the educational system. Figures for 1964 indicate that 
Mexico was spending slightly less than 3 percent for this 
purpose, while Peru was spending almost 5 percent. Education 
in both countries, however, is currently receiving about 25 
percent of total national expenditures per year.
Instruction in Mexico may be of a higher quality than 
that of Peru because more of the teachers in the former have 
been trained. Peru has, however, a slightly lower student-
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teacher ratio than Mexico.
Ahemethy and Coombe have indicated that there is a 
close relationship between government and the educational 
system in most countries. The latter is, they think, a tool 
of the former, one to be used in implementing a country’s 
goals. In Mexico this has been done. Since 1917» education 
has been a means of promoting the Revolution, Through such 
education ministers as José Vasconcelos in the 1920’s, and 
Jaime Torres Bodet in the 1 9 5 0 and I960’s, extensive 
promotion has taken place. Several presidents, especially 
Cardenas and Lopez Mateos, have dedicated their administra­
tions to the promotion of the educational system. Other 
presidents have been only slightly less enthusiastic.
Extensive progress in the educational system of Peru 
did not begin until after World War II. Much attention has 
been given to it since. But in the words of a recent
Minister of Education, the system in that country has been 
moving along without direction; a well defined policy for 
the whole educational system is still lacking.
Education in Mexico has contributed to economic and 
political and social development for at least 30 years. It 
has been a tool of, and has supported the Revolutionary goals, 
In Peru, it has captured the imagination of government 
leaders only in recent years and has suffered from overall 
lack of attention throughout most of the past half century.
It is too early to determine, at this time, the impact on the
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system whioh Is being made by the progressive administra­
tion of President Belaunde, Even the most impressive plans 
which are proposed in Peru will be difficult to implement 
because of the serious obstacles posed by the large Indian 
populations which live in the Sierra region.
Emphasis on education has become one of the cardi­
nal features of United States foreign assistance programs. 
President Johnson has stated emphatically on recent occasions 
that a literate population is basic to economic, social and 
political development. He has recently suggested doubling 
the foreign aid expenditure for education in the developing 
countries.
CHAPTER VII
AGRICULTURE AND LAND REFORM 
Problems of agriculture and land reform occupy a 
conspicuous place in most studies of less developed 
countries. Agriculture alone is more often treated as an 
economic question, but agriculture and land reform combined 
are described as social and economic questions.
An economist. Professor Harvey Leibsnstein, has com­
piled what might properly be described as a definitive list 
of the characteristics of underdeveloped areas. Under the 
sub-heading "economic," he deals with agriculture. Agri­
culture in the underdeveloped areas, he points out, has a 
high proportion of the population engaged in it, perhaps 
above 70 percent. Some of these countries have an "absolute 
over-population" in agriculture, which means that a much 
smaller proportion of the population in agriculture could 
produce the same amount of commodities. The capital per 
head is low; the income per head is low, near the subsis­
tence level. Small size of holdings impede the most effi­
cient use of available capital; tools are primitive.^
^Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth (New 
York: John Wiley and Sone, 1957)t PP» 4o-4l,
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Even if more production were possible, adequate markets 
would not exist. Modern agricultural techniques are usually 
employed only in the larger establishments, which are pro­
ducing for a foreign market.
TOie small landowners and workers in the less de­
veloped areas have more difficulty weathering a short-term 
crisis. Indebtedness is high, and there is constant hunger 
for more land. As the population increases, there is 
pressure to subdivide the available holdings.%
According to Eostow, the agricultural sector must 
play a major role in the transition from the primitive stage 
to the take-off stage. First, he says, "agriculture must 
supply more food."3 such an increase may result in an ex­
panded supply of foreign exchange, or it may "minimize the 
foreign exchange bill for food,"^
The agricultural sector may also play a conspicuous 
role with respect to demand. As output grows, the modern 
sector may be stimulated to produce such things as farm 
machinery, fertilizers, and other materials needed in ex­
panding agriculture.̂  Finally, "agriculture must yield up 
a substantial part of its surplus income to the modern sec-
^Ibid.




tor." The siarplus income derived from expanded production 
"must', somehow, he transferred out of the hands of those who 
would sterilize it in prodigal living into the hands of the 
productive men who will invest it in the modern sector.
Stephen Enke points out that industrialization and 
urbanization, twin goals of developing countries, "require 
a greater total food availability."? This additional in­
crement, he adds, "must usually come from domestic output." 
For centuries', he continues, "economists have agreed that 
more wage goods are a prerequisite of industrial espansion 
and urban growth.
From still another angle, Enke points out that the 
industrial sector "must receive its labor force from the 
original subsistence subeconomy." Gains in agriculture may 
make this transition difficult. If there is considerable 
hesitancy to move from country to town, the "planners may 
"wish to extract all increments of agriculture output from 
village communities, making these extra supplies available 
exclusively to city inhabitants."9
Land reform may or may not be instrumental in achiev­








cussion. As a general rule, Klndleberger says, "land reform 
cuts down production, increases consumption, reduces supplies 
available for shipment to the city and for export, uses up 
capital, and cuts down capital formation," On the other 
hand, he concedes, "land reform is a political necessity in 
many areas where land is held in great latifundia and where 
the aspirations of the peasantry have become identified with 
the ownership and cultivation of separate plots of land.
Paul Alpert claims that in most cases land reform 
"is necessary for both economic and social r e a s o n s . I t  
may be economically wise if it involves the breaking up of 
large landed estates where there is less than maximum pro­
ductivity. It may be unwise if it breaks up the medium and 
large size productive landholdings. It may be necessary, 
however, to break up these latter for social and political 
reasons. If so, efforts should be made to insure that the
immediate decline in productivity will be only a temporary 
12phenomenon,
Enke*8 view appears to be similar to that of Alpert. 
Land reform, he says, "if supplemented by many other essen­
tial changes and improvements, is a necessary but insufficient 
condition of increased agricultural efficiency,"^3 Therefore,
^^Kindleberger, o£, cit.. p. 2 2 5.
11Alpert, 0£. cit., p. 113. 
l̂ Ibid.. pp. 113-14.
13Enke, ojĝ. cit., p. 153
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Enke continues, it would be
dishonest to urge land reform as a means of increasing 
farm output unless plans are also advanced for en­
suring larger holdings, investment of capital, special­
ization of output, innovation of crops and methods, and 
more aggressive entrepreneurship.^^
Agriculture and Land Reform in Latin America
In the late 1950*s, roughly half of all employed 
persons in Latin America were in agriculture. The percent­
ages of total employment in agriculture ranged from some 
83 percent in Haiti and ?2 percent in Bolivia, down to 25 
and 30 percent in Argentina and Colombia respectively. For 
Latin America as a whole, this 50 percent in agriculture 
accounted for only about 25 percent of the gross domestic 
product in the late 1 9 5 0's.^5
For Latin America as a whole, agriculture is still 
the chief economic activity. Manufacturing would be second, 
as it falls about 5 percent below that of agriculture. Some 
two-thirds of the total value of all Latin American exports 
are accounted for by agriculture. Nevertheless, during the 
period 19^5 to 1 9 5 7, when "the gross national product of all 
other activities taken as a whole increased at an annual 
rate of over 5 per cent,” the growth rate of agriculture 
averaged only about 2.5 percent annually. The latter growth 
rate was just about the same as the annual growth rate in
^̂ Ibid.
Cole, Latin America: An Economic and Social 
Geography (Washington, D.C.: Bui'terworths, 1965), p. 128.
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population.
As the above figures might indicate, productivity 
per agricultural worker is low. It has been shown that in 
relation to agricultural workers in Italy (Italy=100), pro­
duction during the period 1956-19^0 in Argentina was 9̂ » 
Colombia 4^, Venezuela 32, and Guatemala 21. Showing the 
same problem in a different way, that is, by the number of 
workers required to produce 100 kilograms of maize, it has 
been shown that it takes only 2 days in the United States,
5 days in Argentina, 30 days in Chile, 33 in Mexico, and 
47 in Colombia.
In the overall area of Latin America, the per capita 
production of foodstuffs is lower now than it was back in the 
1 9 3 0’s. The countries which would be an exception to this 
general rule have managed to increase the production of cer­
tain commodities, namely cotton, coffee, and bananas, all of 
which are destined for export. Productivity in agriculture 
is usually low because
of the uneven distribution of property, the inadequate 
systems of land tenure and use, and the archaic rural 
labour and recruitment systems which still obtain 
in many areas of Latin America. To all of this must 
be added the shortage of capital and the lack of a 
proper infrastructure for the development of productive
^^Uhited Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, EGLA, ”An Agricultural Policy to Expedite the 
Economic Development of Latin America,” Economic Bulletin 
for latin America. VI (October, I96I), pp. 3-4.
l^Cole, o£. cit.. p. 129-
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activities, widespread ignorance of— or failure to 
apply— agricultural techniques through which a better 
combination of factors under existing conditions can 
be secured and, very often, the absense of a policy 
of economic incentives and of structural changes 
directed towards the achievement of specific develop­ment targets.18
A surprisingly small amount, about 5 percent, of the 
total land area of Latin America is in cultivation. Another 
18.5 percent is in pasture ; 4?.5 percent is in forest; and 
29 percent is classified as non-agricultural. In comparison, 
more than 10 percent of the total land area in North America 
is arable. 19
Even with a small percent of the land area in Latin 
America under cultivation, one of the major problems "is the 
insufficient use of Latin American agricultural resources, 
particularly manpower and land.” With respect to manpower, 
many of the laborers work only part of each year. In 
Argentina the rural worker works on the average about 218
days per year. A rural worker puts in about 200 days of
work per year in Colombia, and about 180 in El Salvador. In 
some areas where there is strong emphasis on a single agri­
cultural crop, the number of days worked may be as low as
80 or 100 days per y e a r , 20
In areas where such idleness prevails, it would be 
unwise to introduce labcr-saving devices. Such methods
^®Uhited Nations, ”An Agricultural Policy,” o£. cit,.
pp. 3-4.
^^Cole, op. cit.. p. 130.
20United Nations, loo, cit.
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would tend to create more unemployment. Therefore, a first 
step toward solving the agricultural problem should be to 
promote "full employment of the labour force and the adoption 
of improved techniques which save land and absorb manpower."
Another major problem in Latin America is the proper 
use of available land. There are "vast areas occupied by 
great estates and single-crop entrepreneurs with idle re­
sources." At the same time, "there are armies of small pro­
ducers— e.g., farm-owners, share-croppers, tenent farmers, 
etc.,— who do not have enough land to keep fully employed 
throughout the year." A small percentage of the total farms, 
usually less than 8 percent, control 60 to 70 percent of the 
arable land. More than 75 percent of the holdings "cover 
only 5 to 10 percent of the suitable land.
One possible way to achieve the badly needed growth
rate in Latin American agriculture would be through proper
land redistribution. This would involve the breaking up of
large estates as well as combining some of the smaller units.
The owner of the large estate in some countries is
not interested in investing more in agriculture and 
increasing his income from that sector, since he 
cannot do so without additional managerial and adminis­
trative staff. He prefers to use his present methods 
of working on his estate and to invest his profits 
therefrom in business, industry and other urban activi­
ties whioh are easier to control, present fewer risks
Z^Ibld.. p. 5.
^^Ibld.. p. 4; "Datos y Cifras de las Americas," 
Americas, XVT (November, 1964), p. 47.
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and provide a high yield. As population pressure 
grows, the conditions under which labour is recruited 
and paid become more stringent because, in the final 
analysis, it is the landowner who possesses that scarce 
resource— land, On the other hand, in those cases 
where better farming practices have been applied, the 
extra profit usually goes to the l a n d o w n e r .23
The small landowner, on the other hand, produces 
only enough for himself and his immediate family. His 
methods are primitive. Furthermore, «he is usually outside 
the monetary economy and he can hardly respond to incentives 
based solely on price increases." Therefore, land reform, 
which by itself will not "ensure fulfilment of the objectives 
of accelerated growth and income redistribution," is never­
theless, "both essential and urgent,"2^
At the meeting of the Latin American governmental 
economic leaders in Buenos Aires, March 2 6 ,  I 966, Heman 
Santa Cruz, the Chilean regional director of the United 
Nations ̂ Pood and Agriculture Organization, told the dele­
gates that the region*s "stagnant agriculture" had to be 
activated in order to alleviate the deepening world hunger 
problems, Latin America, he suggested, had to double its 
production by I 9B O ,  not only to feed itself, but also to 
help feed the millions of Asia. Since the inauguration of 
the Alliance for Progress in I 96I ,  Santa Cruz noted, "food 
production expanded at a rate barely keeping pace with popu-
23United Nations, loc. cit.. p. 6.
2hIbid.. pp. 6-7.
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latlon g r o w t h . "25
Mr. Santa Cruz further commented that the Latin 
American nations must "massively incorporate modern tech­
nology and science into their agriculture," and at the same 
time "adopt radical and pragmatic changes in antiquated 
agrarian structures that don*t adapt to the dynamics of 
progress, "26
As pointed out earlier in this study, the Latin 
American governments agreed at Punta del Este in I96I to 
promote agrarian reform. At the same time, a number of 
well-known land reform programs were in operation. Among 
them were those of Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela, 
and Cuba. Since I96I, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Honduras, "■’caragua, Panama, and Peru have passed laws which 
are designed to implement agrarian reform programs. But as 
Mr, Santa Cruz told the Buenos Aires meeting, agrarian re­
form calls for "political decisions that only the individual 
countries can make."27
Urquidi, along with most other economists, sees the 
agrarian reform problem in Latin America as both an economic
and social necessity. The economist, he says, "is able to 
isolate certain problems or important social obstacles to
^^New York Times, March 27, I96 6, p. 6.
26Ibid.. p. 6.
2^ Ibid.; a description of recently passed agrarian 
laws may be found in Uni6n Panamericana, Estudio Social,
OP. cit., p. 147.
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economic development, but he is not qualified to make 
specific recommendations to remedy these matters.” The 
specialists who deal with the social problems, he continues,
”should familiarize themselves with the problems of economic 
development, because social measures may solve or allieviate 
social problems only to the extent that they contribute to 
economic development.” Finally, Urquidi summarizes, "the 
social aspects of economic development and the economic as­
pects of social development must blend together into a single 
drive toward progress,"28
Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in Mexico
During the 1950*s, almost 58 percent of Mexico’s 
labor force was engaged in agriculture. Agriculture^s con­
tribution to gross domestic product about the same time was 
25 percent. 29 The percentage in agriculture, however, has 
declined consistently from a figure of 70 percent in I93O 
to 65 percent in 1940.^®
During the period roughly 1940 to i9 6 0, agriculture’s 
contribution to gross domestic product was roughly 20 percent, 
Agriculture production just about doubled during the years 
1945 to 1957, during which time the population increased by 
only about 4o percent. During the same period, industry and
pQ The Ct^lenge of Development in Latin America.
0£. cit.. pp. 8^-86.
29Ibid.. p. 1 6 1.
30Lewis, "Mexico Since Cardenas,” o£. cit., p. 313.
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commerce were gaining a larger percentage of the total 
lahor force. 31
Mexican agriculture has, since 194-0, performed the 
function which economic development specialists had hoped it 
would. That is, production has increased to the point where 
agricultural commodities may he exported. Therefore, an 
export shift from minerals and oil to agricultural products 
has taken place. This has in turn given Mexico a greater 
capacity to import.32
Even with increased production, agriculture continues 
to he one of the most serious of Mexico's problems. As late 
as 1 9 6 5» reports indicated that Agricultural Minister Gustavo 
Diaz had repeatedly declared that "agriculture is Mexico's 
most acute problem politically, socially, and economi­
cally,"^^ Present problems appear to be centered primarily 
around the question of land redistribution, with increased 
production as a secondary issue, although the latter problem 
is still a serious long-range challenge,
Arable land in Mexico in 1950 amounted to 10.1 per­
cent of the total land area. Another 38 percent was in pas­
ture; 20 percent was in forest; and 32 percent was classified 
as non-agricultural,3^
31lbid.. p. 3 1 2. 32ibia,. pp. 314- 1 5.
^^New York Times. March 21, I9 6 5, p. 30.
34.Cole, OE, cit.. p. 130,
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According to one authority on Mexican land systems, 
"the entire land system has been in a state of transition" 
since 1 9 1 0 .3 3 At that time, the percentage of heads of 
families who held no land was more than 90 percent in every 
Mexican state except Baja California, where it was 88,2, In 
28 of the states, the percentage was above 9^ percent.
Land reform actually began in Mexico in 1915» In
that year. President Carranza issued a decree providing for
the establishment of e.iidos. The land reform plan was given
constitutional status in I9I7 . The famous Article 2? of
that document states that
ownership of the lands and waters within the boundaries of the national territory is vested originally in the 
Nation, which has had, and has, the right to transmit 
title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting 
private property.
Some 8 pages later in Article 27, the Constitution 
states that in each State, Territory, or Federal District, 
"there shall be fixed a maximum area of land of which a
single individual or legally constituted society may be the 
owner," The excess over the fixed amount "shall be sub­
divided by the owner within the time fixed by the local law, 
and these parcels shall be offered for sale under terms 
approved by the governments," If the owner should oppose 
the subdivision, "it shall be carried out by the local 
government, by expropriation," Owners "shall be required to
-'-'George McCutchen McBride, The Land Systems of 
Mexico (New York* American Geographical Society, I 923T T »
p. 1 3 9.
^^Ibid.
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receive bonds of the local Agrarian Debt” at an interest 
rate "not exceeding 2>% per annum.37
The law of e.lidos was issued on December 28, 1920, 
and was supplemented by the Reglamento Agrario of April 10, 
192 2. Under the guidance of a national agency known as the 
Gomlsibn Nacional Agraria, and similar agencies at the state
level, land expropriation and redistribution began. Pueblos, 
or local villages, were encouraged to apply for such land 
located in the immediate vicinity of such settlements. Not 
all requests were honored, but if they were, the quality of 
the land determined the per capita grant,"
From December 1, I9 2 0, to September 1, 1921, e.iidos
we^e given to some 225 pueblos. Another 92 pueblos received
grants of land between September 1, 1921, and September 1,
192 2.^® The program was not, however, without its critics
and opponents. According to James G, Maddox,
the expropriation of private property to turn it over to people who only a few years before had had a status
hardly different from that of slaves, struck deep, hard 
blows at the very heart of the values system. . .. It 
was a hard, and often bloody, struggle all through the 
twenties and early thirties. Landlords were recalcitrant; 
the peones . . , were adamant that they receive land; 
laws were not clear, and were constantly being changed; 
the courts often sided with the landowners almost regard­
less of how the laws were drafted. . ..39
37lbid... pp. 160-61; see also Guillermo Vasquez 
Alfaro, la Reforma Agraria de la Reyoluci&n Mexicana (Mexico 
City: Carlos B, Zetina, 19537» PP» 42-46.
38ji(jBride, o^. cit.. p. I6 5.
^^Mexican Land Reform (New York* American Universities 
Field Stafr; Ï9̂ 7)'» P.
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Paced with such obstacles, it is not surprising that 
the land reform program did not get moving rapidly until the 
years of the Cardenas administration. During the first 18 
years, I9I6 to 193^» some 8 million hectares of land had been 
distributed to 783t000 persons. During the Cardenas period, 
1935-19^0 , some 18 million hectares were distributed to 
815*000 persons. After Cardenas, the program slowed down 
considerably. During the 3 administrations between his and 
that of L'&pez Mateos, only 13 million hectares were re­
distributed,^®
By the late 19^0*s the emido systems were coming 
more and more under attack as uneconomic units of production.
The ejidos are of two types: "collective* and "cooperative," 
The former account for only about 5 percent of the total and 
are located in the regions of La Laguna, Lombardia and Nueva 
Italia, and on the Yucatan peninsula. In these collectives, 
so designated because of the advantages of large scale opera­
tions, members are compensated for the amount of work they 
contribute. Dividends are distributed at the end of a year's 
operations.^^
Thomas P. Carroll, "The Land Reform Issue in Latin 
America," ed, Albert 0. Hirschman, Latin ^erican Issues 
(New York: The Twentieth Century Pund. 196I), pp. 161-201; Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, on. cit,, p, 254; 
Jesus Silva Herzog, El Agrarismo Mexicana 2  la Reforma 
Agraria. Exposicion 2  Crltica (Mexico, D.P,: Pondo de 
Cultura Economica, 1959)» PP« 405-51»
^^The collective ejidos are described in Clarance Senior, Land Reform and Democracy (Gainesville, Fla. :
University of Florida Press, 1958), pp. 96-116.
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In the cooperative ejidos, plots of land are parceled 
out to each family; the ejido members cooperate with each 
other in the use of machinery, technical information, repair 
work, hookeeping and price setting. They work with the 
Agrarian Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the 
National Ejido Bank, through local officials known as 
"commisars.” The latter officials may wield a considerable 
amount of power over the communities,^^
The cooperatives have been criticized for a number 
of reasons, the most important one being the use of the small 
productive unit. The ejidatarios become part-time farmers 
because there is not enough work to keep them occupied year 
around. They lack education, many of the members are hard 
to discipline, and finally, the land does not actually be­
long to them. The latter point, in particular, has raised 
considerable controversy in recent years. Some critics feel 
that production is impeded because the worker has only "use 
title” to the land. Laws prevent him from selling, leasing, 
renting or mortgaging, and he must not let it lie idle for 
more than 2 years.
Partly as a result of these basic questions con­
cerning the use of the ejidos, the Mexican government added 
a program in 19^7 which is called the "colony” system. Under 
this arrangement, which has been used quite extensively in 
recent years along with,the older program, the owner receives
kzChristian Science Monitor, August 1, 19o2,
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title to the land for a small fee, and may dispose of it 
after it is paid for. In 1958, the giant Cananea ranch 
owned by citizens of the United States r?nd containing some 
648,000 acres, was expropriated for colonizing projects. 
Similar actions involving other large land holdings were 
also taking place in the states of Campeche and Yucatan, as 
well as in the territory of Quintana Hoo,^3
Another important action was taken by the Mexican 
government in connection with the land reform program in 
1 9 4 9. In that year, the Agrarian Code was amended for the 
purpose of preventing the spread of more small holdings. It 
provided for a minimum size grant of roughly 10 hectares if 
irrigated, and 20 hectares otherwise. Furthermore, the 1949 
amendment provided for the issuance of certificates of 
MinaffeotabilityM to certain private land holdings, in an 
attempt to assure them that their land would not be expro­
priated.^^ The certificates were to be issued in those 
cases where maximum production was believed to be taking 
place.
In 1 9 5 4, one of the long-time supporters of the ejido 
system. Professor Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, changed his mind 
about the use of them in promoting development in Mexico.
It was not working well, he claimed, for the whites and mes-
^^New York Times. July 30, 1961,18.
^^Edelmann, og. cit.. p. 237.
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tlzos, but was still acceptable for some of the Indian 
areas. -̂5 José Vasconcelos soon joined him in the criti­
cisms. According to the former minister of education, the 
ejido "has been effective politically. . but, . . dis- 
astrious economically.
In 1 9 5 0, something like kS percent of the Mexican 
farm land was in ejidos. In i960 these systems were pro­
ducing about 70 percent of Mexico* tobacco, a little more 
than 60 percent of the wheat, rice, sesame and henequen, 
and around 4o percent of the corn, beans, sugarcane, barley 
and bananas grown in the country. Nevertheless, in some 
of the private holdings, yield per acre was considerably 
higher than that on the ejidos.^7
If the ejido, as a method of land reform, is on its 
way out in Mexico, it does not mean that its use was a 
mistake. According to Carroll, who has worked extensively 
with the land reform issue and programs in Latin America,
"all writers agree that the main politico-social objective 
of the reform, the elimination of the latifundios and the 
institutions they maintained, was accomplished." Furthermore, 
"it is also generally acknowledged that the reform has given 
a tremendous boost to the consolidation of stable and repre-
^Ibid.. p. 235.
New York Times. March 10, 195^i p. 11.
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sentatiTe government.” Finally he says, the ejidos led, 
at least indirectly, ”to the extraordinarily rapid rate of 
economic development during the forties and fifties. ”^8
The cry for land in Mexico continues. There are 
still some 2 million landless farm workers. By the end of 
L6pez Mateos’ administration, it appeared that Mexicans for 
the first time were beginning to realize there was not 
enough usuable farm land to go around. In 1964, Diaz Qrdaz, 
who was the PRX’s predidential nominee, told a crowd at 
Cuernavaca: "More than three-quarters of the cultivable land 
is in the hands of the peasants.” He continued: "There is 
hardly any allotable land remaining and, it seems, we are 
reaching the end of distribution.”̂ ?
Agriculture and Land Reform in Peru
Roughly 60 percent of Peru’s labor force was en­
gaged in agriculture in the 1950’s^^ Cole has estimated that 
agriculture’s contribution to the gross domestic product at 
the same time was 25 percent.51 The percentage of the labor 
force engaged in agriculture appears to be about 5 percent
Carroil, 0£. cit.. p. 1?4.
^?New York Times. June 14, 1964, p. 7-
^^United Nations, "Evolution of the Employment 
Structure in Latin America, 1945-55*" oit.. Table 9»
51Cole, og. cit.. p. 128; More recent ECLA figures 
place agriculture’s contribution to Peru’s GDP as follows: 
1 9 5 0, 26.2 percent; and I963. 21,5 percent; the figures for Mexico are 2 3 .9 percent in 1950 and 19.2 percent in I9 63.
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higher than it was in 19^0 when it was contributing around 
40 percent of the gross domestic product,52
Peru’s agricultural production record during the 
19 5 0’s was not at all impressive. As a matter of fact, one 
Peruvian observer has referred to the agricultural situation 
as "deplorable." Using the 195^ as a base year, one index 
of production has shown that production actually declined, 
in certain commodities, relative to population during the 
following 4" years. The latter included commodities such as 
rice, barley, wheat, corn and potatoes. During the same 
period increases took place in the production of certain 
foodstuffs, primarily beans,53
Agriculture has not performed the function for the 
Peruviain economy that it has for the Mexican economy.5^ In 
fact, the importation of agricultural foodstuffs has in­
creased appreciably over the years. Large amounts of dairy 
products have been imported; so have such commodities as 
wheat, rice, corn, and canned fruits,55 Xn the absense of 
agricultural products to export, Peru has relied heavily on
5^08sar Guardia Mayorga, ^  Reforma Agraria en El 
Peru (Segunda Edicion, Lima* Imprenta "Minerva" Miraflores, 
Ï9^2), p. 1 7 5; the 40 percent figure is an estimate based 
on data found in Union Panamericana, Estudio Social. 1962, 
on. cit.. p. 2 6 1.
^^Mayorga, 0£, cit.̂  pp. I7I-7 3.
5^Carlos Moreyra, and Carlos Derteano, "Evolucion de 
la Agricultura Nacional en el Siglo XX," in Gallo, 0£. cit..
p. 180.
^^Mayorga, cit.. pp. 176-77*
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minerals to serve this purpose. Cotton and sugar have, 
however, hecome Important export crops In recent years,56
In 1 9 6 1, only about 1,5 percent of Peru's total
land area was arable. Only 9 ,5  percent was In pasture,
while more than half of the total, 54.5 percent, was In 
forest. The remaining third, about 34*5 percent, was 
classified as non-agrlcultural.57 Due to the Increase In 
population since 1940, when the number of hectares In culti­
vation per capita was 0.2 3, there has been a decline to 0.18
hectares In cultivation per capita In 1960.5®
The land situation In Peru depends somewhat on the 
area In which It Is located, although there are some similar­
ities In the 3 major regions. On the coast, 80.73 percent 
of the holdings are In mlnlfundlos of 5 hectares or less.
They farm only 6.61 percent of the area In cultivation. At 
the other extreme, some 0.40 percent of the holdings consist 
of farms In excess of 500 hectares. The latter farm 55*68 
percent of the total arable land.59
In the Sierra, the situation Is not nearly so extreme. 
Some 82.42 percent of all production units consists of less 
than 10 hectares. They farm I7 .6 3 percent of the total land
5^Cole, ogi. cit., pp. 288-91; Unlôn Panameri cana, 
Estudio Social. 1962. op. cit., p. 2 6 5.
^^Cole, op. cit.. pp. 130-3 1.
^®Mayorga, o£. cit., p. 1?1.
^^Ibld.. p. 1 6 9.
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area. Properties in excess of 500 hectares, which amount 
to 0 .3 5 percent of the total, control 3 7 .1 5 percent of the 
land in cultivation.^®
In the Selva, 61.07 percent of the holdings are 10 
hactares or less. They farm only 0.84 percent of the total 
land area. There are 2.19 percent of the holdings which are 
in excess of 1,000 hectares, and they control 91.63 percent 
of the arable land.^^
As the above figures indicate, most of the culti­
vât ible land in Peru is owned by the large property holders. 
An overwhelming number of farmers work only a small per­
centage of the land. Such conditions have led, particularly 
in recent years', to demands that the government set up an 
effective program of land reform.
There are in Peru basically two types of land tenure 
systems; the collective systems of the Indians, and the more 
individualistic operations rooted in Spanish culture. The 
latter has been subdivided by Ford into 4 different types. 
They are (1) non-operating owners, (2) owner-operators,
(3)non-owner operators, and (4) farm laborers,^2
Non-operating owners consist of individuals, commer-
^^Ibid.. p. 170.
^̂ Ibid.
^^Thomas B. Ford, Man and Land in Peru (Gainesville, 
■fi'la.; University of Florida Press, 195577 p. 76.
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olal corporations, national and local governmental bodies, 
and religious*; charitable and educational institutions. They 
invest their surplus capital in lands because investment for 
good land is considered wise in Peru. In July, 1949, the 
government issued a decree declaring its intention to ex­
propriate all such lands which were not being improved; but 
enforcement of the decree was not forthcoming due to the 
opposition of the landowners.
The 1940 census classified 40 percent of the popula­
tion employed in agriculture and related categories as 
owner-operators. The rather high percentage figure is 
probably due to the fact that most of the operations are 
small.
The non-owner operators may be administrators, cash 
renters, standing renters, combination cash and standing 
renters, sharecroppers producing a share only, or share­
croppers producing a share and labor. All of the renters, 
regardless of how classified, may be required to perform a 
certain amount of labor. The government passed a law in 
1947 requiring written contracts between the cash-renter 
and the landlord. The law has not, however, been enforced.
The practice of requiring standing rent for the land 
is a more popular practice in Peru than is the cash rental 
program. Standing rent involves payment of a fixed amount
^^Ibid.'V pp. 76-80. ^^Ibid.\ pp. 60-81.
^^Ibld.', p. 84.
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to the landowner. Suoh renting on the coast is known as 
yanaconaje. In the Sierra standing renters may be known as 
colonos and nartidarios. Along with the yanacona je a 
practice called habilitaciôn has become prevalent. Under 
the latter, the owner will furnish toolsand equipment, 
even cash when needed, to assist the yanacona in making the
crop. The renter must repay for any advances made to him
under habilitacion, with interest, and the purchase price 
may be higher than a competitive market system would estab­
lish, In addition, the yanaconas may be expected to donate
a certain amount of labor to other lands farmed by the land­
owner •
A law known as the Law of Yanaconaje was passed in
1 947, According to Ford, the law stipulated that
all contracts should be written and that they could 
not include clauses obliging the yanacona to sell his
crop excess to the owner, to contribute free work not
in connection with his own land, to make permanent 
improvements without compensation, or to trade obliga­
torily with the commissary of the proprietor. The law 
also called for a reduction of the fixed rent in case 
of crop failure. . , and extended a minimum lease term 
of three years. ... A maximum rent not to exceed 6 
percent of the assessed value of the property was set, 
and it was further stipulated that the interest rate of 
the habilitacl&n could not legally exceed 12 percent. 
The proprietor was required to furnish a house for the 
tenant or to pay for one which the tenant himself con­
structed. Further provisions. , , provided that cases 
of disputes should be submitted for arbitration.°7
The Law of Yanaconaje was never enforced, but the 
fact that it was passed indicated that the power of the
^^Ibid.. pp. 81-86. ^flbid,. p, 86.
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renters was generally increasing.
The sharecropping systems undonhtecLly constitute 
the majority of the tenancy systems in Peru, Here, the 
tenant returns to the landowner a certain percentage of the 
crop produced, rather than a fixed amount as is the practice 
with the yanacona. The division is usually in halves'^ hut 
other amounts may be agreed upon. The landowner supplies 
the land and water; the renter pays half the costs of seed, 
equipment, fertilizer and other commodities necessary to 
production. In addition the renter is responsible for the 
harvest. Practices vary somewhat from region to r e g i o n .
The farm laborers, which make up more than half of 
all persons engaged in any way with agriculture, are not a 
tenure status group such as those just discussed, but due to 
a practice known as enganche. their relationship to the total 
agricultural system is worth mentioning. Ttiis practice in­
volves working by collective contract for a specific job 
or task. An enganchador acts as a go-between for the farm 
operator and the mass of workers. Wages are small, as low 
as 15 cents in United States currency per day in 19^9, and 
are often paid in part with rations.^9
The "Native Communities," or comunidades form still 
another important part of the land system of Peru, The 
present day communities have evolved from the reducciones.
^^Ibid.. pp. 88-89. ^^Ibid.. pp. 91-95.
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which were established during the rule of Spain, and the 
Spanish ayllus which were also introduced during the colonial 
period. 70 The I950 census in Peru listed some 1,500 Indian 
communities', although there is reason to assume there are 
more, and they contained in excess of 1 million inhabi­
tants .
The Peruvian Constitution gives the native communi­
ties constitutional status. The communities are, it says, 
entities which "have a legal existence and juridical personal­
ity" (Art, 2 0 7), The State "guarantees the integrity of the 
property" (Art. 208), and "the property of the communities 
is imprescriptible and inalienable^; except in the case of 
expropriation on account of public utility; on payment of 
compensation" (Art. 209). Furthermore''; "the state shall en­
deavor to provide by preference lands for the native communi­
ties who do not possess them in sufficient quantity for their 
needs', and may expropriate lands in private ownership for 
this purpose" (Art, 211). Finally, "the state shall issue 
the civil, penal, economic, educational, and administrative 
legislation which the peculiar conditions of the natives 
demand." (Art. 212).
In practice^; the current system operates more like 
the colonization systems in Mexico than as the ejido in
^^Ayllus were systems where the whole community owned 
the land. Reducciones "were a synthesis of the ayllu and 
the Spanish village," Ford, o£. cit.. p. 9 7.
"̂ Îbid.. p. 96.
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Mexico. The families consider certain plots to be their 
own', and operate them as such. The size of the family hold­
ings differ considerably, and they are willed to their off­
spring. Redistribution of land no longer takes place, and 
individual holders may sell their shares. Sale is restricted, 
however, by community sanctions to members of the community. 
Adjoining lands may be purchased by members of the community, 
after which they are part of the community for legal purposes, 
A major advantage to many members of the community is that 
of mutual aid which is still very much in vogue. Under the 
direction of local officials*", some conservation measures are 
often carried out,72
There has been considerable unrest among the Sierra 
Indians in recent years. The problem appears to be connected 
with their demands for more land"; land which must come frpm 
nearby ranches or haciendas, James C, Carey has pointed out 
that there were I95 Indian peasant invasions of the haciendas 
between July, I9 6 2, and early I9 6 5. Some 80 to 110 persons 
were killed in the fighting which ensued. Accprding to 
Carey,
only the fact that the Indians are disorganized and
separated by mountains, valleys, deserta, jungles 
and even language prevents them from taking more 
directly furious action. Communists, or alleged 
communists'̂ , , . , have tried to rouse the peasantry 
from its lethargy and to incite them to concerted violent action.73
"̂^Ibidv, pp. 97-9 9. 
73carey", 0£, cit.; p. 325^
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As early as August, 1956» President Prado set up a 
commission on land reform and housing. Pedro Beltran, later 
a prime minister, headed the body which drafted a comprehen­
sive agrarian law in September, I96O. Qhe proposal provided 
for a wgradualistic" approach to the land problem, but in its 
final stages would have seen the purchase and distribution 
of about 25 percent of the useable land in Peru, The land 
would be bought with funds set aside in the annual budget, 
income from new taxes, and loans from abroad. The proposal, 
strongly opposed by many landowners, was sent to Congress 
in late i9 6 0. It was never acted upon by that body.’̂^
The military Junta issued a decree in November, I962, 
which was to lay the base for agrarian reform in Peru.75 it 
may be said that more was left out of the law, however, than 
was Included in it; 76 nevertheless, it was quite extensive 
in scope.77
The military government used the Institute de Reforma 
Agraria % Colonizacion (IBAC), first set up by Prado, as the 
national agency to give immediate direction to agrarian re-
7I1,Carrol, w .  cit.. pp. 194-95; Erickson, et al..
on. cit.'. pp. 456-^.
75wBases de la Reforma Agraria," No. 14238 de I9 6 2.
7^For some important provisions not included in the 
law see Uniôn Panamericana, Estudio Social. 1963-64. on. cit..
p. 1 4 7.
77ihe main provisions of the law are outlined in OAS, Economic Survey of Latin America, I962, op. cit., pp.
233- 34.
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form laws In Peru. It would in turn receive direction from 
the National Agrarian Reform Council» a body chaired by the 
Minister of Agriculture, The lEAC took a first step in 
agrarian reform in March, I 963, when it declared some 2 3  
estates, which had about 125,000 acres of land in cultivation 
to be subject to expropriation. The land was located in La 
Convenci6n Valley, Department of Cuzco, and was destined to 
be the place of settlement for about 1 4 , 0 0 0  tenants and 
workers living in the area.^^
Belaunde lost little time, after his election in 
July, 1963, in offering Congress his land reform proposals. 
His bill, presented to Congress in early October, I 963, 
called for a five-year plan to provide land, credit and tech­
nical assistance to 1 00 ,000 small farmers and landless 
peasants. Much of his program would be paid for with a loan 
from the United States. In Belaunde»s initial message to 
Congress, he indicated that he had talked personally with 
some of the Indian community leaders, and had secured from 
them promises to halt further invasions of private holdings. 
About the same time, he announced that he had held talks 
with the Pernandini family, who owned a 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  acre estate 
in Pasco, and that they had agreed to sell the property to 
the government. Similar talks, hé indicated, were taking 
place with other large land owners, including the Cerro de
78Erickson, et al.« on. cit.. p. 457»
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Pasco Corporation:, a United States-owner mining operation 
which held more than 1 .2 5  million acres of land in the
Sierra.79
There was the expected opposition to President 
Belaunde*s agrarian reform bill. Pull-page advertisements 
were placed in most of Peru's daily newspapers denouncing 
the program. In them, the landowner's organizations de­
plored the land invasions which were taking place, and 
criticized the government for not taking more direct action 
to stop them.®® As pointed out earlier in this study, there 
was considerable opposition to the proposed law within the 
Congress. Nevertheless, a new law was passed in May, 1964.
The new act, as described by Carey, has the following 
objectives :
distribution of land to the landless (allotments must 
be farmed and not rented out); protection of land farmed 
efficiently; elimination of small plots; introduction of 
modem agricultural techniques; consolidation of Indian 
communities; development of cooperatives; preservation 
of the sugar industry; rationalization of irrigation; 
destruction of feudalism; encouragement of peasant leader­
ship; punishment of peasant leaders who raid and seize 
land; encouragement of family farming; denial of indivi­
dual ownership in Indian "communities;" promotion of 
colonization in areas of unimproved land; and the fi­
nancing of industry through agrarian debt,81
It is impossible at this time (I967) to evaluate the
79 
^Ibid.
New York Times. October 6 , I9 6 3, p. 32.
80n
onCarey, a£. cit.. p. 324.
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agrarian reform law of 1964, At least one recent report has 
indicated that in some cases the program does not seem to he 
taking hold very qnickly, while in other cases there is be­
lief that some progress is being made,®^
United States Aid and Agriculture and Land Reform
In President Johnson's Foreign Aid message to the 
Congress in February, I9 6 6, he re-emphasized the interest of 
the United States in agricultural and land reform progress 
in the developing countries. About the former, he pointed 
out that only the people and their leaders in the less 
developed world could make the needed changes, one of which 
was land reform, in order to develop economically. But, he 
promised, the United States would help,®3
With respect to agriculture, President Johnson noted 
that hunger continued to be one of the incessant problems of 
the less developed countries. The fact that food production 
is not keeping pace with the rising demands for it "is a 
catastrophe for all of us,” Agriculture production must be 
increased, the President pointed out, because the United 
States cannot, in the future, meet the world needs. The 
solution, he indicated is clears there must be "an all-out 
effort to enable the developing countries to supply their
^^New York Times. March 27, I96 6, p. 5.
^^The text of the message is found in U.S. Department 
of State, Bulletin. LIV, No, 1392, o r . cit.. pp. 321-22,
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own food needs, through their own production or through 
improved capacity to buy in the world market.
In order that the United States might neet its
responsibilities toward eliminating world hunger. President
Johnson proposed to the Congress that the Agency for
International Development
increase its efforts in the field of agriculture 
by more than one-third, to a total of nearly $500 
million. One-third of this total will finance im­
ports of fertilizer from the United States. The 
remainder will finance transfer of American farming 
techniques, the most advanced in the world; im­
provements of roads, marketing, and irrigation 
facilities; establishment of extension services, ~  
cooperatives and credit facilities; purchase of 
American farm equipment and pesticides; and re­
search on soil and seed improvements,
President Johnson made similar comments to the Latin 
American delegates at the Pan American Health Organization 
at Washington, D.C., August I7 , I966. He reminded the 
participants that farm production in Latin America, in order 
to meet anticipated demands, should increase by 6 percent 
every year for years to come. But, he pointed out, the 
current increase was only half that, because lands were 
lying idle, or operating at less than maximum capacity, 
production methods were inefficient and an extensive national 
market was non-existent. The elimination of such barriers
84Ibid,, p, 3 2 2,
8 4
The President immediately added that such programs 
would be beneficial to the farmers in the United States in 
that it would likely create greater demand for United States' 
exports. Ibid.
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to development, the President indicated, would require ex­
tensive planning in all phases of agricultural production.
©le United States, alone and through the United 
Nations has been an ardent supporter of agrarian land re­
form. In 1 9 5 1» at the Geneva meeting of the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations, the United States 
delegate, Isador Lubin, plainly outlined the position of 
his government. The pattern of land ownership in most of 
the less developed world, Mr. Lubin indicated, was such that 
it constituted a formidable barrier to "higher output and 
to higher standards of living." Existing conditions were 
such, he noted, that they "inevitably crush the hopes for 
economic betterment of those who work the land." In addi­
tion, "land reform is important not only because of its 
potential effect on incentives to production," but it may 
spell the difference "between explosive tensions and stabi­
lity, between apathy and hope, between serfdom and citizen­
ship." He continued:
We in the United States recognize that the attain­
ment of peace and stability depends to a considerable 
degree on immediate and positive steps to correct 
systems of land tenure which exploit the workers on 
the land, steps which will remove inequitable taxes on 
farm lands and agricultural products, eliminate un­
reasonably high rents and exorbitant interest rates 
on farm loans. Wm are of the firm confiction that 
peace and stability in many parts of the world will 
require the elimination of those economic and social
86U.S. Department of State, Bulletin. LV, No. 1419, 
o£. 0^., pp. 331-33.
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practices which work extreme hardship on rural 
people.
Shortly after Mr, Luhin outlined the United States 
position on land reform at Geneva, Mr, Willard L, Thorp, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, made 
similar comments at the Conference on World Land Tenure 
Problems held at Madison, Wisconsin, October 9» 1951.
After explaining to the Conference that leaders in both 
the United States and the United Nations were fully cognizant 
of the economics of small versus large scale land production 
units, Mr, Thorp continued:
We have, , , encouraged and supported the land- 
reform programs of other nations. We will continue 
that encouragement and support. You may be sure that 
we will continue, as we have in the past, to support 
land reforms through international organizations such 
as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, 
and the Food and Agriculture Organization,
In proposing the Act for International Development, 
1 9 6 2, administrative spokesmen explained that funds under 
the heading "Development Grants" would be used to give 
assistance to agriculture and land reform, "By changing 
tenant-landlord relationships through land reform and land 
distribution programs, market relationships by the organiza­
tion or rural cooperatives, and borrower-lender relation­
ships by providing agricultural credit," it was believed
®*̂ The speech is reprinted in U.S. Department of 
State, L ^ d  Reform. A World Challenge. Publication 444^ 
(Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 1952), pp.
27-44,
®®The full text of the address is carried in Ibid,,
pp. 54-5 6.
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that an important pressure would he felt among traditional 
institutions of the rural societies and encourage change and 
development.
During the years I96I-I963, United States grants and 
loans through AID for agriculture and related programs in 
Latin America was higher than for most other categories of 
assistance. Due to the progress Mexico had already made in 
this field, only small amounts were contributed by the United 
States, In Peru, substantial sums from the United States 
for agriculture and related development were granted,90
Summary
The role of agriculture in a developing country is 
a significant one. Ideally, a country should be able not 
only to satisfy its own demands for food, but, at least in 
the early stages of development, seek to establish an export 
surplus in agricultural products. For much of Latin America, 
the goal of agricultural self-sufficiency alone has not yet 
been realized.
Land reform may or may not be conducive to increased
production. Conditions existing in a particular country will 
determine whether it is wise. These conditions are not
®9u,a. Department of State, Act for International 
Development, op, clt,, pp, 69-70,
^^Union Panamericana, Estudio Social. 1963-64.
o l t , , pp, 235- 39,
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solely "economic," however, because as most authorities 
recognize, land reform may be necessary due to "social" 
causes as well. Because of either economic or social 
pressures, or both, most of the Latin American countries 
have passed agrarian reform laws.
There are extensive differences between the agri­
cultural and agrarian reform systems of Mexico and Peru,
In the former, early concern for the problem and subse­
quent programs to handle it, has put Mexico far ahead of 
Peru in this phase of development.
Agricultural production in Mexico has increased 
tremendously in the past 20 to 30 years. The increase has 
been so great that Mexico can presently feed itself and at 
the same time export surplus foodstuffs, thereby accruing 
a more adequate supply of foreign exchange. In Peru, agri­
cultural production has increased with respect to some 
commodities, and has decreased in others in relation to 
population growth, Peru continues to be an importer of a 
considerable amount of the food which its own people consume. 
Agrarian reform was first introduced in Mexico in 
1 9 1 5» In every administration since, some land has been re­
distributed, It was under Cardenas and JJopez Mateos that 
land redistribution found its greatest support and advance­
ment, By i9 6 0, almost half of Mexico's arable land was in 
ijidos, and Diaz Ordaz was able to report that more than 
three-fourths of the lands were in the hands of the peasants.
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Mexico has advanced, so far in the area of land, re­
form that it may have passed into a stage where emphasis is 
now more on colonization and land improvement programs than 
on the continued use of the ejido as a basic unit of pro­
duction. In fact, so much of Mexico»s land has been redis­
tributed that the government may now begin to concentrate 
on programs to get the surplus rural population off the farms 
and into the factories.
Agrarian reform in Peru is just beginning. The law 
of 196^ will not be easy to implement successfully because 
there is not the wide support for it which Mexicans have had 
for their program, at least in latter years. In addition, 
in the areas of Peru where reform is badly needed, parti­
cularly in the Sierra, centuries old habits and customs pro­
vide almost impenetrable barriers to the adoption of modem 
farming tools and methods.91
The progress which Mexico has made during the past 
50 years in increasing agricultural productivity, while at 
the same time satisfying the basic desire of many peasants 
to own land, reflects a state of political development found 
in few of the Latin American countries. The difficulty in
91In a study of land reform in Colombia, the author 
points out difficulties, similar to those found in Peru, 
which have impeded effective implementation of land reform 
attempts in that country since 1936. Ernest A. Duff, 
’•Agrarian Reform in Colombian Problems of Social Reform, ” 
(unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. University of Virginia,
196%), p. 331.
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getting an agrarian law passed, and the question of proper 
implementation thereafter, reflects the lack of political 
development in Peru.
Mexico’s agricultural sector is presently an asset 
to development in that country. The same cannot he said of 
Peru. The latter country may, however, have made a start.
The United States has fully supported agricultural 
development and land reform for many years. A substantial 
amount of the foreign assistance funds distributed through 
the Agency for International Development have been designated 
to this sector of the Latin American systems. Peru has 
received considerable sums for this purpose while Mexico’s 
funds for this sector has been relatively small.
CHAPTER VIII 
SU1-1I4ARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study was concerned with the concepts and uses 
of certain political and social factors affecting economic 
development in the less developed countries, and the extent 
to which they have been recognized in the United States' 
foreign assistance programs.
As recognized by most economists and many political 
scientists, there is a multitude of factors, often called 
"social," "political," and "cultural," which, in addition to 
those commonly labeled "economic," affect the developmental 
process in the less developed countries. No attempt was made 
to treat most of the forces and factors. Rather, four of 
them were singled out for specific study; "government," 
"population," "education," and "agriculture and land reform." 
These four were chosen because of the widespread interest in 
each one, because there is something of a consensus with re­
spect to their role, and because a considerable amount of
study has been given to each one.
The approach of the United States foreign assistance
program in general was surveyed, but emphasis in this study
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was on the Alliance for Progress. To dramatize the difficul­
ties of implementing the expressed goals of the United States 
foreign assistance program in Latin America, considerable 
attention was given to existing conditions in that region.
For purposes of more detailed case problems, two Latin American 
countries, Mexico and Peru, were singled out for further study.
In order to present the overall economic picture in 
Latin America, a general survey of the economy was included. 
Some of the more basic problems with which those countries have 
been faced in recent years include low per capita incomes; 
single product export systems; price instability; unfavorable 
terms of trade; balance of payments deficits; a decline in 
direct foreign investments; inflation; indirect and regressive 
taxes and inefficient tax administration systems, and a large 
percentage of the total labor force in agriculture.
Mexico and Peru have escaped or have grown apart from 
many of these common Latin American problems. Both countries 
are multiple-export systems, inflation has not been serious in 
either, and foreign investment or the lack thereof has not 
created serious economic and political problems. Exports have 
increased in both cases, but in Mexico the rise has been more 
pronounced. Finally, while the per capita income is relatively 
low in both Mexico and Peru, it is considerably higher in the 
former than in the latter.
Even with the multitude of problems which the state of 
îtexico still faces, Rostow has classified it as being at the 
"take-off" stage economically. Only one other nation in Latin
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America has rated this distinction--Argentina. Peru cannot 
be so classified at this time, but may, due to recent advances 
made in the country, be meeting the “pre-conditions” for take­
off. Perhaps more accurately Peru may be described as in a 
period of transition from the traditional society to the take­
off period.
Conclusions Applicable to the Factors Used
Government and Politics. This factor plays key roles 
in most development schemes. The ability of the government 
to act in accord with desired goals is itself determined by a 
number of factors, for example, unity, while it in turn must 
act to meet certain pre-conditions for further growth. At the 
very minimum, government can help plan a favorable environment 
for individual efforts conducive to development. At the maxi­
mum, government may become an active partner by not only pre­
paring development plans, but by extensive public investment 
in the economy.
The term “political stability” has been widely used to 
describe a state of affairs which is classified as being an 
asset to economic development. The term “political develop­
ment,” now used widely and especially by political scientists, 
is often used to describe a similar state of affairs and is 
also classified as an asset to economic development. The terms 
do not always, however, mean the same thing. The former has 
often been used as a synonym for democracy. The latter term 
is currently being used to describe systems which may tend
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more toward authoritarianism than democracy.
Population. There is a widely held view among econo­
mists that population growth may have important effects on 
economic development. The effects of population on economic 
development are determined by a number of variables affecting 
a particular case. If the case is one of "static overpopula­
tion," meaning that the economic growth rate is less than the 
population growth rate, the national per capita income follows 
a downward trend, and is consequently an antidevelopmenta1 
element. In countries with an "increasing population," a 
steadily increasing rate of investment is required to equip 
the new members of the society with the same goods and services 
as the rest.
Other variables determining the effects of population 
on development include the mortality rates, whether they are 
increasing or falling, and whether they are high or low in the 
adult population or among the nation's youth. High birth rates 
coupled with high death rates, a situation common in the less 
developed areas, is not economically beneficial; but low birth 
rates accompanied by low death rates creates a situation which 
encourages economic development.
Education. There is wide consensus about the role of 
this factor in affecting economic development. It is a first 
priority whose goal is to erase illiteracy; therefore, emphasis 
is on primary education. While it is difficult to measure the 
exact influence of a literate population on the developmental
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process, it has been shown generally that a correlation does 
exist. Most of the developed states have had a 40 percent or 
higher literacy rate before take-off toward economic develop­
ment began. It is, however, not enough to have a literate 
population to meet the preconditions for take-off. But com­
bined with other conditions, it becomes a necessary element.
There has been less concern for the effects of secon­
dary education on the developmental process. Nevertheless, 
there is wide agreement that students above the elementary 
grades should be specializing in such fields as engineering, 
agriculture, science and vocational areas, rather than concen­
trating in popular areas such as law, philosophy, and the 
humanities,
Agriculture and Land Reform, Most studies of the less 
developed countries give extended treatment to the influence 
of the agricultural sector on the developmental process. The 
first prerequisite of this sector of the economy is to supply 
sufficient food to feed the population. As production increases 
there may be an expanded supply of foreign exchange or it may 
decrease the supply of foreign exchange needed for food. The 
surplus income from increased production may be used as invest­
ment in the industrial sector.
In most instances, and particularly in Latin America, 
land reform is considered as being basically an integral part 
of the overall agricultural problem. The goal is greater pro­
duction, which may or may not be aided by redistributing the
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land; only circumstances in a given country will determine 
that answer. Land reform has not been, however, a response to 
solely economic methods of more efficient production. It has 
often been carried out in response to social demands.
These four factors, singly or combined, create very 
important influences on the developmental process. Of the 
four, government and politics may be classified as the most 
important. The politically developed systems can more ade­
quately handle the problems created by the other three factors, 
although it must be pointed out that the other factors could 
operate as an impediment to the establishment of a politically 
developed state.
Conclusions Regarding the Use of Four 
Factors in United States* Foreign 
Assistance Programs
In studying the major foreign assistance acts of the 
1950's and the 1960's, it was found that Congress stipulated 
some general guides, which were closely associated with the 
goals, for the implementation of the assistance programs. Most 
Congressional acts and related documents have clearly stated 
that the United States' aid programs were designed to promote 
the foreign policy of the United States. Other considerations 
have been listed, but they are secondary.
From the beginning of the foreign assistance programs. 
Congress made it clear that conditions, determined by the United 
States, would be attached to receipt of the funds. As early 
as 1951, Congress specified that the director of the Mutual
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Security Agency make assurances that a recipient's fiscal, 
budgetary, and political resources be conducive to the success­
ful operation of the development assistance funds. In more 
specific terms. Congress has repeatedly indicated that funds 
would be spent in such a way that they would help not only to 
eliminate barriers to free enterprise, but would provide in­
centives for it.
Throughout the life of the foreign assistance programs, 
the Congress has entertained arguments pro and con with respect 
to the most effective and efficient method of channeling funds 
to the developing countries. There have been ample warnings 
about the political consequences of bilateral aid programs.
The merits of the multilateral approach has had wide publicity; 
therefore, in continuing to use the former means. Congress has 
not done so blindly.
It was the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that expressed 
more explicitly than any acts had done up to that time the con­
ditions upon which foreign grants and loans would be made.
The principle of self-help was again emphasized; and it was in 
that Act that Congress made it clear that social development, 
as well as economic development, was a goal of United States' 
policy makers. Even here, however, just as in most other aid 
programs. Congress gave great discretion to aid administrators 
in determining thé exact conditions which should be met. Many 
of these conditions, however, had already been specifically 
outlined in Alliance documents.
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With respect to the factor “government and politics,” 
both Congress and aid administrators have made it clear that 
one of the goals of the aid program in general, and especially 
in Latin America, is the building of political democracy. Re­
peated emphasis on the “social basis of democracy,” the desire 
“to end tyranny,” the fact that “social change is a necessity," 
and “the Alliance is one of free governments,” have been made, 
“Political stability” and "political development” have been 
declared goals. In fact, it is quite clear that Congress has 
tended to equate development with democracy. In a number of 
cases, including that of Peru in 1962, aid was temporarily 
halted when political c o u p s  removed the constitutionally elected 
head of state.
The United States has handled the “population" problem 
carefully. Only recently, and then primarily from administra­
tive sources, has a more direct position been detectable. It 
has recently become clear, for example, that the United States 
is concerned about the world-wide population “explosion,” par^ 
ticularly as it affects development in the low income countries. 
It is their problem, leaders in the developing countries have 
been told, but the United States is willing to help them when 
requested to do so. Only last year, spokesmen for the Agency 
for International Development indicated that assistance was 
available, upon request, for helping countries set up institu­
tions for solving their population crises.
In regard to education, the United States' position
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has been consistent and clear. Through the foreign assistance 
programs, the improvement in educational facilities and instruc­
tion has been emphasized. The Charter of Punta del Este and 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, gave further impetus to 
education in Latin America as well as other less developed 
areas. Only last year. President Johnson suggested that still 
further encouragement be given to this field.
Since the early 1950's, the United States has been a 
firm supporter of increased attention to the agricultural sec­
tor and to programs of land reform. At least by implication, 
the United States has indicated that it supports land reform 
for social as well as economic reasons. President Johnson has 
made repeated statements reminding the Latin American countries 
of their Punta del Este commitments to redistribute the land.
Of the four factors studied. Congress and the aid ad­
ministrators have taken less direct action on "population" 
than any of the others. The reason for this is quite clear: 
the religious objections to a more direct program of birth 
control, particularly in Latin America. While Congress has 
yet to speak with a clear voice concerning the use of funds 
for this purpose, aid administrators are pursuing a course of 
more positive action.
Conclusions With Respect to Applying the 
Conditions in Latin America
Political traditions and cultures are such in many of 
the Latin American countries that successfully implementing the
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factor "government" is not an easy one. It is even more dif­
ficult because the United States interprets the goal as demo­
cratic government. The ease with which implementation of this 
factor may take place, however, varies widely from country to 
country.
The governing system of Ifexico has been a stable one 
at least since 1940, and the movement toward political develop­
ment and democracy has been steady. Mexico has, therefore, 
been a model for the successful implementation of Alliance 
goals. In fact, many of the reforms called for at Punta del 
Este had already been effectively instituted in the Mexican 
state. The status of political development and democracy in 
Peru, remains nebulous. Neither can be said, at this time, to 
have become a reality. Therefore, whether such programs as 
the recently passed Agrarian Reform Law will be successfully 
implemented, remains a question.
With respect to "population," Latin America currently 
has one of the highest annual growth rates of any area of the 
world. But here again, it varies widely from country to coun­
try. Both Mexico and Peru have relatively high increases at 
the present time. In neither country is there any indication 
that the government intends to set upon a program of birth 
control at this time, although non-governmental association and 
organizations, which are encouraging the use of birth control 
devices, are currently operating in both republics. In neither 
case has the government taken measures to curb the activities
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of these private groups.
There appears little likelihood that the Latin American 
governments will, as such, take more positive approaches to 
curbing population growth as long as the position of the Roman 
Catholic Church remains opposed to it. In the meantime,
Mexico will be better able to absorb a high population in­
crease than Peru because of its more highly developed status.
Most of the governments of Latin America have been 
stressing the importance of education. This is especially 
true of Mexico and Peru. Both countries currently have about 
12 percent of their total populations enrolled in primary 
schools, and both countries are currently allocating about 25 
percent of their annual expenditures for this function. The 
literacy rate of Mexico is, however, far in advance of that of 
Peru, with something like 70 to 75 percent in the former com­
pared with only about 45 percent in the latter.
Support for increased agricultural production has been 
almost unanimous among leaders in the Latin American Republics. 
Even so, food production since the launching of the Alliance 
in 1961 has barely kept pace with the population growth. The 
solution to the problem undoubtedly lies in the massive incor­
poration of modem technology into the agricultural sector, and 
the redistribution of lands which are currently being used in 
only minimum production. Aid funds are being expended for 
both, and about three-fourths of the countries have adopted 
agrarian reform programs of some type.
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Both Mexico and Peru have had agricultural and land 
reform problems. In the former, agricultural production has 
increased to the point where some of it may now be exported.
Part of Mexico's success may be attributed to its land redis­
tribution program which began as early as 1915. Distribution 
continued well into the 1960's, and has been slowed primarily 
because most all available land has been redistributed.
Agricultural production in Peru has not grown to the 
point where the Peruvians can fully feed themselves. Peru con­
tinues to import some of its foodstuffs. At the same time, 
there have been outbreaks of violence in the highlands, caused 
primarily by Indians who want more land and who have invaded 
the adjoining haciendas. In response to these cries for land, 
recent administrations, including the military junta, have sup­
ported some type of reform.
The Hypothesis Validated
The initial hypothesis of this study was that these 
four factors which influence economic development have been 
given serious concern and consideration in carrying out the 
foreign assistance program of the United States. The hypothesis 
has been validated. Three of the factors used have been given 
more serious consideration than the fourth. The latter, 
"population" signifies what may be a new undertaking in the 
distribution of the foreign assistance funds of the United 
States.
In a more general way, victor L. Urquidi's following
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remarks provide an adequate summary for this study: "The
social aspects of economic development and the economic as­
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